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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the 
influence and. impact of foreign direct investment 
inflow into the Republic of Korea. It is also an 
investigation of the development of the Korean 
economy. 
The 'research investigates the relationship between 
foreign direct investment and the development of the 
Korean economy by examining both the macro and micro 
aspects of the relationship between the two. This 
involves considering the performance of the Korean 
economy as a whole and then taking a more detailed 
approach by treating the analysis of the relationship 
at the level of individual industrial sectors. It also 
involves investigating the role played by the Korean 
government in the development of the economy and the 
control of foreign direct investment inflow. 
The analysis uses a two stage approach, first by taking 
an exploratory correlation analysis of the interaction 
between the inflow and'a series of key variables, which 
allows a number of tentative conclusions to be drawn. 
By using these conclusions in conjunction with the 
literature survey we were able to analyse the nature 
and impact of foreign direct investment in Korea using 
regression analysis. 
The analysis revealed that except for isolated 
instances, the influence of the inflow of foreign 
direct investment at either the macro-or micro level is 
long-term. The positive effect of the inflow appears 
to be strongest on Gross National Product and Gross 
Domestic Product and on exports rather than imports. 
The results from the principal industrial sectors 
suggest that greatest impact was when the inflow was 
associated with larger firms. Furthermore the results 
suggest that the country of origin of the investment 
may well have an influence. In addition the research 
highlights the importance of the role played by the 
Korean government. 
PREFACE 
The economy of the Republic of Korea has undergone a 
complete transformation since the early sixties, when 
Korea was one of the poorest nations in the world. The 
Koreans are now challenging many of the established 
industrialised nations and hope shortly to become an 
member of the O. E. C. D. 
Taking the position of e 
as a government of 
considering the lessons 
development, then an 
played by foreign direct 
of the Korean economy. 
ither the Korean government, or 
another developing country 
that can be drawn from Korea's 
important issue is the role 
investment in. the development 
To attempt to understand this we need to consider the 
importance of Korea, as it is one of a small number of 
developing countries classed as the Newly 
Industrialising Countries. In addition, we have to 
examine the function of foreign direct investment in 
the development of less developed countries. This is a 
highly contentious issue, though it can be encompassed 
in a number of benefits and costs to the host country. 
We undertake to develop the issues surrounding foreign 
direct investment inflow in chapter one. 
We then need to examine how Korea has developed and 
the central role played by the Korean government in the 
development of the economy, investigating the special 
i 
position given to manufacturing and manufactured 
exports, which have been used by the Korean government 
as the engine of growth for the economy. We cover this 
in chapters two and three. 
In chapter four we investigate the Korean government's 
attitude towards foreign direct investment and the 
controls placed upon the inflow. We also examine the 
size, direction and origin of the foreign direct 
investment inflow. 
We then can analyse the relationship between foreign 
direct investment and the economy using an exploratory 
analysis in chapter five and regression analysis in 
chapter six. This analysis takes place at both a macro 
and micro level. The analysis examines both the 
economy as a whole and industry and its attendent 
industrial sectors. 
This leads us to our conclusions in chapter seven. We 
hope that our research does lead to a greater 
understanding of the nature and importance of foreign 
direct investment to a developing country. 
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large number of people. My special thanks have to go 
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not only given a great deal of support and direction 
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rewritten chapter, overcoming my english on the way. 
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Chapter One 
Korea, the N. I. C's and Development 
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter one includes a short introduction to the 
Republic of Korea and introduces Korea and the Newly 
Industrialising Countries. 
It would be inappropriate to commence a study on the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) without first 
mentioning that Korea is not the only Less Developed 
Country (L. D. C) that has managed to grow at a rapid and 
sustained pace over the past twenty years. There are 
in fact a number of such countries who as a group are 
known as the, Newly Industrialising Countries (N. I. C's), 
though Korea is said to belong to a sub-group 
containing the most successful of the N. I. C's, who are 
all from the Far East and are collectively known as the 
Four Tigers or Four Little Dragons (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong). 
It is also important before we examine the case of 
Korea in depth that we investigate the testimony both 
for and against foreign direct investment in less 
developed countries. To do this we have to consider 
the perceived, costs and benefits and discuss the 
evidence presented by both supporters and critics of 
foreign direct investment in less developed countries. 
Finally we will review a number of empirical studies of 
less developed countries and-foreign direct investment. 
1 
1.2 The Republic Of Korea 
The Republic of Korea, commonly known as South Korea, 
has historical records dating back to 2333 B. C, with 
its own distinct culture and language. Recent Korean 
history has seen the country occupied by the Japanese 
in 1910 and involved in a bitter and ruinous war when 
the communist North Korea invaded the south in June 
1950. The war which lasted for three years left the 
South Koreans with a devastated country and economy. 
South Korea's economic recovery can be dated from the 
early sixties, when the military led by General Park 
Chung Hee seized power in 1961. Korea was again thrown 
into political 'turmoil when President Park was 
assassinated in 1979, which was not settled until 
former General Chun Doo Hwan took up office in August 
1980, leading the country to further economic 
expansion. The style of government could be described 
as autocratic and centralised but with a very pragmatic 
approach to economic development, with the government 
playing a leading role in economic development. 
The Korean climate has four distinct seasons, a spring 
which runs through March to May, summer which takes up 
June, July and August, an autumn which lasts until 
november and winter. Temperatures range from a maximum 
of 98 F (hot and humid) to a minimum of 10 F. 
South Korea occupies the southern part of the Korean 
peninsula, with Japan to the east and China to the west 
and is roughly equivalent in size to Portugal. 
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South Korea has a total land area of 99,117 square 
kilometres (1984) and a population of over 40 million, 
making it one of the most densely populated countries 
in the world. Over 60% of the population lives in the 
cities with the greatest concentration living around 
the capital Seoul, which now has a population 
approaching 9.5 million, with the next largest city 
being Busan with 3.5 million. 
The level of educational achievement in Korea is very 
high, with a literacy rate of 97.5%. In 1984,91% of 
all Koreans attended secondary school and 26% went on 
to further education, compared to only 20% in the U. K. 
The Korean economy has developed rapidly in the past 
twenty years, taking South Korea from the position of 
being one of the world's poorest economies to become 
one of Asia's major industrial powers. An indication 
of the growth is the change in per capita G. N. P, which 
was only $82 in 1961, advancing to $591 by 1975 and 
reaching $1,999 in 1984 as the economy continued to 
expand. The country has developed an industrial base 
with few natural resources, using the countrys well 
educated and disciplined labour force, to first develop 
the labour intensive light industries such as textiles 
and then developing the heavy industries as the economy 
expanded. 
This expansion has been based on the use of centralised 
planning based on the Korean government's 'Five Year 
Economic Development Plans', the first of which was 
promulgated in 1962, and on the outward oriented export 
4 
policy pursued by the government. Exports which were 
barely $40 million in 1961 had increased to over $29 
billion by the end of 1984, with manufactured goods 
increasing from $15 million to over $27 billion in the 
same period. 
The Koreans have relied heavily on foreign capital as ä 
source of investment, though much of this has been in 
the form of loans rather than foreign direct investment 
(see chapter 4). While this has been true, the nature 
of foreign funds entering Korea is now changing as the 
government liberalises the economy and the controls on 
foreign direct investment. 
Korea has developed into one of the most powerful of 
the so called Newly Industrialising Countries, and as 
the economy continues to develop with the expansion of 
the high technology skill intensive industries, the 
Koreans are now on the verge of membership of the 
0. E. C. D. 
1.3 The Newly Industrialising Countries 
Since the mid-sixties a number of developing countries 
have become an important part of World manufactured 
trade. Within a fairly short period of time they have 
transformed their primary based economies, initially 
using their comparative advantage in the labour 
intensive manufacturing industries. The more 
successful of the N. I. C's now making their presence 
felt in the higher technology fields, previously the 
sole domain of the industrialised nations. 
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1.3.1 Who are the N. I. C's ? 
There is a measure of disagreement as to which 
countries actually should be grouped under the N. I. C 
name. Balassa (1979) defined the N. I. C's as "countries 
that had per capita incomes between $1100 and $3500 in 
1978 and where the share of the manufacturing sector in 
the Gross Domestic Product (G. D. P) was 20% or higher in 
1977" p. This gave rise to a list of some 15 countries 
which included Argentina. Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico 
from Latin America, 'in the Far East Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore and finished with Israel, 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey from 
amongst the O. E. C. D. 
Neil McMullen (1982), in 'The newly industrialising 
countries: Adjusting to success', concentrated on Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and India. 
Finally the O. E. C. D use what is a fairly restricted 
list of only 10 countries adding to McMullen's list 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia but leaving out 
Argentina and India. Using this list it is possible to 
highlight the importance of the N. I. C's. 
Taking figures for international trade, then the 6 non- 
European N. I. C's as defined by the O. E. C. D, viz 
Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan all appear among the leading exporting 
countries, which represented 80% of all world exports 
in 1984. These six countries exported a combined total 
of $163.5bn in 1984, which was approximately 8.4% of 
6 
world exports. 
Table 1-1 World Trade 1970-1984 
(U. S $ billions) 
1970' 1975 1980 1984 
Total World Trade 312 872 1,973 11901 
Less Developed Countries 48 125 321 466 
Brazil 39 20 27 
Hong Kong 36 20 28 
Mexico 13 16 24 
Singapore 25 19 24 
South Korea 15 18 29 
Taiwan 2 .... 30 
Source: G. A. T. T International Trade,, various years 
Table 1-1 illustrates the growing importance of the non 
European N. I. C's, in 1970 they represented only 3.4% 
($10.53bn) of world trade, by 1984 this had reached 
8.4% ($163.5bn). This gives an annual average growth 
rate of over 21% compared to 13% for all countries. 
South Korea's volume of world trade increased 35 fold 
in value terms between 1970 and 1984, giving an annual 
average growth rate of approximately 29% and if 
considered from 1965 this rises to 31%. 
1.3.2 The Evolution of the N. I. C's 
From the figures presented in Table 1-1 we can see that 
. 
the six Third World N. I. C's have emerged as a force to 
be reckoned with in international trade. 
An examination of Tables 1-2 and 1-3 shows that there 
are considerable differences between the six countries. 
In terms of size there is a considerable diversity 
amongst them, their sizes range from a mere 1,000 
7 
square kilometres for Hong kong and Singapore to 8.5 
million square kilometres for Brazil. Similarly with 
their populations, which range from 2.5 million for 
Singapore to 126 million in Brazil. Given the size of 
population and the relatively small land areas, Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Singapore are among the most 
densely populated countries in the World. 
When considering their economic standing using Gross 
National Product per Capita, even the richest of the 
six is still well behind the average for the industrial 
economies, though they have exhibited growth rates far 
in excess of the industrialised nations. 
Table 1-2 Economic Comparisons 
Population G. N. P' per capita Annual Rate 
1984 Growth Rate Inflation 
(millions) 1984 1960-1984 1973-84 1984 
Brazil 131.4 1,720 4.6 71.4 203.3 
Hong Kong 5.4 6,330 6.2 9.8 8.2 
Mexico 77.0 2,040 2.9 31.5 78.9 
Singapore 2.5 7,260 7.8 4.4 2.6 
South Korea 40.6 2,110 6.6 17.6 2.3 
Taiwan 18.9 7.02 0.0 
Industrial 
Economies .. 15,430 2.4 7.9 
Source: World Development Report 1986 
World outlook 1986 
1 U. S $ 
2 Estimate 
In addition the figures from table 1-2 show the 
problems caused by inflation and the difficulties 
facing Brazil and'Mexico. 
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A major difference between the six N. I. C's is that the 
Latin American countries have considerable mineral 
resources, while the four Far Eastern economies have 
little or no raw material resource base, which means 
that they are virtually totally dependent on imports. 
One factor that does unite the N. I. C's is the changing 
structure of their economies, as they all move away 
from dependency on agriculture and develop their 
manufacturing industries. 
Table 1-3 Industrial Composition 1960-1984 
Distribution of G, D. P (%) 
Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
1965 1984 1965 1984 1965 1984 1965 1984 
Brazil 19 13 33 35 26 27 48 52 
Hong Kong 21 40 22 24 24 58 78 
Mexico 14 9 31 40 21 24 54 52 
South Korea 38 14 25 40 18 28 37 47 
Singapore 31 24 39 15 25 73 60 
Industrial 
Economies 53 39 35 29 25 56 62 
Source: World Development Report 1986 
[Figures for Taiwan not available] 
Table 1-3 illustrates the changes in their economies. 
Taking South Korea as an example, agriculture's share 
of G. D. P has reduced from 38% in 1965 to 14% by 1984, 
while industry's share increased from 25% to 40% during 
the same period. Also the N. I. C's exhibited very high 
growth rates, with the Tigers showing the highest 
growth rates. Even with this change it is evident that 
the larger of the N. I. C's are still more dependent on 
agriculture than the industrialised economies and that 
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their service industries still lag far behind. 
1.3.3 Factors for Success 
Given the diversity that exists amongst the six Third 
World N. I. C's, what if any are the common factors that 
could possibly explain their success? McMullen (1982) 
highlighted five specific conditions that had some 
influence on 'the development of these countries and 
led to them becoming N. I. C's. 
1. The rate of growth in the World economy, which 
provided demand for exports from the N. I. C's. 
2. The level of educational attainment set them apart 
from the other less developed countries. 
This is particularly true of the smaller Asian N. I. C's 
where literacy rates reached over 90%. In 1981 South 
Korea could claim that 85% of children had enrolled in 
secondary -school, in comparison to only 27% in 1960, 
also 18% of all 20 to 24 year olds were in higher 
education, which compares favourably with Britain which 
had 20% in higher education in 1981. 
3. Political stability appeared to be a necessary 
condition to allow a rapid increase in industrial 
output and a sustained entry into foreign markets. 
4. The resource poor nature of some of the N. I. C's can 
possibly be taken as a spur to industrialisation as 
they lacked opportunities to develop natural 
resources or agriculture as a source of foreign 
exchange. 
This could be said to be particularly true for the 
Asian N. I. C's. 
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5. The N. I. C's share, at least to some degree, their 
experience of transforming their closed inward- 
looking and import-substituting development 
strategies into much more open export-oriented 
ones' 
Korea has suffered from increased labour and political 
unrest since 1986, with calls for greater democracy and 
a fairer distribution of wealth which has presented an 
increasing challange to Korea's ability to continue to 
develop without significant changes. 
The means of achieving it, the timing and intensity of 
development has differed from nation to nation, but it 
is this outward looking policy that can be identified 
as a significant factor in their success. The 
importance of this outward looking policy has also been 
highlighted by Balassa and in an O. E. C. D report on the 
impact of the N. I. C's published in 1979. 
1.3.4 Inward and Outward Strategies 
An inward oriented strategy is characterised by the use 
of import substitution, which tends to discriminate 
against exports and is directed towards the domestic 
market, with the intention of replacing intermediate 
and durable imports with domestic production. 
This is usually achieved by using tariff and import 
controls, which bring with them high protection levels 
which lead to a tendency to discriminate against 
manufactured and primary exports. An inward oriented 
policy encourages the formation of what can be 
described as a 'sellers' market, which produces 
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considerable intra-industry affects. It leads to the 
stifling of competition, buffers local industry from 
world as well as from domestic competition, and results 
in higher costs with little incentive to improve 
productivity. This results in a position where there 
is less risk associated with domestic production than 
with exporting and this damages the development of a 
manufacturing export sector. The tendency is for the 
formation of an over-protected, inefficient and 
expensive domestic manufacturing sector, with the 
consequence that exports are not competitive and that 
the domestic industries depend on protectionism for 
survival. The result of such a policy produces 
industries with a vested interest in prolonging a 
protectionist policy. The effects of an import 
substituting strategy only become apparent over a long 
period of time. 
The six Third World N. I. C's have all gone through an 
import substituting phase. The length of the phase has 
differed from country to country and from industry to 
industry. The time has by and large depended upon the 
perception of the returns from import substitution or, 
as in the case of South Korea, the limitation on the 
further productive opportunities for this policy 
(chapter 2, section 2.3.2). The Korean government 
became. convinced that the scope for continuing 
productive and effective import substitution had become 
negligible by the early 1960's. In contrast Brazil and 
Mexico did not move to a more outward looking policy 
(4 
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until the mid 1960's and did not move as far as the 
Asian N. I. C's. 
An O. E. C. D2 report'stated that: 
"The main aims of outward looking growth policies are 
faster and more efficient economic growth through an 
improved allocation of domestic and foreign resources". 
Outward oriented strategies use incentives and the 
control of exchange rates and domestic demand to 
stimulate growth. Such a policy involves a number of 
factors such as exchange rate adjustment, incentives 
for export production, subsidies and taxes to guide 
exporters and tight control of domestic money and 
demand. An outward oriented strategy can result in the 
export sector of the economy being used as an 'engine 
for growth', by permitting greater efficiency, 
economies of scale with the efficient use of import 
substitution and foreign competition to stimulate the 
economy as a whole. 
In particular it has enabled the Asian N. I. C's to make 
best use of their comparative advantages, by 
encouraging them to compete in the labour intensive 
industries, to take advantage of their relatively cheap 
but well trained labour forces. 
The results of adopting a strong outward looking policy 
can be illustrated by Chart 1. All of the Asian 
N. I. C's show remarkable growth records. This 
illustrates the dramatic growth exhibited by the six 
N. I. C's, and also highlights the difference in 
performance between the two Latin American and the four 
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Asian N. I. C's. Both Mexico and Brazil had G. D. P growth 
rates of around 5% with exports expanding at 7 and 9% 
respectively. This is as good as any of the 
industrialised nations but is well behind the rates 
exhibited by the Asian 'Tigers', who all have G. D. P 
growth rates of above 8%, with export growth ranging 
from close to 11% to over 14% in the case of Korea. 
Chart 1 
Export and Economic Growth of Leading Exporters 1973-84 
Growth of 
real 10 
domestic 
product Hong Kong* South Korea 
(%) 8 Singapore* 
Taiwan 
6 
4 
Mexico* *Brazil 
*Japan 
*U. S 
2 *F. R. G 
*U. K 
02468 10 12 14 16 
Growth of export volume (%) 
Source: International Trade 1984/85 
1.3.5 Economic Performance 
Given the outward looking policies pursued and the 
growth of exports, the impact on manufacturing has as 
already indicated in Table 1-3 been very dramatic. 
This can also be said for manufacturing exports. 
A high percentage of the growth shown in Chart 1 is 
directly attributable to the growth of manufactured 
exports. From table 1-4, the expansion in the value 
of manufactured exports is quite evident, as is the 
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change in the composition of exports, with manufactured 
exports becoming the major component of total exports 
by 1984/85 for the Asian N. I. C's. The reduced size and 
importance of the manufactured exports for the two 
Latin American countries is a reflection of their 
mineral resource base. Only Japan had a greater level 
of manufactured exports (97%) than Taiwan or South 
Korea. 
Table 1-4 Manufactured Exports 
Manufactured % of Total 
Exports Exports 
1965 1975 1980 1984 1960 1984 
Brazil 0.1 2.2 4.3 7.6 3 41 
Hong Kong 1.0 5.6 18.0 19.5 80 93 
Hexico 0.1 0.9 1.7 3.2 12 39 
Singapore 0.3 2.2 9.0 11.6 26 56 
South Korea 0.1 4.1 15.7 26.8 14 93 
Taiwan 0.2 4.3 18.0 27.7 .. 91 
Source: World Development Report various years 
International Trade various years 
With the growth of the economies came noticeably higher 
levels of investment. Domestic investment surged 
ahead, helped by the fact that private consumption 
lagged behind the growth in output which left space to 
increase investment. Once again the Asian N. I. C's led 
the advance, with domestic investment increasing at a 
greater rate in Singapore and South Korea than even in 
Jara... 
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Table 1-5 Consumption and Investment 
(Average annual growth rate (96)) 
Public 
Consumption 
65-73 73-84 
Private 
Consumption 
65-73 73-84 
Gross Domestic 
Investment 
65-73 73-84 
Brazil 7.3 3.1 10.2 4.9 11.3 6.5 
Hong Kong 6.9 9.2 9.5 9.9 3.7 9.7 
Mexico 8.7 6.8 7.7 4.7 8.4 3.3 
Singapore 16.3 6.5 9.9 6.2 22.7 9.5 
South Korea 7.3 5.4 8.7 5.9 19.7 8.8 
Industrialised 
Economies 3.2 2.5 4.9 2.6 5.4 0.9 
Japan 5.3 3.9 8.4 3.3 14.1 3.0 
Source: World Development Report 1986 
[figures for Taiwan not available] 
If there is one area which raises concern for the 
future of the N. I. C's it has to be their external debt 
position. This is not a problem facing all the N. I. C's 
but it has already caused severe economic difficulties 
for Brazil and Mexico, and threatened at one time to 
become a problem for South Korea. The debt burden has 
of course been a-problem for most of the developing 
countries; the debt service ratio for all the 
developing countries had increased to 21.1% by 1984. 
The problems facing Mexico and Brazil are evident. 
They have not been able to expand quickly enough to 
keep the ratio of debt to exports from rising rapidly, 
putting a great strain on their economies. 
Both Brazil and Mexico have increased their 
indebtedness, with Brazil's debt increasing to $66.5 
billion and Mexico owing $69 billion in 1984. Debt 
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servicing represented close to 80% for Brazil and 50% 
for Mexico in 1984. In 1984 Korean debt service 
repayments rose to $5.3 billion, representing 13.5% of 
exports, though since 1986 Korea has been able to start 
repaying a considerable amount of its outstanding debt 
and hopes to become a net creditor by the mid 1990's as 
long as the economy continues to grow. 
Table 1-6 Debt and Debt Service Ratios 
External Debt Service 
Debt to 
U. S $ million &% GNP G. N. P Exports 
1970 1984 1970 1984 1970 1984 
Brazil 3,236 66,502 0.9 4.1 12.5 26.6 
(7.1) (33.6) 
Hong Kong 2 270 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
(0.1) (0.8) 
Mexico 3,206 69,007 2.0 6.9 23.6 34.3 
(9.1) (42.8) 
Singapore 152 1,911 0.6 1.8 0.6 1.0 
(7.9) (10.6) 
South Korea 1,797 24,642 3.0 5.6 19.4 13.5 
(20.4) (30.4) 
Source: World Development Report 1986 
McMullen (1982) noted that: 
"The growing external debt burden is now a major force 
pushing the N. I. C's and the other developing countries 
to industrialise and export more manufactured 
goods" (p72). 
This also increased pressure on the N. I. C's to look at 
other forms of foreign financing including foreign 
direct investment. 
Debt is not the only threat to the N. I. C's; inflation 
and labour costs are also areas of concern. The 
average inflation rates shown in Table 1-2 show that 
inflation has been a prevalent problem for most of the 
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N. I. C's. Though the four . Asian N. I. C's brought 
inflation under control in the early eighties, both 
Brazil and Mexico continue to face severe difficulties, 
with inflation in 1984 registering 77% for Mexico and 
over to 200% for Brazil. 
While the Asian-N. I. C's can congratulate themselves for 
controlling inflation they are experiencing rising wage 
costs which threatens to erode their competitiveness. 
It is true to say that the Asian N. I. C's have all seen 
their wage costs rise and are experiencing growing 
competition from other low wage developing countries. 
1.3.6 The Future of the N. I. C's 
Of the six third world countries classified as Newly 
Industrialising Countries in the 1970's, both Brazil 
and Mexico can be considered to have lost their way, as 
economic growth has stagnated, inflation increased and 
the debt burden expanded. This leaves the four Asian 
Tigers, which also face problems, some of them 
economic, some political. All four have a good future 
if they can overcome the threats of protectionism form 
the developed countries, and can continue to develop 
their industries as they move to the next stage, 
membership of the O. E. C. D. 
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1.4 Foreign Direct Investment 
The role and effects of foreign direct investment 
(F. D. I) is an area of considerable discussion and 
disagreement. 
Kindleberger (1971) stated in 'American Business 
Abroad' that: 
"The valid economic arguments against this form of 
investment - monopoly exploitation, threat to infant 
industries or barrier to a second best solution of a 
problem in which access to the best is unattainable - 
are still good" (p145). 
This represents the views of many writers in the field. 
In an O. E. C. D study paper the following was stated: 
"F. D. I is considered by most developing host countries 
as a major instrument of their industrialisation". 
From these two statements it is apparent the there is a 
divergence of opinions on the effects of foreign direct 
investment. Is it a boon or a bane to a developing 
country? 
We need to investigate the supposed costs and benefits 
of foreign direct investment to less developed 
economies, in order to be able to gauge its effects on 
Korean development. 
1.4.1 Costs and Benefits 
There is a considerable body of work on the perceived 
costs and benefits of F. D. I, and as previously stated 
there is a considerable amount of disagreement on the 
overall impact of F. D. I. 
There is a measure of agreement that the costs and 
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benefits can be listed as either monetary (economic) 
or non-monetary, but as to their various weights there 
is considerable disagreement, with some writers 
virtually ignoring the non-monetary effects and others 
stating that this aspect is possibly the most important 
of all. 
Meier3 (1976) listed the benefits and costs as follows: 
It (F. D. I) can contribute to the development by, 
1. Helping to reduce the shortage of domestic savings. 
2. Increasing the supply of foreign exchange, it can 
permit: 
a) a more rapid expansion in real income, 
b) it eases the shortage of foreign exchange, 
c) it removes the necessity of resorting to a 
drive to self-sufficiency and deliberate 
stimulation of import substitution out of 
deference to foreign exchange considerations. 
It can also have a national economic benefit if value 
added to output is greater than the amount appropriated 
by the investor, in other words social returns exceed 
private returns. 
As long as F. D. I raises productivity benefits can 
accrue in: 
a) higher real wages, 
b) lower prices, 
c) the government can expand revenue, 
d) indirect gains. 
Within indirect gains are the following possible gains: 
An increase in technical knowledge, market information, 
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managerial and supervisory personnel, organisational 
expertise and innovations in products and production 
techniques. 
It can also act as a stimulus to domestic investment, 
encourage the host countrys industries by helping to 
reduce costs and encourage expansion, raise demand for 
output from other manufacturers due to the linkage and 
multiplier effects. 
On the debit side, Meier highlighted a number of key 
issues: 
1. The cost of the incentives and concessions given to 
attract investment may be so high as to cancel out 
any benefits accrued. 
2. The possible adverse effect on domestic saving, if 
the foreign investment is competing with home 
industries and reduces profits in domestic 
industries. 
3. Deterioration in terms of trade. 
4. Pressure on the balance of payments due to the 
return of profits, dividends and repatriation of 
capital. 
Many writers have similar lists to Meier, for instance 
Deepak Lal (1975)4, who concentrated more on the costs, 
giving only the following possible benefits: 
1. Labour benefits from wages. 
2. Taxes (increased government revenue). 
3. Technical progress. 
4. Net capital inflow. 
Ile did add that the balance of payments effects 
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depended crucially upon the assumptions made about 
the expenditure changes accompanying and/or following 
the real income changes. 
In addition to the costs listed by Meier, Lal 
introduced the following indirect costs associated with 
F. D. I: 
1. Squeezes out local business. 
2. Slows domestic business development. 
3. Deleterious external effects on income. 
4. Adversely affects distribution and consumption 
patterns. 
5. Wrong items are produced. 
Similar themes are developed in work by Lall & 
Streeten, Reuber et al, Seers, Vernon, Biersteker and 
many others. In 'Private Foreign Investment in 
Development' Grant L Reuber et al (1973), developed the 
political and social concerns which strongly influence 
investment. Reuber reminded us that private foreign 
investment is 
-different 
in that it involves not only 
private interests but foreign private interests at 
that, hence the political control is not always easily 
available and can be seen as a threat to sovereignty 
and independence. 
So, are the benefits sufficient to outweigh the 
possible costs (political, social and economic)? Again 
Reuber (1973)5 highlighted a number of costs and 
benefits saying that F. D. I has three special 
characteristics:. 
1. Non resident control. 
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2. Not only transfer of capital but also a package of 
auxiliary factors. 
3. The opportunity afforded the host countries to 
capture a substantial share of earnings on foreign 
capital and rents earned on the package of- 
auxiliary factors associated with F D. I. 
He also listed the following adverse factors: 
1. Foreign enclave development. 
2. Stifling or alternatively excessive promotion of 
export markets. 
3. Distortion of import markets. 
4. Failure to develop adequate domestic research and 
to adapt the imported technology to local 
conditions. 
5. Inadequate efforts to train and develop local 
managerial and technical talent. 
6. Brain drain effect. 
7. Excessive influence on local development. 
8. Stunting of capital markets. 
9. Excessive dependence on local savings distorting 
the market. 
10. Transfer pricing problems. 
11. Lack of co-ordination on investments and 
development. 
12. Undesirable production. 
13. Competition from big foreign firms stunts growth of 
domestic firms, prevents big domestic firms from 
growing up. 
14. Threat of over dependence on F. D. I can threaten 
balance of payment position. 
15. Foreign firms' over-dependence on imports does 
not help develop local suppliers. 
16. Failure to gain access to technology et al, saying 
that many of the benefits are just the reverse of 
the list. 
Reuber et al also point out that there are important 
differences between F. D. I and domestic investment is 
that the foreign investor will be looking for a premium 
to compensate for the greater risk, that F. D. I is more 
likely to be in the new ventures rather than the 
expansion of old investments and financially the F. D. I 
requires a much more complex organisation. As already 
mentioned, similar lists of the benefits and costs have 
been used by many writers in this area. 
The final two we will mention is one by Vineate Paterno 
and one highlighting the most common 'charges' against 
F. D. I by Streeten. 
Paterno (1977) listed the following assets and 
liabilities of private foreign investment. 
Assets are: 
a) To supplement domestic capital for productive 
- investment, which is deficient in. developing 
countries. 
b) Production is achieved and employment generated 
that would not otherwise occur. 
c) Foreign investment brings with it new 
technologies, commercial know-how etc. 
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d) Where foreign investments are made in export 
industries, especially for manufactured goods, 
they bring access to their home markets. 
Liabilities-are: 
a) Individual foreign equity investments may be 
expected in the long-run to entail greater foreign 
exchange remittances by the economy. 
b) A foreign investor cannot be expected to have the 
same regard for the national interest as the 
indigenous investor would have (p99). 
Lall and Streeten (1977), listed the most common 
charges made against F. D. I. 
These being: 
1. Uneven impact on development, which creates 
or reinforces dualism and inequality. 
2. Inappropriate products introduced with the same 
charge applying to technology and consumption. 
3. Loss of local funds and the associated opportunity 
cost. 
4. Undue influence on government policy, which may 
ensure. excessive concessions. 
5. Stifles domestic enterprise. 
6. Creates political friction (p11). 
From the evidence presented, it is possible to observe 
that there are a large number of benefits claimed for 
F. D. I, but there is an equally large body of criticism 
aimed at foreign investment, The six charges used by 
Lall and Streeton are the ones. nost often used. 
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1.4.2 Critics and Supporters 
From Biersteker's (1978) 'Distortion or Development' 
we have the following categories on the pro-F. D. I side. 
1. The 'business school' approach, who have an 
implicit belief in laissez faire 
2. The traditional economic approach. 
3. The Neo-traditionalist approach which admits the 
concern over oligopolistic nature of the Multi- 
National Companies (M. N. C's), but believes in the 
beneficial nature of F. D. I. 
On the other side, Biersteker listed the following 
anti-F. D. I arguments. 
1. The nationalist approach which considers F. D. I from 
the the L. D. C's viewpoint and which argues against 
it on the grounds of economic damage, distortion 
and cost. 
The nationalists tend to be the strongest supporters of 
stringent regulation and the use of case by case 
bargaining. 
2. The dependence approach, which originated in Latin 
America. This approach supports the view that 
development is not possible as long as the L. D. C's 
remain dependent on the developed countries and 
the 24. H. C's. 
3. The narxist approach which attacks all the values 
of the capitalist system. 
Of the anti-F. D. I positions the one that is of most 
interest when considering the impact of F. D. I on the 
L. D. C's is dependency theory, which gained prominence 
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in the 1970's. 
Dos Santos (1970), one of the leading proponents of 
this theory, described it as follows: 
"Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the 
economies of one group of countries are conditioned by 
the development and expansion of others. A 
relationship of- interdependence between two or more 
economies or between such economies and the world 
trading system becomes a dependent relationship when 
some countries can expand through self-impulsion while 
others, being in a dependent position, can only expand 
as a, reflection of the dominant countries. Which may 
have positive or negative effects on their immediate 
development" (p289). 
Seers (1981) attacked the theory striking at its 
fundamental weakness. He reviewed its lack of rigor 
and called it a portmanteau concept, pointing out that 
if the dependency theory was correct then the N. I. C's, 
who are highly dependent, should have not been able to 
grow as fast or as long as they have. 
Similarly when Biersteker (1978) showed that the four 
most common assumptions about the multinationals and 
developing countries made by both sides of the 
arguments were in fact false, he also damaged the basis 
of dependency theory. 
The assumptions examined by Biersteker were that: 
1. Developing countries are important to 
multinationals, as, a major source, of sales, 
revenues, profits and growth; if not the mainstay 
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of 'corporate capitalism'. 
2. Foreign capital whether supplied by governments or 
businesses can supply the resources, especially 
the capital resources required for economic 
development. 
3. The ability of 'multinational companies to 
integrate and allocate productive resources on a 
global basis across national boundaries, and thus 
to substitute transnational for national economic 
considerations, subordinates the best national 
interests of the developing countries to global 
exploitation. 
4. The traditional 'nineteenth century form of 
corporate organisation, that is the 'parent 
company' with wholly owned 'branches' abroad is 
the form of organisation for the twentieth century 
M. N. C. 
Biersteker points out that in reality the developing 
countries'are neither important markets or producers of 
profits, also that it is not the lack of capital rather 
the lack of'ability to'rnobilise it fully, that is the 
developing countries' problem. Also that a global 
strategy offers a way of obtaining bargaining strength 
and control and that the policy of self-sufficiency is 
not possible even for the best endowed country today. 
Finally he''shows that the multinationals find it 
increasingly to their advantage not to have 100% 
control so as to gain access to local capital and 
talent. 
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Deepak Lal (1983) also disproved the claim that F. D. I 
must be controlled because its operations would be 
likely to cause damage to the economic welfare of the 
host country. He established that studies carried out 
by Reuber, -Streeten and Lall, and Vernon as well as his 
own could not prove that the traditional criticisms 
against F. D. I. 
Of the differing views of F. D. I the approach that 
appears to be the best is the neo-classical economists; 
whose leading proponent is Vernon (1971), who in 
'Sovereignty at Bay' stated the following: 
"Allowing for variations in nuance and emphasis, the 
general view, - is that U. S direct investment has on 
balance been helpful in the growth of the economies of 
the advanced countries receiving that investment" 
(p158). 
Vernon does admit that the L. D. C's do have a different 
emphasis towards F. D. I than the advanced countries, 
the balance of payments. effect. is of far greater 
importance, and that the availability of foreign 
exchange has a far greater effect, since it tends to be 
a scarce resource, whose availability or more 
importantly lack of availability inhibits growth. He 
went further by saying that the argument that foreign 
subsidiaries decapitalise the L. D. C's ignores the non- 
economic impact of F. D. I. 
Vernon (1972) also wrote that: 
"Forces that generate misgiving about F. D. I in L. D. C's 
or elsewhere are not only economic, but also political, 
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social and cultural. Though the misgivings may be 
couched in economic terms at times, economic analysis 
may be of no great relevance in analysing them" (p185). 
Biersteker (1978) brought together the criticisms laid 
against the multinationals with regard to their adverse 
effects on the outflow of capital and the balance of 
payments. 
1. That they do not bring in a great deal of capital. 
2. They limit their subsidiaries to the local markets. 
3. They remit 'excessive' profits. 
4. They employ transfer-pricing and tie-in clauses 
to disguise capital outflows. 
5. Few linkages are established with the local economy 
(p49). 
He established that the neo-classical approach agrees 
with proposition 1, has contending propositions for 2,4 
& 5, and has a mismatched argument for 3 on the basis 
of different assumptions, contending that excessive is 
value laden and that remissions are insignificant when, 
local production or inefficient indigenous production 
are considered. The critics of U. N. C's and F. D. I tend 
to use conventional accounting, taking no notice of 
opportunity costs, multiplier effects and the 
mobilisation of domestic resources. 
The overall result is that the neo-conventional 
approach while supporting F. D. I does agree with the 
conventional critics on several points; that most of 
the F. D. I capital is local and that there are problems 
over remittances, displacement of local producers, 
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technology transfer and others, but the benefits 
outweigh the costs and this does appear to be the 
correct approach to follow. 
Kindleberger likens F. D. I to a 'non-zero-sum game', 
meaning that the combined score or result can add up to 
more. than or less than zero and that: 
"In the bilateral monopoly, non-zero-sum game 
represented by direct investment in the less developed 
countries, there has been a steady shift in the 
advantages from the side of the company to that of the 
country" (p150). 
Lal (1975) points out the following: 
"In manufacturing,, the degree of effective protection 
offered to . the foreign 
investor is both the major 
incentive. to foreign investment and the major 
determinant of the net gain to the host country from 
his operations. The higher, the effective protection 
offered, the more: likely are social losses to the host 
country from the. operation of direct foreign 
investment. So it is the domestic policies adopted 
which can make it harmful" (p36). 
So it is possible to see the-dilemma raised by -F. D. I, 
is it a help or a hindrance to the L. D. C's? 
Given the varying views put forward it is difficult to 
decide which to take. Possibly the best view in the 
final analysis is not to take any single approach, but 
instead to consider that there is some truth in most of 
the approaches. 
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What can be agreed upon is that the F. D. I decisions 
facing the L. D. C's are not just a simple matter of 
economics, in fact the. economics of the decision can be 
difficult to quantify and is often lost in the politics 
surrounding it, other factors have to be taken into 
account. This covers not only the non-monetary effects 
but the social and political consequences to the 
country. 
1.4.3 Empirical Evidence 
To further investigate the possible effects of F. D. I on 
the L. D. C's, we have to examine the available empirical 
evidence. We used only research that related F. D. I and 
the developing countries. 
Phillip Opher (1973) in 'Policies Related to Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Comparison Between Developed and 
Developing Countries' examined F. D. I from the 
perspective of U. S investors in manufacturing 
interested in finding optimum locations abroad. 
He developed the following matrix: 
Categories of Policies 
Unfavourable Favourable 
Full Disincentives Incentives 
to foreign to foreign 
Impact investors A investors D 
of 
Policies Limited Denial from Exemption of 
foreign investors foreign 
of incentives investors from 
granted to local disincentives 
national imposed on 
investors B local national 
investors C 
He categorised the policies of the host country into 
either favourable or unfavourable to the investor and 
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into the strength of the impact that the policies would 
have on the investor, giving this either a full or 
limited impact. 
Opher found that categories A or C were more liable to 
occur in developing countries, with developed countries 
having a much lower incidence of A or C, about half as 
frequent as the developing countries. He also found 
that there was little difference between the developed 
or developing countries with regards to categories B 
and D. 
He showed that the multipolicy programs of the 
developed countries were more attractively oriented (to 
the investor) than those of the less developed 
countries. The L. D. C's used a more varied selection 
of policies in all categories except for incentives. 
The investors reacted favourably to the use of 
incentives and perceived any regulatory measures as a 
limitation to their ownership rights which acted as a 
disincentive. 
What emerges from Opher's work is that the investor is 
attracted to a more permissive regime and that 
government policy and actions on foreign investment 
will have a significant influence on the ability to 
attract foreign investment. Opher illustrated what 
attracts or frightens off investors, but this does not 
consider the impact on the host country. 
Looking at the possible impact of F. D. I on developing 
countries, Yoram Blam (1973) investigated the effect of 
various forms of foreign investment on trade and other 
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key variables. 
Blam examined three principal questions: 
1. Does F. D. I stimulate export production and/or 
import substitution, which would ease the debt 
service burden associated with it? 
2. Does F. D. I stimulate or retard domestic capital 
formation, productivity and other economic 
variables which are essential for economic growth? 
3. Is F. D. I superior or inferior in performing the 
functions described in 1&2 to other types of 
external capital inflows? 
Blam's results were based on a sample of 30 developing 
countries, which he split into two subgroups using 
population, classing 15 as 'large' (over 10 million) 
and 15 as 'small' countries (under 10 million). 
The resulting statistical analysis indicated that 
export receipts were jointly related to the different 
types of foreign capital. He found that F. D. I was 
significantly (at 1% level) related to both total and 
manufactured exports when all 30 countries were 
considered, but once they were split into two the 
results were quite different. While the results were 
broadly the same for the 'small' countries, with the 
'large' countries, F. D. I was only significant at the 
10% level for total exports and actually negative for 
merchandise exports. 
He argued that this may be because of the smaller 
countries' need to export, while the larger ones use 
their investments to meet domestic demand and for 
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import substitution. 
In his conclusions he had the following observations: 
a. Exports, imports and their corresponding breakdowns 
into primary and manufactured goods are closely 
associated with particular types of foreign 
investment studied. The nature of the relationship 
may reflect the way in which developing countries 
use various flows. 
b. F. D. I is seen to be consistently associated with 
higher exports and especially exports of 
manufactured goods. 
c. F. D. I is associated with higher levels of imports, 
but it does not create a drain on the trade balance 
of the host country. 
d. The 'small' countries' association of the various 
capital inputs with trade variables is similar to 
that of the complete sample of all the developing 
countries. 
The only difference with regard to F. D. I was a more 
pronounced positive association between it and 
manufactured exports. 
e. The elasticity measures computed implied that 
countries with higher levels of F. D. I tend to be 
associated with larger positive or better trade 
balance. This suggests that the debt service 
payment problems resulting from foreign capital 
investments are likely to be less on average when 
F. D. I is high. 
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f. The 'large' developing countries exhibit different 
reactions to foreign capital investments, the 
trade variables are apparently little influenced 
by foreign investment. 
g. F. D. I is positively related to direct taxes on 
corporations and employee compensation. 
h. Domestic savings are positively related to high 
levels of F. D. I, which appears to act as a 
stimulus. 
i. F. D. I seems highly associated with labour 
productivity in manufacturing, which may have a 
spill over effect into other sectors of the 
economy. 
In a PhD published in 1980, Han X Vo investigated the 
relationship between F. D. I and the economic growth of 
developing countries by examining 59 L. D. C's, between 
1960 and 1963 and 1967 and 1973, he also categorised 
then into mining and non-mining countries. 
He found that there is a positive relationship between 
F. D'. I and G. D. P growth rates, but that this is very 
weak and intricate. Also that the effect of F. D. I on 
the growth rate tends to be swamped by the dominant 
presence of domestic investment. 
That F. D. I has an effect on the industrial growth of 
the L. D. C's'is even less clear as. Vo states: 
"While there is reason to expect a significant link 
between" F. D. I and the growth rate of the industry in 
which F. D. I played an important role, it is another 
matter as far as the association between F. D. I and 
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sectorial growth is concerned" (p91). 
He found that F. D. I had a generally favourable effect 
on domestic capital formation, but it did tend to 
displace domestic savings in a majority of countries 
where mining had a share of less than 5% of G. D. P. 
F. D. I had a negative effect on domestic savings- in the 
non-extractive countries. 
With regard to exports, F. D. I had a beneficial effect 
on both types of country, with no discernible 
difference between them. 
He concluded by suggesting that the results of his 
study show that it may well be worth encouraging F. D. I, 
but that, it is dangerous to generalise as individual 
countries. have different economic and industrial 
structures and that the benefits have to be weighed 
against the domestic resource cost of promoting F. D. I 
and exports. 
We also examined two single country studies that 
touched upon the impact of F. D. I on a developing 
country. One study uses the Philippines, the other 
concentrates on the Nigerian economy. The first study 
written by Falih M. H Alsaaty (1973) came to the 
following conclusions regarding the impact of F. D. I. 
F. D. I can affect the economic growth of developing 
countries due to the impact it has on the quality and 
quantity of inputs into the economy, and the technical 
and organisational changes it can bring with it. If it 
does not cause- 100% displacement of the local 
enterprises then F. D. I can have a positive contribution 
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to make, through the employment of local labour, by 
enlisting the participation of local managers and with 
training programmes, also it has an effect due to the 
transfer of technology, by helping to develop 
managerial techniques and skills, it helps the 
development of local sources of supply, and can assist 
R&D, tax and can promote increased productivity. 
He did warn that the contribution from F. D. I depended 
on the actual and potential net contribution of the 
foreign and domestic (replaced) firms. The indications 
were that the contribution from F. D. I to real resources 
and consequently to economic growth are positive. 
Alsaaty did note that there is a need for a favourable 
climate for investment, and that foreign firms are 
selective in their approach, picking which country they 
consider best to invest in. 
Emmanuel Chinyene Egbe (1984) investigated the impact 
of F. D. I, on the growth of G.: J. P and capital formation. 
He had the following results to report: 
1. That there was a positive contribution to G. D. P, 
with the highest contribution being in the 
manufacturing sector. 
2. That there was a positive contribution to G. N. P, 
but that remittances were running at a yearly rate 
of 18.36%. 
3. There was a positive effect on domestic 
investment. 
4. Due to the rapid repatriation of funds in the 
agriculture and service industries there was a net 
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negative effect on total investment. 
5. The impact of new inflows was negative on G. D. P, 
G. N. P and domestic investment, largely due to its 
impact on domestic prices, which discouraged 
exports. 
6. Over time the effects were positive, though close 
to half of the total invested was remitted. 
He came to the conclusion that the initial impact of 
F. D. I tended to be negative, though the long run 
effects appear to be positive. 
1.5 Conclusions 
From the small number of studies there does appear to 
be a relationship between F. D. I and the economy, though 
this is by no means straightforward and appears to 
differ depending on the composition of the countrys 
economy and the size of the country. What emerges is 
an expectation of a relationship between F. D. I and 
exports and also with G. D. P and G. N. P, but that this 
relationship may be masked by other factors, and that 
it may not be as strong in 'large' and 'non-extractive' 
countries. 
From the literature there appears a picture of a 
contentious issue as to the costs and benefits and as 
to whether F. D. I should be supported or treated as an 
anathema. 
Aharoni (1966) stated that: 
"Investments are needed in less developed countries to 
fulfil four major functions: 
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1. Initiative (ie the recognition and promotion of 
opportunities). 
2. Capital 
3. Know-how. 
4. Management" (p233). 
From Aharoni we see that costs and benefits are both 
monetary and non-monetary in nature, and once again 
there is disagreement as to the relative strengths of 
the two. It will possibly suffice to say that F. D. I 
brings with it a bundle of possible benefits and a 
number of costs and it will be beneficial if it is 
handled properly. How the host country treats the 
investor and controls the inflows will have an effect 
not only on the levels of investment arriving but also 
on how effective the foreign direct investment is in 
helping the economy. 
Vernon (1972) argues that: 
"In balance of payment terms, the best measurements 
that have so far been developed support none of the 
extreme propositions that are commonly advanced with 
regard to the M. N. E's. They neither support the view 
that F. D. I is hurtful to the U. S balance of payments 
nor the conflicting view that such investment is 
hurtful to the balance of payment of the host 
countries" (p80). 
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Chapter Two 
Development of the Korean Economy 
2.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the emergence of the N. I. C's and the 
perceived role of foreign direct investment in a 
developing country's economy, we have to examine the 
development of the Korean economy in order to 
understand the part played by the inflows into Korea. 
To understand the role of foreign direct investment in 
the Korean economy, we need to study the Korean 
economic success story, especially the key role given 
to manufacturing as this is where the bulk of the 
inflows went (as chapter four shows). 
To do this we will examine the circumstances leading up 
to Korea's economic expansion, the role of the various 
Five Year Economic Development Plans, and the 
development of Korean manufacturing. In order to 
understand how Korean industry developed we must first 
look at the circumstances leading up to the development 
of an outward oriented economic policy and the role 
played by the Korean government. We have to consider 
the different five year economic plans brought forward 
by the Korea government and to what degree they were 
successful in promoting Korea's economic development. 
Chapter 2 concentrates on the Koreans' transit. on to an 
outward oriented, manufacturing based, export led, 
development policy and the Five Year Economic 
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Development Plans that span the period 1962 to 1986. As 
previously stated in chapter one, our interest lies in 
the period 1971 to 1984, but we need to understand the 
reasons for the type of development undertaken by the 
Koreans, and the role of economic planning, hence we 
need, to look at economic development from the late 
fifties up to 1984. 
Chapter two combines with Chapter three, which examines 
in more detail the development of Korean manufacturing. 
Chapter two examines the broad aspects of economic 
development. under the various plans, while chapter 
three concentrates on the transition and development of- 
Korea's manufacturing industries. In order that we may 
understand the role played by foreign direct investment 
at both a macro level for the,, whole economy and a micro 
level for manufacturing alone. 
2.2 Korean Expansion 
South Korea's rapid rise as an industrial nation dates 
from the early sixties as the economy started to change 
from its predominantly agricultural base towards 
industrialisation. Korea's image underwent a dramatic 
transformation, from being considered by the American 
administration as 'a hopeless case and one that would 
require considerable assistance for the foreseeable 
future, to one of only a handful of developing 
countries that has managed to successfully make the 
transition to an industrial nation. Korea now has to 
be taken as a serious competitor across virtually the 
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whole range of manufactured goods. 
By comparing Korea's economic situation at the start of 
this climb to industrialisation, to the position 
reached by the mid-seventies and eighties, we can 
comprehend the enormous advances made by South Korea in 
the past twentyfive years. _ 
2.2.1 The Pattern of Economic Growth 
In 1961 South Korea was rated as one of the World's 
poorest nations. The economy was heavily dependent on 
agricultural production and exports of primary 
products, exports had as yet not recovered from the 
Korean War, and were only equal to their peak pre-war 
value of $40 million (registered in 1953). Aid in 
various, forms represented a vital component of the 
economy, financing nearly three-quarters of Korea's 
import bill. The following figures indicate the overall 
economic position in 1961. 
Table 2.1 Korean Economic Indicators 1961 
Gross National Product $2,103 million 
G. N. P growth rate 1.1% 
Per Capita G. N. P $82 
Exports $40.9 million 
of which 
primary products $27 million 
manufactured goods $11.6 million 
Imports $283 million 
Unemployment 8.2% 
Source: Economic Statistics Year-book, various years. 
National Income Statistics 1984 
By 1975 the economy had undergone a dramatic 
transformation. No longer were primary products 
dominant in terms of output and exports. Growth which 
had been sluggish if not actually. moribund, was now 
increasing at a remarkable speed, average annual growth 
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in G. N. P had registered approximately 10% since 1961. 
The growth of exports was even higher, averaging 33% 
per year. Exports which had represented barely 2% of 
G. N. P in 1961, now constituted nearly 36%. Aid which 
had been so crucial in the late fifties and early 
sixties was no longer an important economic factor. 
Manufacturing had grown tremendously, primarily based 
in the light industries, such as textiles and wood and 
wood products, though the Korean government was now 
encouraging the development of chemical and other heavy 
industries (see appendix A). Agriculture, although no 
longer a dominant force, still provided 40% of all 
employment. The following figures indicate some of the 
changes that had taken place since 1961. 
Table 2.2 Korean Economic Indicators 1975 
Gross National Product $20.8 billion 
G. N. P growth rate 6.9% 
Per Capita G. N. P $591 
Exports $5.1 billion 
of which 
primary products $0.8 billion 
manufactured goods $4.3 billion 
Imports $7.3 billion 
Unemployment 4.1% 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
National Income Statistics 1984 
The transformation of Korea from an agricultural to an 
industrial economy continued with manufacturing playing 
an increasingly important role. Korea-by 1984 was 
considered to be a strong and increasingly successful 
competitor in the World markets. Growth had continued 
to remain strong and the economy looked like developing 
at a continued rapid pace as manufacturing moved to 
higher technology products. 
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Table 2.3 Korean Economic Indicators 1984 
Gross National Product $79.0 billion 
G. N. P growth rate 7.6% 
Per Capita G. N. P $1,999 
Exports $29.2 billion 
of which 
primary products $1.6 billion 
manufactured goods $27.6 billion 
Imports $30.6 billion 
Unemployment 3.9% 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
Korea Statistical Yearbook 1985 
2.3 Korean Economic Development 
The transformation of the Korean economy was achieved 
by turning away from the import substitution and aid 
maximisation policies pursued by the Rhee 
administration and embracing export oriented growth as 
the route to economic expansion. This is not to say 
that the 'Korean government did not use import 
substitution as a policy tool for developing the 
economy, but it was only used in the early stages of 
development and not taken to extremes as we'shall see 
in the following section. 
2.3.1 Policy Changes 
Mason, Kim, et al (1980) reported that : 
"President Rhee was adept at maximising aid flows 
through skilful mismanagement of the foreign exchange 
policy and domestic inflation" (p13), and in addition 
"The United States had no firm policy, just to keep the 
economy afloat for security reasons" (p13). 
They further indicated that Rhee's government used an 
inward looking economic 'policy, encouraging import 
substitution, especially in the consumer goods 
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industries, and that the government used over valued 
exchange rates and multiple exchange rates as part of 
their aid maximisation policy. Growth remained a 
secondary objective throughout the period 1953 to 1960. 
These observations were reiterated by a 
number of others, Professor Sun M. Kahng (1984), wrote 
that: 
"Until 1960 the government development strategy was 
based on the protection of the infant domestic industry 
from foreign competitors and the promotion of domestic 
production of import substitutes" (p15). 
Similarly Anne- Krueger (1979) wrote: 
"Korean trade- and payments policies were geared 
primarily to receiving as much aid as possible, 
preventing the excess demand for foreign exchange from 
being realised, maintaining an overvalued exchange 
rate, and stimulating domestic economic activity in 
import substitution industries" (p4), and that 
"production for export was discouraged by, the 
attraction of new resources to the sheltered domestic 
market and relatively unattractive real exchange rates" 
(p42). - 
The position during the late 1950's was one of the 
Korean government both actively encouraging import 
substitution, relying on aid to finance the economy, 
and following an aid maximisation policy to provide an 
adequate level of growth. This policy provided steady 
growth of 5% per annum up to the end of 1957. 
Aid peaked in 1957, with the U. S providing $382.9 
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million, which covered over 86% of Korea's import bill. 
Exports continued to be of little or no consequence, 
failing to exceed pre Korean War levels until 1961 and 
were a minor factor in the economy. This resulted in 
the overvaluation of the currency and the use of 
multiple exchange- rates to boost the amounts of aid 
received. 
1957 can be said to be a watershed for the economic 
policies of Syngman Rhee's government, as they were 
overtaken by changing circumstances. Mason, Kim et al 
(1980) reported that in 1957: 
"largely as a result of poor performance and growing 
American discontent-with Syngman Rhee's intransigence, 
the U. S government decided to start reducing its aid 
levels and to curtail new investment projects" (p195). 
The American government made it abundantly clear that 
aid levels would decline from now on, with the eventual 
intention of their complete removal in the near future, 
and that their policy towards the type of-aid provided 
would also change. In a World Bank paper published by 
Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981), the following 
comment was made: 
"American economic assistance continued through the 
1960's. Beginning in the 1950's, however the Americans 
initiated actions to increase Korea's economic 
independence, the first being a gradual 'shift from 
grant aid to concessional lending" (p11). 
The impact of this decision was that after 1957 project 
aid became more important, rising above 25% of total 
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aid for the first time, project aid was directed 
towards specific development schemes, rather than being 
channelled through the Korean government for general 
commodity imports, which did not always meet with 
American approval. 
Rhee. did not initially respond to these changes, as 
Kruger (1979) noted: 
"The attempt to continue import substitution after 1957 
took place against a background of declining imports, a 
fact that had significant implications for resource 
allocation. The exchange rate continued to relate to 
aid and not to equating supply and demand for foreign 
exchange" (p42). 
The reducing and changing nature of the aid available 
was not the only factor affecting the Korean economy. 
Import substitution had played an important role in the 
government's economic policies. The problem that arose 
was that the first 'easy' stage was virtually over. The 
easy stage involved imports of non-durable consumer 
goods and their principal inputs had to be replaced by 
domestic production. - 
Kruger (1979) said that: 
"Import substitution had clearly failed in the sense 
that manufacturing had not become the dominant 
sector" (p63) and that it was "generally believed that 
by the late 50's 'easy' import substitution in light 
industries exhausted" (p63). 
The rebuilding and reconstruction' programs which 
followed the Korean War were also coming to an end. 
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The results of these changing circumstances were 
apparent in the slow and declining growth observed in 
1958,1959 and 1960, as the economy stagnated, 
unemployment started to rise, inflation was also on the 
increase, the economy was obviously in trouble. 
The 
. way was opened 
for a new economic strategy 
following the collapse of the Rhee government in 1960. 
In 'Imported Inflation and Development of the Korean 
Economy', In June Kim (1985)1, listed the reasons for 
the adoption of an export oriented policy, which were 
as follows: 
1. The reduction of aid by the U. S. 
2. There was a limit to import substitution, since the 
share of non-competitive imports to total imports 
was quite high. 
3. The initial 'easy' phase of import substitution was 
complete. 
4. There was limited scope in the domestic market. 
5. The large capital requirement of any continued 
import substitution. 
6. The present import substitution policy was failing 
to use their comparative advantages. 
7. ' Export oriented strategies were seen as being more 
amenable to incentives, which were regarded as 
being more efficient than direct controls. 
From the evidence of the position of the Korean economy 
in the 1950's, the choice of an export oriented 
development policy appears to be the right decision. 
Given that the policy of the 'ghee government in 
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supporting import substitution, had not become 
sufficiently entrenched for a high cost industrial base 
dependent on substitution policies to develop. Korea 
did not have the special interest groups, dependent on 
import substitution, which would have caused large 
scale disruption and could adopt an outward oriented 
strategy. 
2.3.2 Korea's Outward Oriented Strategy 
An inward oriented strategy is characterised by the use 
of import substitution, which as related in Chapter 1 
discriminates against exports by encouraging the 
domestic market to replace imports with domestic 
production. Import substitution is said to come in 
several stages, as already mentioned Korea moved away 
as the first easy stage neared completion. 
The easy stage of import substitution is the 
replacement of non-durable products and their 
intermediate inputs with domestic production, which 
does not require large amounts of capital, skilled 
labour or high levels of technology. The size of such 
operations are quite small, so they can be relatively 
efficient in the tiny domestic market. 
Any attempt to move to the next stage of import 
substitution would involve much greater costs. These 
arise due to the nature of the products that domestic 
producers are trying to replace, requiring a much 
higher level of technology and capital, along with 
skilled labour and more intermediate inputs. They also 
tend to be associated with large scale plants for their 
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economic efficiency, which means that the domestic 
economy may not be able to supply enough demand to 
allow efficient use of plants. 
Balassa (1982) noted that, "An outward oriented 
strategy does not mean favouring exports or import 
substitution. Rather it means providing similar 
incentives to both domestic and export manufacture" 
(p45). 
Bhagwati (1986) stated the following with regard to an 
export promoting strategy: 
"Let me first clarify that, by EP (export promoting) 
strategy, the literature now simply means a policy such 
that, on balance, the effective exchange rate for 
exports (EERx) is not significantly different from that 
for imports (EERm), so that the EERx is roughly equal 
to the EERm. In short, theeffective exchange rate does 
not show a 'bias against exports'" (p92). 
Also Bhagwati (1986)also noted "the motivation is 
simply that the EP strategy eliminate the bias against 
exports, thereby restoring the incentive to export as 
much as to produce for the home market. Morever this 
as it were minimalist definition of EP conforms closely 
to the actual experience of the successful East Asian 
export promoters mentioned earlier (including Korea). 
In their case, their EERx exceeded their EERm only 
relatively insignificantly - in contrast to the great 
excess of EERm over EERx in the IS countries most 
widely studied" (p93). 
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2.3.2.1 Cost of an Inward Strategy 
The easy stage of the inward oriented strategy has few 
costs attached as the country is using its comparative 
advantage, it is when the second stage is reached that 
the costs rise. The encouragement of import 
substitution is achieved by using tariff and import 
controls. These bring high levels of protection, which 
discriminates against manufactured and primary exports. 
These controls encourage the establishment of a 
sellers' market, with considerable intra-industry 
effects, stifling competition and acting as a buffer 
for local industry against world competition. This 
gives rise to higher costs with little or no incentive 
to improve productivity, leading to a situation where 
there is less risk associated with domestic production 
than exporting, with the consequent impairment to the 
development of a manufacturing export sector. The 
damaging effects of import substitution only become 
% apparent in the long run. 
All the N. I. C's went through this phase, the only 
difference being the length of time that they have 
continued with this policy, which has largely depended 
on their perception of the returns from the import 
substitution policy. In contrast to Korea, both Brazil 
and Mexico did not change their import substitution 
policies until the mid-sixties and did not move as far 
as Korea towards an outward oriented policy. 
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2.3.2.2 Benefits of an Outward Strategy 
In 'Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial 
Economies', Balassa (1982) stated that: 
"The main aims of outward looking growth policies, are 
faster and more efficient economic growth through an 
improved allocation of domestic and foreign resources". 
and in addition, "Continued import substitution behind 
high protection involves 'traveling up the staircase' 
by undertaking the production of commodities that 
involve increasingly higher domestic costs per unit of 
foreign exchange" (p51). 
Outward oriented policies use incentives, and control 
of exchange rates and domestic demand to stimulate 
growth. Such a policy involves a number of factors 
such as exchange rate adjustment, incentives for export 
production, subsidies and taxes to guide exporters with 
tight control of domestic money and demand. 
This results in a so called 'export for growth' 
strategy using the export sector as the engine of 
growth for the whole economy, permits greater 
efficiency and economies of scale, with efficient use 
of import substitution and allows foreign competition 
to stimulate the entire economy. 
Using such a policy has enabled Korea to make the best 
use of its comparative advantages. It allowed Korea to 
compete in the labour intensive manufacturing 
industries, such as textiles, taking advantage of its 
low cost but well trained labour force. 
Balassa (1979) classified the' Id. I. C's into four 
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groups. The first of which contained Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan. Balassa noted that for this group: 
"Export oriented policies entailed applying a free 
trade regime to non-traditional exports, with 
additional incentives provided to manufacturing exports 
largely on an across the board basis and considerable 
stability in incentives assured over time. Also, on 
the average, incentives to exports were at least 
comparable in magnitude to the incentives accorded to 
import substitution in manufacturing and there was 
little discrimination against primary activities" 
(p19). 
2.3.2.3 Comparative Advantage 
Some of the determinants which affect the comparative 
advantage of a country, are the effects of natural 
resource endowment, levels of labour skills, the 
level of managerial expertise and the rate of 
accumulation of these skills, also the level of wages. 
Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981), remarked that: 
"Because of Korea's poor natural resource endowment, 
resource allocation along the lines of comparative 
advantage was required" (p15). 
By moving to an outward oriented export led growth 
strategy, Korea was able to make use of its comparative 
advantages by producing suitable products that made the 
best use of Korea's scarce natural resources, and the 
best use of Korea's labour force. Korea's comparative 
advantages in the early sixties lay in the labour 
intensive industries. since it possessed a well 
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educated, disciplined, and low cost labour force, 
entirely suited to the production of light industrial 
products that did not require vast amounts of capital 
to set up. 
By moving to an export oriented policy, Korea was able 
to improve its resource allocation, bringing in 
economies of scale into industries where the domestic 
market was far too small to support economically sized 
plants. This allowed greater capacity utilisation, 
which provided much needed employment and reduced costs 
not only to the producers but also to the domestic 
consumers. 
This policy acted as a stimulus to business introducing 
competition and access to overseas markets, it also 
dictated the need for realistic government policies to 
sustain the export strategy, which perhaps partly 
explains why the administration was known not only for 
the high decree of centralisation, but also for its 
pragmatism in dealing with policy decisions. if 
policies were not seen to be working, they were changed 
to suit the conditions, rather than sticking 
dogmatically to them. 
2.3.3 Economic Transition 1960 to 1965 
"A number of attempts were made at policy reform and 
economic liberalisation in the first half of the 
1960's, as policy makers came to accept that rapid 
economic development depended on export oriented 
industrialisation, together with greater effcrt to 
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mobilise domestic and foreign resources, these attempts 
culminated in 1964 and 1965, when a number of reforms 
were successfully implemented"2. 
The transition to the new policy took place over 
roughly five years, from 1960 to 1965. Most writers 
agree that by the end of 1965, the policies for 
economic expansion were in place. The major influences 
on the transition can be timetabled as follows: 
1. In April 1960, the new administration led by Chang 
Myon took over, following the student revolt that 
brought down the Rhee government. Myon's civilian 
government started the process of change by 
attempting to stabilise the economy and bringing 
out the basis of the first Five Year Plan. 
2. In January/February of 1961, the Korean won was 
devalued, with the intention of unifying the 
exchange rate and to try to eliminate or at least 
reduce the level of currency overvaluation. Whether 
the stabilisation measures would have worked 
remains conjecture, because following continued 
unrest and riots, there was a military coup. 
3. The coup in May 1961, was led by Chung Mae Park, 
who eventually became president. The military 
government adopted a strong expansionary policy in 
an attempt to overcome the stagnation effecting the 
economy. They increased the scope for export 
incentives, introducing a number of measures, 
including an import-export linkage scheme. They 
also liberalised and simplified the remaining 
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quantitative controls on imports and brought in a 
number of exchange, budget and tax reforms. An 
important step was taken in 1962 with the release 
of the 1st Five Year Plan, outlining the 
government's development strategy. 
4. As the Park government favoured an expansionary 
policy rather than the stabilisation strategy of 
the Myon administration, inflation became a serious 
problem, rising from 9.4% in 1962 to over 20% in 
1963 and over 30% in 1964, before it could be 
brought under control. Also the expansionary 
policy had led to a deterioration in Korea's 
foreign exchange reserves, which created further 
problems. Reserves declined from $207 million in 
1961 to a low of $131.5 million in 1963, this 
represented less than 25% of Korea's mounting 
import bill and less than 30% of the $410 million 
1963 trade deficit 
5. By 1963 the mounting pressure on the economy led to 
the government introducing controls on imports and 
foreign exchange, with the government introducing 
quantitative controls on the purchase of foreign 
exchange. 
These moves acted as a check to the growth rate, 
though as Kruger (1979) highlighted: 
"The disincentive, to exports was offset somewhat 
by the export-import link system, which transferred to 
the exporter the premium implicit on import licences, 
this served to maintain export incentives and mitigate 
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the increasing currency overvaluation effect on 
exports" (p84). 
6. In May 1964 a civilian administration was elected 
with Chung Hee Park as its president. The final 
stage of Korea's export promotion strategy was 
brought into play immediately after the electicn. 
7. In 1965 the stabilisation measures initiated in 
1963 had had sufficient enough effect to allow the 
government to press ahead with its expansionary 
policy. The first act was a considerable 
devaluation of the Won, from its fixed value of 130 
to the dollar to 256 to the dollar. This restored 
it to its real value, bringing it back to its 1961 
value. This allowed unification of the exchange 
rate, and the subsequent floating of the Won in 
March 1965. In addition, a number of fiscal and 
monetary reforms were undertaken, enabling the 
government to improve its ability to maintain a 
realistic exchange rate and to pursue its policy 
initiatives. The import restrictions introduced in 
1963 were liberalised so that by the end of 1965 
the export incentive scheme can be said to have 
become well established. 
2.3.4 Export Incentives 
The use of incentives for exporters underwent 
continuous expansion between 1961 and 1965. A number 
of schemes were introduced to encourage exports. : he 
major programs included the use of subsidies and tax 
breaks to encourage exports. 
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The tax incentives included reduced rates of tax on 
earnings from exports by 50%, allowing special rates of 
depreciation on machinery used for export production 
and reducing tariffs on raw materials and business 
taxes. In addition to these measures the Korean 
government set up a number of trade associations. 
In 1964 the government launched even more measures 
following the stabilisation of the economy started in 
1963. These included funds set up to promote the 
export industries and to convert small and medium sized 
firms from domestic suppliers into exporters. Finally 
in 1965, they introduced another package of measures, 
which included a wastage allowance, the introduction of 
a local letter of credit, waiver insurance for shipping 
goods and discount on electricity rates. 
These measures indicated the commitment of the 
government to exporters, measures such as the linkage 
scheme which allowed exporters to import consumer 
durables, allowed exporters to make considerable 
profits on the imports, at a time when the government 
was being forced to implement policy changes that would 
put exporters at a considerable disadvantage. The 
linkage scheme gave exporters special permission to 
import goods that were otherwise heavily restricted, 
such as expensive consumer durables. Allowing the 
exporters to make considerable profits on these 
imports, helped them fund their expansion, allowing 
them a buffer against the effects of the stabilisation 
of the economy and of course encouraging others to 
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export. As the economy improved in 1964 and 1965 the 
Korean government moved towards the use of indirect 
control and subsidies. The most overt of the subsidies 
were terminated, incentives were shifted to exchange 
rate control, using favoured access to credit and 
imported raw materials, with an almost complete 
exemption from taxes on export production. 
With these policies and access to private finance, and 
the ability to purchase their raw materials and 
intermediate inputs from abroad, the export 
manufacturers were able to offset the effects of 
devaluation. While at the same time the 
industries solely supplying the domestic market found 
that their profits were severely curtailed. 
Regardless of the picture of a strong bias towards 
exports, we have to remember that an outward oriented 
policy does not mean giving exporters an unfair 
advantage, merely providing an equitable system. 
Most observers of the Korean economy are largely agreed 
that, the use of export incentives helped offset the 
disincentive effects that the rest of the trade regime 
had, as the government stabilised the economy. 
By the end of 1965 it was safe to say that the 
transition period was complete and that Korea was set 
on the path to'economic expansion. 
2.4 The First Five Year Plan 1962 to 1966 
It is important to examine the various economic 
development plans because they reveal the amount of 
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government intervention in the economy, the transition 
to an industrialised economy and the policies that 
brought about this change. 
In 1962 the military government led by Chung Hee Park 
published Korea's first economic development plan. The 
First Five Year Economic Development Plan set out the 
following targets for the economy: 
1. To increase the energy supply, including electric 
power and coal. 
2. To increase agricultural production and farmers' 
incomes. 
3. The expansion of key industries and of the social 
overhead capital. 
4. The development of land conservation through the 
utilisation of idle resources, particularly 
manpower. 
5. An improvement in the balance of payments, through 
the expansion of exports. 
6. The promotion of technology. 
In addition to these objectives a number of growth 
targets were set. The first plan was prepared in a 
very short amount of time and without any real 
experience in planning such an enterprise. Many of the 
targets given in the plan were considered to be very 
ambitious, not only by the Koreans but also by the 
Americans. Some observers have dismissed the plan and 
the 1964 revised version. Kuznets (1977) remarked 
that: 
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"Neither the 1st Five Year Plan nor the revised Five 
Year Plan should be credited with much influence over 
the actual events in 1962-1966" (p35). 
This view point is not universally held and there were 
many who hold a completely opposite view of the 
importance of the 1st plan. Jones and Sakong (1980) 
stated that, 
"The 1st Five Year Plan was, however, significant in 
various ways. It showed the people that the government 
was seriously committed to the nations development. At 
the same time rather inexperienced political leaders 
and government officials began to appreciate the 
complexity of the planning process and gained useful 
experience for the future. The over achievement of 
growth targets during the latter period also started 
building self confidence on the part of both the people 
and the economic policy makers" (p49). 
While it is probably true that the plan did not greatly 
influence events, especially during the first three 
years. The presence of targets to aim for and the 
experience gained in the planning and in operating the 
plan was invaluable. Subsequent plans benefited from 
learning progress, becoming much more detailed. Another 
benefit little mentioned was the improvement in 
confidence of overseas investors, who had a benchmark 
to measure performance against and could see that the 
Korean government was determined to follow through its 
policies and that the plan was not just window dressing 
as with many other L. D. C's. 
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Table 2-4 First Five Year Plan 1962-1966 
Planned Achieved 
G. N. P growth rate 7.1 8.3 
Agriculture Forestry & Fish 5.7 5.5 
Mining & Manufacturing 15.1 14.8 
Social Overhead Capital 5.4 8.9 
Industrial Structure for 1966 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fish 34.8 37.9 
Mining & Manufacturing 20.6 19.8 
Social Overhead Capital 44.5 42.3 
Investment as a share of G. N. P 22.6 19.8 
Current Account Deficit 247.0 429.5 
$ millions 
Unemployment (millions) 1.8 0.6 
Source: Economic Survey 1967 
2.4.1 Economic Performance 1962-1966 
The economy had stagnated in the early 1960's, with 
exports not reaching $40 million, its 1953 peak, until 
1961. The change in the economy by the end of the 
First Five Year Plan was quite remarkable: G. N. P 
increased by 12.7% in 1966, compared to 2.2% in 1962. 
Manufacturing experienced a growth rate of 17.3% in the 
same year: this remained in double figures until 1980. 
Inflation was coming back under control down from its 
peak of 34.7% in 1964 to 8.8% in 1966 as the 
stabilisation policies took effect. 
Exports were growing at a strong pace: in 1966 they 
increased by 42.9%. Import growth which had slowed 
during 1963 and 1964 due to the stabilisation policies, 
surged by 54.6%, resulting in a trade deficit of $429.5 
million. The contribution of manufacturing to the 
economy was still less than half that of agriculture, 
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though this represented a virtual doubling of its share 
since 1960. Unemployment had plummeted, registering a 
continued decline for the last four years. 
Table 2-5 Economic Indicators 1960-1966 
G. N. P Trade Official 
growth Export s Imports Balance Aid 
rate (%) ( U. S $ millions) 
1960 1.1 32.8 343.5 -272.5 231.9 
1961 5.6 40.9 316.1 -242.2 196.8 
1962 2.2 54.8 421.8 -335.3 218.5 
1963 9.1 86.8 560.3 -410.2 232.6 
1964 9.6 119.1 404.4 -244.9 142.6 
1965 5.8 175.1 463.6 -240.3 135.5 
1966 12.7 250.3 716.4 -429.5 143.6 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
Exports exceeded aid inflows for the firs t time since 
the Korean war in 196 5, and the amount of aid was still 
reducing. The trade deficit remained a problem, but 
during the same pe riod that imports ha d more than 
doubled, exports had increased by a factor of eight. 
Table 2-6 Industrial Growth 1962-1966 (%) 
Agriculture All 
Forestry Other 
& Fisheries Industry Manufacturing 
1962 -6.0 9.5 11.7 
1963 9.5 8.8 16.1 
1964 15.6 4.9 9.9 
1965 -1.0 11.6 20.5 
1966 11.6 13.5 17.3 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
While G. N. P grew by an average of 7.9% , industrial 
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growth rates were not as uniform, agriculture continued 
to suffer from poor weather and lack of investment, 
while manufacturing improved rapidly, touching 20.5% in 
1965, and 1964 was the last time manufacturing had a 
growth rate of less than 10% until 1980. 
The 'growth. in manufacturing is also reflected in 
manufactured exports, which grew rapidly during the 
first plan, most of this in the light industries. The 
plywood and clothing industries were by far the largest 
exporters representing nearly a quarter of all exports 
in 1966. Exports increased to over $250 million by 
1966, with manufactured exports reaching $154 million, 
60% compared to, 15% of all exports in 1960. 
Table 2-7 Exports by Commodity Group 1962-1966 
(U. S $ millions) 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Food & Live 
Animals 21.9 18.1 26.4 28.2 41.3 
Beverages & 
Tobacco 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.9 6.9 
Crude Materials 
19.3 26.2 31.4 37.0 46.7 
Mineral Fuels 
& Lubricants 2.8 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.5 
Animal & Vegetable 
Fats 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Chemicals 
1.0 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.7 
Manufactured Goods 
by Material 6.2 28.1 42.3 66.4 84.2 
Machinery & Transpo rt 
Equipment 1.3 4.1 2.2 5.5 9.6 
Miscellaneous 
Manufactures 2.0 6.4 13.2 34.5 59.2 
Others 
Source: Korea Statistical Yearbook 1972. 
Manufactured goods, increased from $6.2 million to over 
$84 million, led by textiles ($34.4 million) and 
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plywood ($29.9 million). Similarly miscellaneous 
manufactures, which increased exports by $57.2 million 
during the 1st plan, was led by clothing which 
accounted for 56% ($33.4 million) of the group's 
exports. The light industries accounted for the bulk of 
manufactured exports: less than 18% came from the heavy 
industries. 
By the end of the first plan the Korean economy had 
already experienced considerable change, moving away 
from being dependent on agriculture towards an 
industrial economy. 
2.5 The Second Five Year Plan 1967 to 1971 
The second plan straddles the late sixties and the 
start of the seventies. It can be considered to be the 
first proper plan produced, given that the first plan 
was produced in great haste with a lack of data 
sources, - accurate statistics, models and with no 
experience. The second plan was much more 
sophisticated, though it still was too pessimistic as 
to the level of economic performance that could be 
achieved. It used a relatively sophisticated design, 
especially when compared to the first plan. 
Jones and Sakong (1980), noted that the Second Five 
Year Plan:. 
"utilised a reasonably accurate input-output matrix and 
a rather sophisticated dynamic projection model for 
testing the consistency of the overall plan as well as 
estimating sectorial investment and import 
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requirements" (p50). 
Considerable use was made of the models and of the 
assistance of foreign experts to arrive at the final 
plan. The growth model was especially helpful in that 
it enabled the Koreans to reconcile their targets with 
the constraints on foreign exchange and domestic and 
foreign savings. 
The Second Five Year Plan had virtually identical 
objectives to the first plan, aiming for the 
modernisation of the industrial structure and the 
building of a sound base for a self-supporting economy. 
The importance of adequate investment was heavily 
emphasised, particularly in the emerging heavy 
industries. The government also laid emphasis on 
improving farming so as to improve Korean self- 
sufficiency. 
Exports were seen as a major instrument in achieving 
the second plan's targets, with improving productivity, 
mobilising sources of capital and financial stability 
seen as the other important agents of economic 
development. 
There was a considerable amount of discussion of these 
targets, as to whether they were either too 
conservative or overambitious, given the actual 
performance of the First Five Year Plan. The second 
plan attracted criticism from both Korean and overseas 
sources, though for differing reasons. 
The head of the Economic Planning Board in the preamble 
to the Second Five Year Plan reported that: 
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"My fellow countrymen criticise the Plans objectives as 
being too conservative. On the other hand our friends 
from abroad observed that the plan targets are too 
ambitious "3 . 
Table 2-8 Second Five Year Plan 1967-1971 (%) 
Target Achieved 
G. N. P growth rate 7.0 11.9 
Investment ratio 19.1 30.9 
Savings ratio 11.7 15.6 
Industrial Structure 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fish 35.2 27.7 
Mining & Manufacturing 25.2 26.6 
Social Overhead Capital 39.6 45.7 
Investment 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fish 16.3 7.1 
Mining & Manufacturing 30.7 24.2 
Social Overhead Capital 53.0 68.7 
Unemployment 5.0 4.5 
Source: The Third Five Year Economic Development Plan 
1972-1976 Economic Planning Board 
Cole and Lyman (1971) had the following comment 
concerning Korean proposals for the second plan (which 
helps explain why they appeared to be so conservative 
when setting their growth targets): 
"did not consider or accept the possibility of very 
high high growth, (above 7% per annum), partly because 
of the criticism of such high targets in the 1st plan 
and also because of continuing admonition from the 
World Bank to hold the growth target of the 2nd plan to 
6%" (p217). 
To assist in the operation of the plan, the Koreans 
introduced a yearly planning exercise: these plans were 
69 
called overall Resource Budgets (O. R. B's). The O. R. B's 
enabled the Koreans to fine-tune their planning process 
and to revise strategies if it became apparent that 
they were, for instance, either not working or 
hopelessly inaccurate. The 1968 O. R. B revised the 
target for G. N. P growth upwards to 10%. This move was 
prompted by the need to provide sufficient planned 
growth for the countrys infrastructure, especially with 
regard to such industries as electricity. Without 
sufficient generating capacity serious bottlenecks were 
liable to occur. 
2.5.1 Economic Performance 1967-1971 
The growth rate of G. N. P touched 13.8% in 1969, and 
averaged a yearly growth rate of 9.6% for the second 
plan. The composition of industrial output changed, 
reflecting the government's investment policies and the 
growth of manufacturing as the export led 
industrialisation policy took effect. 
Table 2-9 Economic Indicators 1967-1971 
G. N. P - G. N. P 
growth per Exports Imports Balance 
-rate (%) capita (U. S S millions) 
1967 6.6 143 320.2 996.2 -574 
1968 11.3 165 455.4 1,462.9 -835 
1969 13.8 195 622.5 1,823.6 -992 
1970 7.6 243 835.2 1,984.0 -922 
1971 8.8 285 1,067.6 2,394.3 -1,046 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
Exports expanded very rapidly during the second plan, 
breaking through the Si. billion barrier in 1971, when 
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they reached $1,067.6 million, compared to $250 million 
at the end of the first plan. 
At the same time the share of exports represented by 
manufacturing increased to over 80% by 1971. While 
exports continued to increase, so did imports reaching 
$2,394 million in 1971. The trade deficit continued to 
grow, though for the first time the level of export 
earnings exceed the trade deficit. 
Table 2-10 Industrial Growth 1967-1971 (%) 
Agriculture, All 
Forestry Other 
& Fisheries Industry Manufacturing 
1967 -5.9 15.9 21.6 
1963 1.3 17.2 27.2 
1969 10.5 15.5 21.6 
1970 -1.4 12.1 19.9 
1971 3.1 11.0 18.7 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1985 
The government's policy of encouraging manufacturing 
led to growth rates that far outstripped the rest of 
industry, while agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
suffered from a series of poor harvests and a lack of 
investment. Manufacturing had an average growth rate 
of 21.8% during the 2nd plan, compared to 15.1% for the 
1st, plan, this is also reflected in the higher G. N. P 
growth rate, 9.6% against 7.9%. 
As previously outlined exports grew at a phenomenal 
rate, during the Second Five Year Plan, quadrupling in 
value. The major areas of export growth were in 
manufacturing and as Table 2-10 illustrates these were 
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still mainly connected with the light industries. 
Table 2-11 Exports by Commodity Group 1967-1971 
(U. S $ millions) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Food & Live 
Animals 37.9 44.5 50.3 65.5 69.7 
Beverages & 
Tobacco 7.0 8.6 14.8 14.2 15.3 
Crude Materials 
58.0 61.5 73.0 100.0 94.9 
Mineral Fuels 
& Lubricants 1.8 2.3 4.9 8.8 11.3 
Animal & 
Vegetable Fats 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.8 
Chemicals 
2.4 3.1 9.8 11.4 14.9 
Manufactured Goods 
by Materials 101.4 143.6 173.8 220.9 328.4 
Machinery & Transport 
Equipment 14.2 24.5 53.2 61.5 87.4 
Miscellaneous 
Manufactures 97.2 167.0 242.3 352.5 445.4 
Others 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1977 
The major export growth areas included fuels, 
chemicals, manufactured goods, machinery and 
miscellaneous manufactures, demonstrating the growing 
strength of Korean manufacturing. By 1971 
manufacturing accounted for 80.7% of all exports and 
23.3% of G. N. P. 
The second plan exceed its original growth target of 7% 
and even exceeded the revised target set by the 1968 
O. R. B. It was evident from the position of, the economy 
at the end of the plan that the targets set had been 
overcautious. This did not discourage the Koreans from 
the use of planning, - if anything it reinforced their 
belief in the need for accurate planning and greatly 
improved their confidence, as it was much easier to 
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admit the need for uprating targets than to have to 
reduce their stated objectives. 
The continued strong growth evident in the Korean 
economy also improved Korea's image with investors and 
other sources of foreign capital. Korean business 
became more confident of the stability of the 
economy, of the government's determination and 
commitment to make the economy expand and in their own 
competence to export and compete in world markets. 
2.6 The Third Five Year Plan 1972 to 1976 
The Third Five Year Economic Development Plan differed 
from the previous two plans, as the Korean government 
introduced qualitative targets as opposed to the 
quantitative targets previously used. The philosophy 
behind the third plan was a harmonisation of growth, 
coupled with stabilisation, a balanced economy, and the 
promotion of a self-sustaining economic structure and 
regional development. 
The third plan looked to place much more emphasis on 
developing and improving conditions in rural areas and 
enhancing the quality of life of the Korean work force. 
Until this plan, although agriculture had received 
attention in the other plans, in truth it had attracted 
little or no assistance, as shown by the actual level 
of investment experienced during the second plan (7.1% 
against a target of 16.3%). As a consequence of this 
neglect, earnings and conditions in the rural areas 
were now becoming grossly out of line with the rest of 
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the economy. To encourage development in the rural 
areas, the government set up the 'Saemaul Undong' (new 
village movement) in early 1972. 
The economy was targeted to grow at an annual rate of 
8.6% and the following targets were set. 
1. The production of food grains will be increased and 
self-sufficiency will be achieved in the major food 
grains. Furthermore, the incomes of farmers and 
fishermen will be raised and farmland re- 
arrangement will be extended to facilitate farm 
mechanisation. 
2. Health and cultural facilities in farm and fishing 
villages will be expanded, and electrification and 
the expansion of road networks in rural areas will 
be promoted. 
3. The international balance of payments will be 
improved by achieving commodity exports of 3.5 
billion dollars in the target year. 
4. Heavy and chemical industries will be constructed, 
thereby further improving the nation's industrial 
structure. 
5. Manpower will be developed and employment will be 
maximised through the dramatic development of 
science and technology and the expansion of 
educational facilities. 
6. The balanced development of such basic social 
facilities as electricity, transportation, storage, 
cargo handling, and communications will be pursued. 
7. Regional development will be expedited through the 
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effective implementation of the four major river 
basins development programs and through the 
creation of industrial estates. 
8. The welfare of the people will be enhanced through 
the promotion of housing programs, sanitation 
facilities, and social security programs and 
through the improvement of working environment4. 
Table 2-12 Third Five Year Plan 1972-1976 (%) 
(1970 constant prices) 
Planned Achieved 
G. N. P growth rate 8.6 11.2 
Investment ratio 24.9 26.4 
Savings ratio 21.5 23.8 
Industrial Structure for 1976 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fish 22.4 20.3 
Mining & Manufacturing 27.9 36.0 
Social Overhead Capital 49.7 43.7 
Unemployment 4.0 3.9 
Source: Evaluation Report of the Third Five Year 
Economic Development Plan (1972-1976) 
The Third Five Year Economic Development Plan 
1971. 
The basic objectives were described in the Third Five 
Year Economic Development Plan (E. P. B) as, "the dynamic 
development of the rural economy, a dramatic and 
sustained increase in exports, and the establishment of 
heavy and chemical industries" (p3). 
The target set for G. N. P growth was deliberately set 
lower than in the second plan to try to avoid 
overstimulation of the economy which would result in 
excessive imports, and to enable the third plan to 
reach its targets of harmonising growth and stability. 
The emphasis on exports continued with their value 
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expected to triple, while imports were to double. In 
addition to expecting commodity exports to increase to 
$3.5 billion, imports were projected to increase to 
$3.6 billion, with the trade deficit reducing to $144 
million. Domestic savings were targeted to rise, as a 
greater proportion of total investment was to be 
financed from domestic resources. Manufacturing 
continued to be seen as the engine for growth, as it 
was targeted to increase at 13% per annum, with the 
heavy industries to increase their proportion of output 
and exports, as manufactured exports are expected to 
increase their share of total exports to 90%. 
The measures to stimulate the chemical and heavy 
industries started during the second plan, and were to 
accelerate during the third plan period, with the 
government encouraging the establishment of the import 
substituting chemical industries. The government had 
decided that the heavy industries needed building up to 
improve the, structure of manufacturing to make Korean 
industry more competitive. 
The move to more qualitative targets meant that new 
policies and strategies had to be developed and that it 
was becoming more difficult to actually assess the 
eventual performance. 
2.6.1 Economic Performance 1972-1976 
The third plan suffered serious difficulties due to the 
impact of the unfavourable economic conditions outside 
of Korean control. First there was a shortage of grain 
in 1972 and then more seriously in October 1973 the 
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world suffered the impact of the First Oil Crisis. 
These had an immediate impact with wholesale prices 
rising rapidly: in 1974 they increased by 42.1%, and it 
was not until 1976 that prices were coming back under 
control, at 12.1%. 
Table 2-13 Economic Indicators 1972-1976 
G. N. P 
growth 
rate (%) 
G. N. P 
per 
capita 
Exports 
(U. S 
Imports 
S millions) 
Balance 
1972 5.7 304 1,624 2,522 -574 
1973 14.1 361 3,225 4,240 -566 
1974 7.7 523 4,460 6,851 -1,937 
1975 6.9 573 5,081 7,274 -1,671 
1976 14.1 765 7,715 8,773 -591 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
The economy achieved a growth rate well above the 
target rate, averaging 11.2% against the target 8.6%. 
Inflation, as already indicated, increased rapidly 
though the government can be said to have started to 
come back under control by 1976. Following the changes 
in world trade conditions brought on by the oil crisis, 
which led to world-wide recession and the shortages of 
raw materials, Korean exports and imports were much 
larger than anticipated. Most importantly the trade 
deficit increased far more than the anticipated $144 
million, though it had started to reduce as trading 
conditions improved in 1976. Due to the change in 
world conditions, the heavy and chemical industries did 
not contribute as much as expected to exports, as is 
apparent from Table 2-15. 
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Their share of exports rose from 24.2% to 34.0%, though 
manufactured exports now accounted for over 90% of all 
commodity exports. As could be expected given the 
trading conditions the import bill increased, with the 
cost of oil imports increasing from $296 million in 
1973 to $1,020 million in 1974. The increase in the 
import bill obviously found its way through to the cost 
of Korean exports, but the government was able to 
overcome the problems presented by increasing the 
markets Korean exports entered and by strengthening 
support for exporters. 
Even with the world recession the economy continued to 
grow, with agriculture benefiting from a series of good 
harvests, the average growth rate of just below 6% far 
exceeded the target of 4.5%. Similarly manufacturing 
also exceeded its projected 13% annual average growth 
rate by 50%. 
Table 2-14 Industrial Growth 1967-1971 (%) 
Agriculture, All 
Forestry Other 
& Fisheries Industry Manufacturing 
1972 2.9 6.7 14.8 
1973 6.2 17.0 29.9 
1974 7.4 7.8 15.7 
1975 4.0 7.6 11.9 
1976 9.4 15.6 23.9 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1985 
The continued rapid growth rate in manufacturing led to 
the composition of industry changing even more than 
anticipated, with mining and manufacturing growing by. 
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5% more than anticipated, and increasing from 26.2% in 
1972 (of G. N. P, using 1970 constant prices), to 36.0% 
in 1976. While in the same period agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries reduced from 25.2% to 20.3%, 
showing that the third plan had continued the move away 
from agriculture towards industrialisation. 
Exports were also assisted by the pick up in the world 
economy in 1975 and 1976, and the government helped the 
trade deficit by bringing measures to curb import 
demand and the import of unessential products. 
Table 2-15 Exports by Commodity Group 1972-1976 
(U. S $ millions) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Food & Live 
Animals 107.0 245.6 299.7 602.4 508.3 
Beverages & 
Tobacco 14.0 22.9 47.5 67.6 78.3 
Crude Materials 
119.2 196.1 198.4 150.5 195.8 
Mineral Fuels 
& Lubricants 18.2 35.4 107.7 104.5 144.6 
Animal & 
Vegetable Fats 0.3 0.6 1.8 0.9 1.2 
Chemicals 
36.1 48.5 91.8 74.8 119.5 
Manufactured Goods 
by Materials 514.2 1,102.9 1,475.5 1,484.6 2,336.5 
Machinery & Transp ort 
Equipment 171.6 395.9 672.3 702.1 1,280.4 
Miscellaneous 
Manufactures 642.7 1,169.9 1,547.0 1,882.6 3,028.3 
Others 0.7 7.1 18'. 5 11.1 22.5 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1977 
Table 2-15 shows the very large amount of growth' in 
Korean manufacturing during the third plan. Most 
commodity groups showed substantial growth, though 
within theses figures, the growing influence of 
manufactured goods is visible: It is evident that the 
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three manufacturing commodity groups have continued to 
increase their influence as they represented just short 
of 81% of all exports in 1972 and by 1976 this had 
increased to over 86.5%. 
By the end of the third plan, the Korean economy had 
weathered the changing world economic conditions, and 
the targets set by the plan had yet again been 
exceeded. The industrial structure had improved, with 
a marked broadening of the industrial base, and both 
investments and savings had continued to rise. 
There were a number of difficulties facing the economy 
at the end of 1976: these were described as: 
"First, Korea's pattern of external trade is 
characterised by a rigid import structure due to the 
fact Korea has been heavily dependent on imports of 
principal raw materials and intermediates,. plus 
overseas capital sources, in achieving its high 
economic growth. This means that overseas business 
cycles tend to have severe effects on the domestic 
economy. Also, the export structure is greatly 
dependent on the country's export competitiveness based 
on low wages, because the bulk of Korean exports 
consist of labour intensive light industrial products 
This makes it difficult for the country to improve its 
terms of trade. 
Second, the disequilibrium in the balance of payments 
results basically from Korea's industrial structure 
itself. This situation calls for stepped-up efforts to 
build a resource-saving industrial structure, while 
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developing greater self-sufficiency in raw materials 
and capital goods. 
Third, rapid upward spirals of domestic prices have 
been leading to distortion of resources allocation, 
while abetting inflation hedging practices of the 
public. Thus, endeavours to increase domestic savings 
have been impeded. 
Fourth, the country's export-first policy has tended to 
retard sufficient increases in the international 
competitiveness of export industries that they need in 
coping with an inevitable shift toward an open economic 
systems . 
By the end of the Third Five Year'Plan, a consensus had 
arisen that Korea needed to improve monetary policy, 
banking, introduce price stabilisation, and move to 
improve the balance of payments and encourage foreign 
investment. Also there was a need to increase the 
quality of exports and to diversify the range of 
exports. 
2.7 The Fourth Five Year Plan 1977 to 1981 
The fourth plan came at a very important juncture in 
Korean economic development and for the future 
prospects for Korea's' economic expansion. 
The trade conditions facing not only Korea were no 
longer as favourable as in'the sixties and early 
seventies, following the oil crisis in 1973 and the 
subsequent world-wide recession and inflationary 
pressures. Trade had improved in 1975 and 1976 as 
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confidence returned, but many of Korea's major 
customers were facing large balance of payments 
deficits and growing unemployment, so there was a 
danger of protectionism increasing. 
The Korean government expected lower growth rates and 
realised that there, were a number of problems facing 
the economy that had to be faced. The Korean 
government also foresaw greater competition from both 
the other developing economies and from the developed 
economies. They reaffirmed the need to promote 
industry that used Korea's comparative advantage and 
the health of the economy as a whole was dependent on 
the continued-expansion of the export market. 
The Fourth Five Year Economic Development Plan had the 
following preamble, "With the ideals of 'growth', 
'efficiency', and 'equality', the Fourth Plan aims to 
build an economic structure for self-sustaining growth, 
to increase equity in income distribution through 
social development and to improve technology and 
efficiency of the economy. Fundamental to the 
achievement of these goals is the preservation of 
national security and the pursuit of an improved 
standard of living" (p10). 
The fourth plan set out a number of objectives, 
A. Economic structure for self-sustaining growth. 
1. Self-reliance in investment financing. 
2. Equilibrium in the balance of payments. 
3. Deepening of the industrial structure. 
B. Promotion of social development. 
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C. Technological innovation and improvements in 
efficiency. 
The government expected that by 1981 gross investment 
would be financed by domestic savings. Exports were 
expected to grow by an average of 16%, 4% higher than 
imports, so that the trade balance would be in surplus 
by 1980. They also had targeted the skilled labour 
intensive industries so that by 1981 the heavy 
industries would increase their share of manufacturing 
output to 50%. 
The need to improve productivity was seen as a major 
aim, as this would enable the economy to continue to 
grow, and technical innovation and increased efficiency 
were seen as the means to this. The fourth plan 
included specific schemes to encourage development of 
the skilled labour intensive industries through 
preferential development schemes. Industries targeted 
included electronics, machinery, and shipbuilding. The 
chemical and heavy industries were expected to expand 
at an annual rate of 17.3%, the industries benefiting 
from this preferential treatment had projected growth 
rates of 21.6% per annum, while the light industries 
had a target of 11.8%. 
The G. I1. P growth rate was set at a low value, when 
compared to the third plan, only 9.2% against 11.2%, 
but even this would mean G. N. P reaching $58 billion in 
1981. The fourth plan anticipated that the share of 
the economy represented by the primary sector would 
continue to decrease from 25.4% in 1975 to a targeted 
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18.5% by 1981, and that mining and manufacturing would 
increase its share, and as previously mentioned the 
greatest growth would be in the heavy industries. 
Table 2-16 Fourth Five Year Plan 1977-1981 (%) 
(1975 constant prices) 
Planned Achieved 
G. N. P growth rate 9.2 5.5 
Investment ratio 26.0 33.2 
Savings ratio 26.1 22.8 
Industrial Structure for 1981 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fish 18.5 18.3 
Mining & Manufacturing 40.9 35.9 
Social Overhead Capital 40.6 45.8 
Unemployment 3.8 4.5 
Source: The Fourth Five Year Economic Development Plan 
1977-1981. 
Economic Survey 1982. 
Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985. 
By 1981 Korean exports were expected to be worth more 
than $19 billion in 1981, of which 92% would be in 
manufactured goods, and half of this from the heavy 
industries. To achieve the export target the plan 
intended that the composition of Korean exports should 
change, with a move towards greater technology and 
goods requiring higher levels of skilled labour. This 
was in-line with the fourth plan's economic development 
policy, which projected that the heavy industries would 
receive the lion's share of manufacturing investment. 
Diversification was seen as a key policy to open up new 
markets and to overcome the threats of protectionism 
directed at the traditional Korean exports. The 
government encouraged the development of new markets, 
as they saw a need to reduce their dependence on the 
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U. S and Japan. 
Price stabilisation was also seen as a key target, 
since 1961 wholesale prices had increased by an average 
of 14%. Obviously the impact of the oil crisis had 
caused inflation, but even without this there was a 
long-term inflationary trend present, blamed on the 
excess supply of money. The government set a target of 
8 to 9% for inflation, and pursued this aim by 
introducing a number of stabilisation measures in the 
4th plan. These were, first, controls to keep the 
money supply at an average annual growth rate of 20%, 
secondly, measures to reduce the cost of production and 
finally moves to ensure that the market mechanism 
operated fairly. 
Overall the Fourth Five Year Plan while taking note of 
the world economic problems in 1973,1974 & 1975, was 
still fairly optimistic about world growth (4 to 5%) 
and very optimistic for the continued success of the 
Korean economy. 
2.7.1 Economic Performance 1977-1981 
Once again the Koreans' economic plans were damaged by 
changing world economic conditions, although this was 
not the only difficulty that the fourth plan faced. It 
became apparent during the plan, that the push by the 
government in developing the chemical and heavy 
industries, had caused serious structural problems 
within the economy. 
In 1978 and 1979, it was only the investment boom that 
kept the economy growing. The economy was overheating 
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with high levels of inflation coupled with rapidly 
rising wages and an ambitious development program. The 
expansion program, combined with the rapid recovery 
from the first oil crisis, joined forces to rapidly 
increase the money supply. This excess liquidity 
became a serious problem, coupled with a scarcity of 
resources and labour in some sectors. The government 
instituted a stabilisation package designed to adjust 
prices, effect an economic recovery by reviewing 
development policy. Unfortunately before the measures 
had a chance to take effect, the Korean economy along 
with the world economy suffered a severe blow as the 
'Second OIl Crisis' started. The Korean economy was 
not sufficiently strong enough to ride the effects, as 
Korea's oil import bill increased from $3. lbillion in 
1979 to $5.6 billion in 1980, and the world economic 
growth slowed to 3.5%. 
1980 was a terrible year for the economy, with negative 
growth (-5.2%) being achieved. Unemployment rose for 
the second year running (to 5.3%), consumer prices 
increased to 28.7% (18.3% in 1979) and wholesale prices 
recorded an increase of 38.9%. In addition as a result 
of problems with the harvest,, the summer crop was 
reduced by 30%. 
A final blow to the confidence in the economy and the 
government's ability to overcome the economic 
difficulties facing Korea, was the assassination of 
President Park in October 1979. Confidence in the 
economy completely collapsed and the interim government 
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could which not cope with the unrest, floundered. A 
military take-over occurred in May 1980, led by Chung 
Doo Hwan. 
Table 2-17 Economic Indicators 1977-1981 
G. N. P 
growth 
rate (9) 
G. N. P 
per 
capita 
Exports 
(U. S 
Imports 
S millions) 
Balance 
1977 12.7 965 10,046 10,810 -467 
1978 9.7 1,279 12,711 14,971 -1,781 
1979 6.5 1,597 15,055 20,338 -4,396 
1980 -5.2 1,605 17,505 22,292 -4,384 
1981 6.6 1,735 21,253 26,131 -3,628 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
Korea Statistical Yearbook, various years 
The balance of payments deficit had started to 
dereriorate prior to the second oil crisis, due to the 
increased imports of capital goods for the heavy 
industries in 1978 and the worsening export position in 
1979. The second oil crisis, which started late in 
1979 had a dramatic effect on the trade balance, with 
deficits of over $4 billion recorded in 1979 and 1980. 
The government introduced a stabilisation package in 
April 1979 with the aim of enhancing economic 
efficiency. The stabilisation package contained a 
number of key measures, which included moves to adjust 
prices to a realistic level, raising interest rates and 
bringing in a wage freeze to help counter the problems. 
One result of the balance of payments deficits induced 
by the second oil crisis was the rapid increase in 
overseas debt, increasing from a modest $12.6 billion 
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in 1977 to $32.5 billion in 1981. 
Exports increased to over $21 billion by 1981, beating 
the target, even though the growth rate slowed 
considerably in 1979 and 1980. Unfortunately imports 
helped by the influx of capital equipment and the oil 
crisis surged ahead, growing by 38.5% in 1977 and 35.8% 
in 1979, the stabilisation measures and the slowing 
down of the economy resulted in slower growth of 
imports in 1980 and 1981. 
Economic growth slowed during the period, with an 
average growth rate of just 5.5% against the targeted 
9.2%, and was actually negative in 1980, the first time 
since the 1950's. The performance of the different 
industrial sectors was also the worst for a number of 
years. 
Manufacturing registered less than 10% growth for the 
first time since 1964, actually posting a negative 
growth rate of -1.1% in 1980: similarly agriculture 
which had been improving and was now receiving greater 
government support went into decline. 
Both mining and manufacturing, and agriculture failed 
to meet their growth targets. Mining and manufacturing 
with a planned target of 14.2x&, only registered a 
growth of 9.7%: for the first time since the five year 
plans were introduced growth was well below 
expectations. Growth was still below target in 1981, 
due to poor domestic demand and low levels of 
production from the heavy industries. 
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Table 2-18 Industrial Growth 1977-1981 
Agriculture, All 
Forestry Other 
& Fisheries Industry Manufacturing 
1977 2.6 15.8 16.0 
1978 -9.2 14.7 21.3 
1979 6.7 6.5 10.3 
1980 -21.7 -1.7 -1.1 
1981 24.5 3.1 7.2 
Source: Econoinic Statistics Yearbook, 1985 
The change in Korean industrial structure continued, 
though not quite as planned. Agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries continued to decline in importance, but 
manufacturing failed to expand at quite the anticipated 
rate, and with social overhead capital managing to 
increase by more than 10% per annum, then it was this 
sector rather than manufacturing that became the 
largest contributor to G. N. P. 
Although exports did not perform as well as they had 
been expected to, the heavy industries considerably 
increased their share. Exports from the traditional 
light industries slowed, due to lack of investment 
which had resulted in poor levels of productivity and a 
growing lack of competitiveness; while the heavy 
industries increased their share to nearly half of all 
manufactured exports. The effects of the government's 
plan to develop the heavy industries is evident with 
the $3 billion increase in value in exports of 
machinery and transport. 
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Table 2-19 Exports by Commodity Group 1977-1981 
(U. S $ millions) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Food & Live 
Animals 945 933 1,082 1,153 1,322 
Beverages & 
Tobacco 108 120 118 124 119 
Crude Materials 
295 326 354 331 283 
Mineral Fuels 
& Lubricants 119 42 30 46 183 
Animal & 
Vegetable Fats 5 11 27 13 15 
Chemicals 
221 329 504 755 644 
Manufactured Goo ds 
by Materials 3,032 3,796 4,831 6,252 7,232 
Machinery & Tran sport 
Equipment 1,853 2,711 3,232 3,555 4,839 
Miscellaneous 
Manufactures 3.426 4,414 4,856 5,229 6,501 
Others 41 30 22 46 114 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
The Korean economy underwent a series of profound 
shocks and economic difficulties during the fourth 
plan. Trade recession, industrial inefficiency, 
difficulties with the development policy and the second 
oil crisis highlighted the structural inefficiencies of 
the Korean economy. The government's use of investment 
to force-feed the heavy industries, proved that it was 
no longer possible to centrally direct the whole of 
Korean economic development and that they were unable 
to -invest their way out of any economic difficulties. 
The complexity of the economy was now at such a level 
that the policies that had worked for Korea during the 
sixties and early seventies were no longer appropriate. 
The high levels of investment in the heavy 
industries had resulted in lop-sided development, 
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wasted resources, and the starvation of the light 
industries. There was a realisation that inflation, 
which was now running at 21.310 had to be tackled: 
previous plans had not treated inflation as an 
important factor, even though it could seriously effect 
industrial competitiveness. 
The economy was showing signs of recovery by the end of 
1981. The new government, led by Chun Doo Hwan had 
established itself in power, and the stabilisation 
measures undertake in late 1979 and early 1980 were 
having an effect. Also exports had started to recover, 
though growth was slower than experienced prior to the 
oil crisis. There was a realisation that the 
inflationary cycle had to be broken and the efficiency 
of Korean industry improved by introducing increased 
competition. 
`2.8 The Fifth Five Year Plan 1981 to 1986 
The fifth plan saw the role of government in the 
economy reduced, following the lessons learnt during 
the fourth plan. The government encouraged industry and 
the private sector to make more of their own decisions. 
The government's role was seen as being a guiding force 
rather than trying to direct the whole of the economy. 
Emphasis was now placed on stability, improving 
efficiency and balanced development. Greater priority 
was given to improving productivity and modernising 
industry, parity if not priority was given to the 
light industries. The plan looked towards balance, 
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rather than having 75% of the total fixed capital 
formation going to the heavy industries as in the 
previous plan. 
The fifth plan noted that the domestic economy faced a 
number of serious problems, including inflation, 
structural problems and distortions brought about by 
the encouragement of over expansion in industry, 
excessive government intervention and difficulties due 
to inequalities in income and regional development. 
The 1985 Economic Survey, highlighted the problems 
experienced during the fourth plan as, "domestically, 
the Korean economy began to reveal structural problems 
accumulated in the process of its rapid growth in the 
past. These problems led to political and social 
instability, which" made economic growth difficult. 
Moreover, the efficiency of the economy as a whole went 
down as the expansion of the money supply accelerated 
inflation. Similarly, excessive investment in heavy 
and chemical industries in the late seventies had 
become a severe burden to the economy, distorting the 
balance between heavy industries and light medium and 
small industries" (p12) 
The fifth plan differed from the four previous plans as 
the government realised that a different approach would 
have to be take if the economy was to continue to grow. 
The plan stated that, "First of all, the Plan, a 
blueprint for the future course of the nation, is the 
product of extensive' participation of the general 
public in the process of its formation and 
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implementation. It, therefore, identifies and reflects 
the broad national consensus on issues posed to Korea 
in the 1980's and the policy lines to effectively cope 
with them. 
Another distinctive feature of the plan is that it 
strongly possesses the character of an indicative plan 
and thus represents the changing role of government 
vis-a-vis private economic activities. Aside from a 
limited number of large scale projects, investment 
choices will be left to the private sector, while the 
government will indicate only the general framework and 
direction in which such choices should be made"6. 
The fifth plan was made during a period of severe world 
economic problems, following the second oil crisis. The 
Koreans expected world economic growth to be slow, at 
around 3.5% per annum and that protectionism and 
stagflation would be continuing threats. They also 
projected that the price of oil was liable to continue 
to rise towards $60 or even $70 a barrel. So it was 
with these projections in mind that the fifth plan was 
developed. 
The Fifth Five Year Economic and Social Development had 
the following objectives and strategies: 
"In view of the prospects for the world economy in the 
1980's and domestic issues raised since the late 
1970's, the basic objectives of stability, efficiency 
and balance constitute the keynote of the present Plan. 
The highest priority will be given to economic 
stabilisation, ` which is mandatory to ensure the 
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stability of livelihood, to strengthen industrial 
competitiveness and to improve the balance of payments. 
Policy measures will be implemented to reduce the rate 
of inflation ultimately to the 10% level. To this end, 
efficiency will be the foremost criterion for 
investment allocation and more efforts will be made to 
augment domestic savings. Economic efficiency will be 
improved, as the proper functioning of the market 
mechanism is restored by fair trade and other related 
policies. 
Although a great emphasis is placed on stabilisation in 
this Plan, a steady annual growth rate of 7 to 8% on 
the average is'called for to adsorb the ever increasing 
labour force and simultaneously to raise the income 
level. In fulfilling this objective, the export sector 
will continue to play the leading role, while the 
domestic market will accept more foreign competition in 
order to create a healthier climate for sustained 
economic growth. At the same time, the industries that 
have comparative advantages both home and abroad will 
be promoted, although energy-intensive industries will 
be discouraged to lessen the burden of the perennial 
energy constraint. 
Finally, to come astep closer toward the ideal of the 
welfare state, social development programs will be 
pursued to` obtain balanced growth in all regions, 
sectors and social groups. In an effort to improve the 
quality of life, more investments will be allocated to 
ameliorate environmental conditions and to meet the 
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basic needs of the people. 
In striving to reach the goals envisioned in the Fifth 
Plan, however, Korea will depart from quantitative 
target-oriented methods, which were the primary tactics 
of the` past four plans. The present Plan, in its 
place, relies mainly on the structural reform of 
economic institutions and policies, working toward, 
among others, import liberalisation, autonomous banking 
operations, an efficient industrial incentive system, 
and a competitive market mechanism. This strategy is 
inevitable and indispensable, since only such a 
structural readjustment will enable the Korean economy 
to tackle the changing domestic and foreign 
environment, and continue on the path of long-term 
steady growth" (pil-12). 
As can be seen this is quite different from previous 
plans: while exports are still considered to have an 
important role, economic growth has been scaled down 
from previous plans and other factors such as 
stabilisation, efficiency, productivity and better 
welfare are considered important. 
The fifth plan as previously mentiored gave greater 
emphasis to economic stabilisation, hence the growth 
target was set at only 7.6%. The government intended 
to bring in policy measures to reduce inflation, 
wholesale inflation stood at 20.4% in 1981, to 10%. 
With regard to industrial development, the plan 
expected manufacturing to continue to expand to reach 
34.0% of G. N. P by 1986. They expected a period of 
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consolidation in the heavy industries, with the light 
sector seen as the best place for investment as the 
results were liable to be quicker coming through. 
Exports continued to be seen as a major source of 
economic growth, commodity exports were expected to 
increase to $53 billion, with imports increasing to 
$55.5 billion. 
Table 2-20 Fifth Five Year Plan 1982-1986 
(1975 constant prices) 
Planned Achieved' 
G. N. P growth rate 7.6 7.6 
Investment ratio 30.1 32.6 
Savings ratio 29.6 27.3 
Industrial Structure for 1981 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fish 14.8 16.4 
Mining & Manufacturing 35.0 32.3 
Social Overhead Capital 50.2 51.3 
Unemployment 4.0 3.9 
Source: The Fifth Five Year Economic Development Plan 
1982-1986. 
Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985. 
1982-1984 
The traditional light manufactured exports, such as 
textiles, clothing and footwear were expected to 
continue to g: ow. but were expected to face mounting 
protectionist pressures, and so were expected to become 
of less importance during the fifth plan. Exports from 
the skill-intensive heavy industries were expected to 
grow very rapidly, so that by 1986,55% of all 
commodity exports would be from this area. 
In line with the policy of improving competitiveness 
and efficiency the government intended to shape its 
investment strategy to improve allocation of 
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investment, assist industrial technology and 
development, improve agriculture and reorganise Korea's 
energy strategy. 
Overall the Fifth Five Year Plan was a considerable 
departure from the previous plans, looking for greater 
stability and balance in the economy, and recognising 
the need to improve efficiency, productivity and bring 
inflation into line. 
The fifth plan underwent revision of its targets in 
1983 as it became apparent that the projections used 
for the world economic growth, inflation and oil prices 
were severely out of line with reality. The plan had 
projected world growth of 5%, when in fact growth had 
been negligible, similarly oil prices, instead of 
rising at 10% per annum were falling and the measures 
to stabilise inflation had had remarkable success, with 
consumer inflation running at only 7.3% in 1982. 
The revised plan continued to e phasise stability, 
efficiency and balance, focusing on the development of 
a self-reliant economy. It encouraged increased 
domestic saving to improve the balance of payments and 
promoted export growth by assisting Korean firms to 
enter new markets. The revised plan emphasised raising 
the efficiency of industry, mainly by using technology 
and through the development of technology oriented 
industries. Export and import targets were reduced, 
exports were now expected to reach $35.7 billion by 
1986, also the target for inflation was now 2% rather 
than the original 10%. 
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2.8.1 Economic Performance 1982-1984 
The economy continued to feel the effects of the 
recession in 1982, G. N. P grew at only 5.4%. and export 
growth was'only 2.8% compared to 21.4% in 1981. 
Growth picked up in 1983 and 1984, with G. N. P 
increasing by 11.9% and 8.4% respectively and with 
exports increasing quicker than imports in both' years, 
which resulted in a gradually declining trade deficit, 
though the gap still remained at more than $1 billion. 
Table 2-21 Economic Indicators 1982-1984 
G. N. P G. N. P 
growth per Exports Imports Balance 
rate (%) capita (U. S $ millions) 
1982 5.4 1,800 21,853 24,250 -2,594 
1983 11.9 1,884 24,445 26,192 -1,763 
1984 8.4 11999 29,244 30,631 -1,035 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
Korea Statistical Yearbook 1985 
The stabilisation program had brought inflation rapidly 
under control, with the declining oil prices assisting 
in reducing consumer inflation to only 2.3%, also 
wholesale prices only increased by 0.7% in 1984. In 
general world economic conditions had recovered since 
1992, with growth of around 4%, which had helped 
Korea's economic recovery, but there were signs of 
increasing protectionism which threatened many of 
Korea's exports. 
Exports increased primarily as a result of increased 
shipments of machinery and chemicals, while imports 
increased due to increased capital imports reflecting 
the growing strength of the economy. Manufacturing 
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showed signs of recovery in 1983 and 1984, posting 
growth rates of over 10% in both years. 
Table 2-22 Industrial Growth 1982-1984 (%) 
Agriculture, All 
Forestry Other 
& Fisheries Industry Manufacturing 
1982 3.3 5.9 4.1 
1983 6.5 13.0 12.2 
1984 0.2 10.0 14.8 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1985 
Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1985 
Agriculture continued to suffer from problems with 
stagnation, which resulted in growth of only 0.2% in 
1984. On the other hand, manufacturing grew at strong 
pace in 1983 and 1984, due to strong domestic and 
foreign demand. 
Table 2-23 Exports Commodity Group 1982-1984 
(U. S $ millions) 
1982 1983 1984 
Food &Live 
Animals 1,081 1,092 1,149 
Beverages & 
Tobacco 128 126 119 
Crude Materials 
1 273 292 328 
Mineral Fuels 
& Lubricants 310 556 832 
Animal & 
Vegetable Fats 9 4 4 
Chemicals 
670 677 845 
Manufactured Goo ds 
by Materials . 6,650 6,957 7,378 
Machinery & Tran sport 
Equipment 6,152 7,981 10,462 
Miscellaneous 
Manufactures 6,534 6,721 8,093 
Others 47 39 34 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
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The heavy industries continued to expand at a faster 
rate, recording a 19.8% rise in 1984, led by 
transportation, machinery and the electrical 
industries. 
Commodity exports increased rapidly in 1984, recording 
an increase of 19.6%, up from 11.9% in 1983, with 
imports growing at 16.9%, an increase of 8.9% on 1983. 
The major increases in exports came from the heavy 
industries, with light industrial exports recovering 
from their slump as textiles and rubber products 
registered strong growth. The increase in commodity 
imports to $30.6 billion in 1984 was directly 
attributable to strong growth in exports and increased 
domestic demand. 
By the end of 1984 it did look that the targets set for 
both the original and revised fifth plan would be 
achieved, as the economy and exports continued to grow. 
The economy has grown at an average of 8.6% and with 
domestic inflation coming under control looks set for 
the future. 
2.9 Conclusion 
South Korea has in the space of two decades moved from 
being one of the world's poorest L. D. C's to become a 
strong industrial based economy, with the ability to 
compete in the world's export markets. To achieve 
this the Korean government had to embark on an 
ambitious development plan, which required a complete 
change in philosophy and industrial strategy. They 
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have embraced an outward oriented development policy 
with exports seen as key element in this strategy. To 
this end the Korean government has used a series of 
Five Year Economic Development Plans as the basis for 
economic planning. The plans have differed in scope, 
complexity and emphasis but they have all acted as a 
framework for development of the economy. 
Because of the strategic role played by the state Korea 
has been identified as a 'Developmental State'. 
Johnson (1982) described the phenomenum as existing 
"in states that were late to industrialise, the state 
itself led the industrialisation drive that is, it took 
on -developmental functions" (p19). The developmental 
state is goal oriented and plan rational, with the 
impact of the government's decisions reaching far 
beyond economic policy, encompassing all aspects of the 
countrys development. 
With regard to countries like Korea, White (1988) 
stated that: 
"East Asian experience illustrates the crucial 
importance of achieving a balance between governmental 
regulation and market processes, state and civil 
society, domestic and international economies; a 
balance which accords a substantial role to the state 
as- the executor of'a national economic interest but 
encourages a vibrant market context" (p25). 
While Japan was the model for the developmental state, 
Korea does appear to fit into this category as we have 
seen the government make great use of the plans drawn 
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up by the E. P. B and Ministry of Finance. In addition 
the Korean government has made great use of its powers 
to direct the economy, though it is now liberalising 
and relaxing its controls as the economy develops. 
Kwang Suk Kim (1983), noted that: 
"Korea's past economic success has been related in 
large part to the system of economic management 
discussed in this paper. Another important ingredient 
has been the political leadership's strong commitment 
to economic growth. Since Korea's government is highly 
centralised, it could not have brought about economic 
success without the top policymaker's commitment to 
this goal. 
This system is currently facing a new test now that 
development objectives have been expanded. In the 
past, the political leadership was committed simply to 
maximising economic growth and did not pay much 
attention'to price stability, -an equitable distribution 
of growth benefits, political stability, and so on. 
Now it is commited to attaining more diverse 
objectives. The question arises whether Korea's present 
system of economic management can continue to achieve 
economic success under such a multidimensional 
commitment. " (p76-77). 
Whang (1987) noted that the Korean government was 
continuing to liberalise the economy and relinquish 
its direct control in favour of indirect means. In 
addition he wrote the following, "lastly it is worth 
noting that the Korean government's role in economic 
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development has felt few ideological constraints. The 
"pragmatism" prevailing in the policy making process 
has allowed the government to choose among all 
available instruments and tools in achieving the 
defined goals and solving the policy problem" (p88). 
Not only has the Korean government been commited to 
planning and development but a possible key to their 
success has been this pragmatic approach. 
This commitment to planning and development has led to 
a dramatic change in the economy, with G. N. P increasing 
from $2 billion to over $79 billion between 1961 and 
1984. Similarly exports have increased from only $40 
million to $29.2 billion, with manufacturing exports 
taking a greatly increased share of commodity exports. 
The economy has undergone aa complete transformation, 
from one which was heavily dependent on aid and leaning 
towards 'import substitution to an outward oriented 
industrialised economy. The development of Korean 
manufacturing and especially manufactured exports has 
been vital to the success of the Korean government's 
plans, with manufacturing developing from a very small 
base and moving from the light to the heavy industries, 
as we shall see in chapter three. 
The Korean government has had a key role to play in 
Korean economic development and they are liable to 
continue to have an impact on the direction the economy 
takes. Given the difficulties experienced in the late 
seventies this was likely to be more in an advisory 
and less directive way than before. The Korean 
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government has exercised considerable control over the 
economy and as we shall see in chapter four foreign 
direct investment. As the economy has developed the 
government has had to liberalise and loosen the control 
of the economy, letting Korean industry take more of 
its own decisions. 
The economy still faces a number of challenges, as 
outlined in the Economic Survey in 1985. 
"Before Korea can achieve an advanced economy, 
however, it has to commit itself to improving its 
economy's structural efficiency and to promoting 
welfare among all segments of its society. 
First, the nation's hard-won stability has to be firmly 
consolidated so that inflationary expectations can be 
completely eradicated. 
Second, in order to cultivate its growth 
potential, Korea must resolve structural problems still 
latent in some sectors of the economy, by such means as 
the liquidation of insolvent enterprises and the 
development of the banking sector. 
Third, the need for social development must be met on 
an enlarged scale in order to fulfil the ever- 
increasing social and economic expectations of the 
people and to avoid the conflicts that may result if 
popular expectations are denied" (p16). 
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5. Evaluation of 3rd Five Year Economic Development 
Plan pp141-142. 
6. The 5th Five Year Economic and Social Development 
Plan p10. 
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Chapter Three 
Korean Industrial Development 
3.1 Introduction 
The development of a strong industrial base has been a 
key economic policy since the early sixties and this is 
evident when examining the Five Year Economic 
Development Plans, in chapter two. The development and 
composition of Korean manufacturing is an important 
factor when considering the impact of foreign 
investment and especially F. D. I, as it to this area 
that the vast majority of foreign direct investment was 
directed in the sixties and seventies. Because of this 
it is important to investigate the development of 
Korean manufacturing, so as to understand its 
importance, to Korean economic growth and the inferences 
that can be drawn to the importance of foreign direct 
investment inflow. 
We -have investigated the development of the 
Korean manufacturing sector by examining the 
performance of certain key industrial sectors within 
manufacturing, considering the changes in the 
composition of manufacturing in terms of output and 
exports. By doing this we'. can emphasise the 
alterations that Korea has undergone in the last two 
decades and it improves our understanding of Korean 
manufacturing development, and the role played by 
foreign direct investment. 
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Because of the importance of the Five Year Plans and 
their role in shaping economic development, this 
chapter will treat manufacturing development under the 
same time scales as chapter two. 
While for the purposes of this research we are 
interested in the period 1971 to 1984, we have to 
examine the background to manufacturing development 
prior to 1971, and we need to examine the 2nd plan 
period in some detail as 1971 was the last year of the 
plan. 
3.2 Industrial Development before 1967 
As explained in chapter two, section 2.3, Korea had 
established a firm economic base by the start of the 
2nd plan in 1967, with the establishment of an outward 
looking export oriented development strategy based on 
the expansion of Korean manufacturing. Manufacturing 
had started to emerge as an important key element of 
the Korean economy and its expansion. Although the 
contribution from agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
towards G. N. P was still twice that of manufacturing in 
1966, (37.9% vs 18.1%), this was a considerable 
improvement as from only 15% in 1962. 
Domestic investment in manufacturing increased from 10 
billion won (1962) to 66 billion won in 1966, which 
represented 29.4% of domestic capital formation, as 
the Korean government focused on expansion of key 
industrial factories, with the intention of rapidly 
increasing manufacturing production capacity. 
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Manufacturing exhibited very high growth rates during 
this period, averaging 15.1% between 1962 and 1966. 
The evidence from Table 3-1, is that manufacturing 
during the ist plan grew at nearly double its pre-war 
rate of 7.6%. -Strong growth was evident in all areas, 
with exceptional growth in general manufacturing, 
which increased by 34.4%, led by clothing industry. 
The rapid growth of manufacturing was also reflected in 
the increase in the size of the work force; between 
1963 and 1966, total. employment increased by 760,000, 
of which 220,000 found employment in manufacturing. 
Manufacturing's share of total employment (considering 
only "those in work) increased from 8% in 1963 to over 
10% by the end of 1966. 
Table 3-1 Manufacturing Growth Rates by Division 
(1965 constant prices %) 
1954-1961 1962-1966 
Processed Food & Beverages 7.0 11.4 
Textiles 7.5 15.8 
Chemicals 14.2 20.0 
Ceramics 13.1 22.3 
Metals 26.6 20.2 
Machinery 15.5 22.5 
Others 6.8 34.4 
All manufacturing 7.6 15.1 
Sources: Economic, Survey 1967 
Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
Commodity exports increased rapidly from only $40.9 
million in 1961 to $250.3 million in 1966. 
Manufacturing exports which had only represented 22% 
of commodity exports in 1961, had risen to a share of 
over 60% by 1966. The major manufactured exports 
listed in Table 3-2, show that as manufacturing 
increased its share of commodity exports to over 60%. 
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certain industries became major exporters. By 1966, 
the five items listed in Table 3-2, accounted for 
nearly 60% of all manufactured exports and 37% of all 
commodity exports. If textiles (exports $34.5 million 
in 1966) was used, rather than the largest export item 
from the textile group (cotton fabrics), then the five 
would represent 75% of all manufactured exports. 
Table 3-2 Major Manufactured Exports 1962-1966 
(U. S dollars millions) 
Veneer Iron & False 
Sheets & Cotton Steel Beards 
Plywood Fabrics Plates Clothing &Wigs 
1962 2.3 1.8 .51.1 
1963 6.3 4.3 8.3 4.6 
1964 11.4 11.1 2.1 6.6 
1965 18.0 10.5 10.2 20.7 2.3 
1966 29.9 10.0 7.1 33.4 12.0 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
.. indicates item not separately reported. 
This signifies the strength and importance of the 
so called light industries in the sixties at the start 
of Korean industrial development. These industries 
include foods, textiles, footwear, wood and wood 
products and ceramics. Manufacturing output reached 
600 billion won (approximately $2.2 billion) in 1966, 
and the light industries accounted for over 70% of this 
output. Similarly with 'exports, these industries 
represented 93% ($145 million) of manufacturing 
exports. 
Even though in 1966, Korean manufacturing was dominated 
by the light industries (textiles, clothing, food 
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processing et al), the heavy industries (chemicals 
sector, basic metals and the fabrications sector), were 
developing as the government encouraged the building of 
new plant. The following is a list of projects 
completed in 1966, and indicates the scale of the 
development taking place and the changes in the 
structure of Korean industry. 
These were the major projects completed in 1966: 
a. Samhwa Iron & Steel Plant 
b. Corrugated cables 
c. P. V. C Plant 
d. 5 Cement Plants 
e. Fertiliser Plant 
f. Viscose Rayon Yarn Plant 
g. Polyacrylic Fibre Plant 
h. Ramie Textile Facilities 
j. Inchon Iron & Steel Plant 
Source: Economic Survey 1967 (p22). 
So that while the light industries continued to be the 
most important, their share was gradually diminishing, 
as Table 3-3 demonstrates. 
The structure and composition of Korean industry was 
changing at a very rapid pace, the heavy industries had 
more than doubled their share of value added since 
1958. Their presence in the export sector was as yet 
limited, with much of the expansion aimed at import 
substitution. In industries where it was relatively 
easy, such as fertiliser, cement and chemicals, though 
this was expected to change during the second plan. 
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Table 3-3 Composition of Value Added 
(1965 constant prices, %) 
1958 1960 1963 1966 
Food Processing 26.1 25.8 20.5 18.6 
Textiles 33.5 29.5 25.0 8.5 
Chemicals 3.5 4.6 8.1 8.5 
Ceramics 2.7 2.9 3.6 4.3 
Metal 2.8 4.3 5.8 5.3 
Fabrications 5.5 5.8 9.7 10.2 
Others 25.9 27.1 27.3 25.9 
Heavy Industry 11.8 14.7 23.6 24.0 
Source: Industry in Korea 1967 
By the end of 1966 manufacturing had become a major 
part of the Korean economy. Manufacturing now 
represented 19.8% of G. N. P, over 60% of commodity 
exports and contributed 25.2% of all growth in 1966. 
Growth in manufacturing averaged over 15% per annum, 
with the fabrications sector (fabrication, machinery 
electronics and transportation equipment), recording an 
increase of 44% in 1966. Exports were expanding and 
the government's development plans were beginning to 
take effect. 
Although manufacturing was heavily reliant on the 
light industries, this was undergoing a gradual change, 
as Korean industry expanded and new development took 
place. The challenge to the Koreans was, could 
the performance achieved during the first plan be 
sustained and expanded upon in the second plan? As it 
transpired the targets were surpassed with ease. 
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3.3 Industrial Development 1967-1971 
The basic objectives for industry set out in the 
Second Five Year Plan were: 
"Modernising the industrial structure and expediting 
the attainment of a self-supporting economy"'. 
With the initial success of the Korean 
government's export oriented growth policy, and the 
strengthening of the country's manufacturing base, the 
situation facing the planners when considering 
industrial policy was described by Cole and Lyman 
(1971) as follows: 
"the questions that had to be answered in connection 
with industrial structure for the Second Plan were more 
in'terms of how far the existing trends could or should 
be pursued and what marginal adjustments seemed 
appropriate rather than what major shifts in direction 
or policy were needed" (p212). 
As with the First Economic Development Plan the policy 
of using exports as the engine of growth for the 
manufacturing sector and the economy were taken as 
agreed and the basic strategy was very similar to the 
first plan. 
The main areas of discussion centred on the following 
issues: 
1. How rapidly could exports be increased? 
2. Could demand for certain intermediate products 
expand sufficiently to justify the building of 
economically efficient plants? 
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3. Whether or not to permit the large scale 
importation of machinery and equipment to support 
a rapid expansion of investment, or to try to 
divert some of this demand to the domestic 
machinery and capital goods industries. 
Frank, Kim and Westphal (1975) noted that: 
"The basis for accelerated and diversified 
industrialisation will be broadened by giving emphasis 
to investment in such industries as chemicals, 
machinery and iron and steel" (p20). 
The main thrust of the Korean government's industrial 
strategy during the Second Five Year Plan was to deepen 
the manufacturing base and to build-up the heavy and 
chemical industries, looking for higher growth and 
increased efficiency. The government brought in 'The 
Machinery Industry Promotion Act' in 1967 to assist the 
development of the machinery sector. This facilitated 
, the development of the machinery sector by providing 
assistance, expanding production facilities, aiding 
modernisation and in using licensing to upgrade the 
industry. Also in 1967 the 'Electronics Industry 
Promotion Law' was brought in as electronics was now 
regarded as a strategic export industry. 
The major recipients of domestic investment during this 
period were the chemicals, apparel, food and later the 
fabrication industries (mainly electric and 
electronics). The light industries received 68.5% of 
domestic investment in 1967; this had diminished to 
52.5% by 1971. 
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Table 3-4 Domestic Investment 1967-1971 
(billion won) 
1967a 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 58 15 30 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 13 32 30 39 
Wood & Wood Products 
45 10 7 
Paper & Paper Products 
2 6 5 7 
Chemicals 
11 29 22 47 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 25 20 9 10 
Basic Metal Industries 
3 9 6 16 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 9 14 13 23 
Others 
1 3 3 2 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, ' Summary of 
Mining and Manufactur ing', various years 
a. 1967 not available 
Construction became quite important during the second 
plan, as the cement industrys capacity increased to 
6.8million MT (metric tonnes), with the renovation and 
expansion of existing facilities, as in the iron and 
steel industry and with the construction-of new plant 
in the fertiliser industry (eight built). Also during 
the second plan the first stage of major development of 
many heavy industries started. Korea's first oil 
refinery opened at Ulsan in 1964. 
During the second plan two more refineries came on 
stream (in 1969 and 1970) doubling Korea's refining 
capacity. This was in line with the. government's 
strategy to move from coal to oil for electricity 
generation, and the development of inter-related 
petrochemical industries and the expected increase in 
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oil demand, projected to increase by 250% from 1970 to 
1976. 
Other important developments included the start of 
Korea's first integrated iron and steel mill at Pohang 
(being built for POSCO) and the construction of a 
naptha cracking plant (and the associated downstream 
plants) to greatly boost the petrochemical industries. 
The plan to develop an integrated iron and steel mill 
was not new, it had initially been included in the 1st 
Plan, but was withdrawn as the World Bank considered 
even a small iron and steel plant (1 million MT), as 
being far too ambitious for the Korean economy to 
support. Given this opposition and the consequent 
failure to raise the necessary finance, the plan was 
shelved. 
The construction of such projects needed considerable 
government `support due to the, tremendous capital 
investment needed. Such projects, however were vital 
for the development of manufacturing and for the plans 
to deepen and broaden the industrial base. - 
3.3.1 Industrial Performance 1967-1971 
During this period manufacturing output, value added, 
exports and all other performance measures surged 
ahead. Output increased from 785 billion won ($2.9 
billion) in 1967 to over 2,454 billion won ($6.6 
billion) by 1971. The major change over this period 
was the increase in the chemical industrys share of 
output from 15.2% in 1967 to 20.4% in 1971 (Table 3-5). 
The light industries continued to dominate output, 
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though their share had reduced from 67.3% to 61.9% by 
1971. Four industrial sectors dominated manufacturing 
output, accounting for 79% of manufacturing output in 
1971= which was only a slight drop from the 79.9% in 
1967. Textiles and food remained the largest industrial 
sectors (in terms of output), accounting for 45.5% of 
output, though this was a considerable reduction on the 
51.4% in 1966. 
Table 3-5 Manufacturing Output 1967-1971 j 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 26.1 24.7 25.6 25.1 22.2 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 25.6 24.9 24.5 24.6 23.3 
Wood & Wood Products 
4.5 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.9 
Paper & Paper Products 
5.6 5.1 4.8 4.4 5.0 
Chemicals 
15.2 17.1 16.8 18.6 20.4 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.4 
Basic Metal Industries 
4.6 4.3 4.4 4.8 4.7 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 13.0 13.4 13.9 11.9 13.1 
Others 
1.7 1.6 1.7 2.3 2.1 
Source: National Income Accounts, various years 
The change in the composition of manufacturing output 
between the light and heavy industries is reflected in 
the average growth rates experienced by the various 
industrial sectors. In general output from the light 
industries increased threefold during this period, from 
528 billion won to 1,517 billion won, while the heavy 
industries experienced- slightly faster growth 
increasing by 360% (from 257 to 937 billion won). 
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The effect of the slightly higher growth in the heavy 
industries was to increase their share of manufacturing 
output from 32.8% in 1967 to 38.2% in 1971. 
Table 3-6 Structure of Manufacturing 1967-1971 (%) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Light Industriesa 67.2 65.1 64.9 63.1 61.8 
Heavy Industriesa 32.8 34.9 35.1 36.9 38.2 
Source: Derived from output in Manufacturing 
National Income Statistics 1984 
see Appendix A 
Between 1967 and 1971 manufacturing had an annual 
growth rate of close to 23% (Table 2-9), in contrast 
G. N. P increased by 9.6% per annum over the same period. 
Table 3-7 Growth Rate of Production 1967-1971 
(%, 1970 constant prices) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Manufacturing 29.6 35.8 20.6 11.6 16.6 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 25.7 22.3 22.9 11.6 21.3 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 31.2 40.6 29.6 18.5 25.3 
Wood & Wood Products 
77.3 50.4 3.5 9.8 13.2 
Paper & Paper Products 
9.3 45.4 1.2 1.7 19.1 
Chemicals 
43.4 47.1 19.7 21.1 12.3 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 20.6 13.3 21.5 -2.2 17.7 
Basic Metal Industries 
3.6 58.8 23.7 4.3 8.5 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 28.8 27.2 22.8 3.7 13.8 
Others 
17.6 -7.9 31.5 27.4 -11.4 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1977 
This rapid rate of growth and the effects of the 
Korean government's development policy, are shown in 
table 3-7, as indicated by the rapid increases 
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experienced by the 
and the iron and 
1968. 
Textiles, apparel 
increases in pro 
chemicals sector 
chemical industries in 1967 and 1968 
steel industries (basic metals) in 
and clothing had the highest average 
auction, averaging 29%, with the 
also coming close to an average of 
29%. Although the wood and wood products sector 
(mainly the plywood industry) averaged over 30%, due to 
changing circumstances, with other countries becoming 
more reluctant to supply timber, growth had slowed 
considerably by 1971. 
The fabrications sector, which includes machinery, 
electric and electronics and transport showed strong 
growth (19%), with the electrical industries averaging 
over 30%. 
Table 3-8 Manufacturing Employment 1967-1971 
(thousands) 
19678 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Manufacturing 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 
Wood & Wood Products 
Paper & Paper Products 
Chemicals 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 
Basic Metal Industries 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 
Others 
1,170 1,232 1,284 1,336 
96 100 117 
241 274 268 
43 46 45 
45 46 49 
88 91 102 
" 51 50 50 
29, 29 32 
117 138 150 
'39 55 48 
115 
274 
42 
51 
104 
48 
26 
144 
43 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
e. Figures gor individual sectors not available. 
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The changes in the structure of manufacturing are also 
evident when the pattern of employment during 1967 and 
1971 is considered. The textile industries remained 
the largest employers, increasing their employment by 
13.7%, as shown in Table 3-8. The largest increase was 
registered by the fabricated sector, who increased 
their work force by 23%, also the chemicals sector 
experienced an 18% increase. Total manufacturing 
employment rose from 833,000 in 1967 to 1,336,000 by 
1971, as its share of the Korean work force increased 
from 9.9% to 13.6%. 
With the expansion of Korean manufacturing, the 
governments development plans and the 
increasing importance of manufacturing (see chapter 
two, section 2.5.1), there was a gradual lessening of 
the dependence on the traditional light industries as 
the heavy and chemical industries continued to expand. 
This has been shown in table 3-6, with the heavy 
industries' share of output gradually increasing. This 
is also apparent when the composition of manufactured 
exports is examined (table 3-9). 
Table 3-9 Manufacturing Exports 1967-1971 
(U. S $ millions) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Manufacturing 215 340 483 653 884 
Lighta 160 254 326 421 628 
Heavya 55 84 157 232 256 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
a see Appendix A 
The, change in the structure of manufacturing was also 
evident when examining manufactured exports. Exporting 
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had as outlined in chapter two been seen once again as 
the engine of growth and with this manufacturing 
exports increased to over $880 million in 1971, rising 
to 82% of commodity exports. The development of the 
heavy sector was revealed by its increasing importance 
with regard to manufactured exports. In 1967 the heavy 
and chemical industries accounted for approximately 25% 
of manufactured exports by 1971 they represented 29%, 
which was very much in-line with their increased share 
of output (5.4%). So while the heavy industries were 
improving their share of exports, the light industries 
continued to dominate. 
The textiles sector accounted for over 54% of 
manufactured exports in 1971, with the nearest sector 
being wood and wood products with 14.8%. The 
largest heavy industry sector was fabrications sector 
which had 12%. 
The government's policy of encouraging the development 
of the electrical goods industries led to exports of 
electrical machinery increasing from $7.7 million to 
over $68 million. The principal individual exports in 
1971 were, clothing and accessories ($132.9 million) 
and plywood ($124.3 million). Table 3-10 indicated 
that most of the principal exports were still from the 
traditional light industries. 
An important point to note is that items above 
accounted for 66% of all manufactured exports in 1971, 
little changed from 1967 (65.8%). The principal 
exports all came from the light industries except for 
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plates and sheets of iron and s 
important export item towards the 
to demand from Vietnam. 
Table 3-10 Principal Manufactured 
(U. S $ millions and %) 
1967 1968 
teel which became an 
end of the period due 
Exports 1967-1971 
1969 1970 1971 
Clothing & 25.0 52.0 73.4 84.3 132.9 
Accessoriesa 11.6 15.3 15.2 12.9 15.0 
Plywood 36.4 65.6 79.2 91.7 124.3 
16.9 19.3 16.4 14.0 14.1 
Textile Yarn 10.0 11.6 17.6 30.6 71.0 
4.7 3.4 3.6 4.7 8.0 
Wigs & Beards 22.7 35.1 60.2 100.9 69.9 
10.6 10.3 12.5 15.5 7.9 
Mens & Boys 13.9 27.8 37.6 52.7 63.7 
Under Garments 6.5 8.2 7.8 8.1 7.2 
Mens & Boys 4.6 9.0 14.8 22.6 43.2 
Outer Garments 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.5 4.9 
Footwear 8.1 11.0 10.5 17.3 37.4 
3.8 3.2 2.2 2.6 4.2 
Textile Fabrics 19.4 27.7 19.7 17.3 21.3 
9.0 8.1 4.1 2.6 2.4 
Plates & Sheets of 7.6 20.1 
Iron & Steel 1.2 2.3 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
e. Clothing and accessories, knitted or crocheted 
As already indicated, textiles and clothing represented 
by far the largest amount of exports and dominate the 
principal export items. Even with the growth of 
electrical machinery exports (6% of manufactured 
exports), no single item was large enough to feature in 
Table 3-10. 
3.3.2 Summary 
By the end of the Second Five Year Plan, Korean 
manufacturing had experienced its seventh year of 
121 
double digit growth. Manufacturing now represented 
over 20% of G. N. P and 82% of commodity exports. 
Exports, particularly manufactured exports, continued 
to play a significant role in the government's plans. 
Several of the traditional light industries had already 
established significant export markets, with the newer 
industries such as electronics looking to become major 
exporters in the near future. 
3.4 Industrial Development 1972-1976 
The major targets of the Third Five Year Economic 
Development Plan included: 
1. - A dramatic and sustained increase in exports and 
the establishment of heavy and chemical 
industries. 
2. Heavy and chemical industries will be constructed, 
thereby further improving the nation's industrial 
structure. 
Manufacturing was projected to grow at 13%, a lower 
growth target had been set (in comparison to the 2nd 
plan), because it was believed that as the 
structure of industry deepened then growth would slow. 
Manufacturing growth actually exceeded the target set 
by 6.2%. Manufacturing was expected to lead and 
increase the potential for the growth of the whole 
economy. 
Output from manufacturing was expected to rise by 
133.2% of its 1970 level, once again a lower growth 
rate than in the previous plan because of the increased 
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emphasis on the heavy and chemical industries, which 
was expected to take time to develop significantly. 
With the emphasis on the heavy and chemical industries, 
it was expected that there would eventually be a 
considerable increase in output. It was expected that 
the effects of this growth would be felt across the 
entire manufacturing sector. The anticipation was that 
by 1976 the heavy sector would represent 40.5% of all 
manufacturing output (38.2% in 1971). 
Once again exports were seen as the path to industrial 
expansion. As outlined in Chapter 2 (2.6), exports 
were anticipated to increase threefold to about $4 
billion, with commodity exports reaching $3.5 billion, 
so that total exports to G. N. P should rise to 29.6% by 
1976. 
Commodity exports were expected to grow by 24.3% per 
annum, with manufacturing's share increasing to 
approximately 90%. Electronic products were expected 
to become a major export sector, reaching $452 million 
by 1976 (12% of exports). Emphasis was also to be 
placed on the development of shipbuilding, machine 
tools and metal products. The heavy and chemical 
industries were expected to contribute over 30% of 
manufacturing exports by 1976. 
Support was given to the further expansion of the iron 
and steel industry, as projections for 1976 showed that 
even with POSCO's integrated mill entering production 
in 1973, demand was liable to exceed the projected 
supply for 1976 (4 million MT). The petrochemical 
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sector was to continue its expansion and oil refining 
was also to expand further. To further encourage the 
machinery industries, efforts were to be made to 
increase raw material supply, use tax incentives to 
encourage investment and to speed technical 
development. 
Table 3-11 Domestic Investment 1972-1976 
(billion won) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 28 57 57 74 106 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 30 183 176 202 274 
Wood & Wood Products 
6 21 12 12 21 
Paper & Paper Products 
8 21 18 27 22 
Chemicals 
82 93 124 143 123 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 18 11 31 55 77 
Basic Metal Industries 
55 102 40 64 193 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 25 82 127 257 287 
Others 
4 4' 4 5 14 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 'Summary of 
Mining and Manufacturing', various years 
The pattern of domestic investment indicated by the 
figures from the yearly 'Summary of Mining and 
Manufacturing'2, indicate the change in the direction 
of investment. By 1976, the fabrications sector had 
become - the largest single recipient of domestic 
investment in manufacturing followed by textiles, basic 
metals and chemicals. The heavy industries received 
54% of the reported domestic investment in 1976 and 53% 
of the total investment for the five years (3375 
billion won). The Korean government gave encouragement 
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to continue expansion and renovation of facilitates in 
general. Necessary improvements to the infrastructure 
were to be made, to allow for this growth without 
bottlenecks developing. 
As outlined in chapter two, the targets set were 
beaten, even allowing for the first oil crisis, which 
occurred in October 1973. The economy grew at an 
average annual rate of 11.2% and commodity exports 
reached $7,815 million against a target of $4,000 
million. Mining and manufacturing which had been 
projected to rise to 27.9% of G. N. P actually reached 
30%. 
The third plan laid stress on the further development 
of the heavy industries. This development had already 
started during the second plan period but was 
accelerated during the third plan. The first 
integrated iron and steel mill at Pohang for POSCO was 
completed in 1973, with`a second expansion plan going 
into immediate effect which reached completion in May 
1976, with a further development planned in 1976. These 
developments boosted production of iron and steel to 
2.6 million MT, with 'a huge increase in pig iron 
production, which had increased tenfold from 1971 to 
2.15 million MT. 
In the petrochemical industries, a naptha plant and its 
associated downstream plants were completed at Ulsan 
in 1974. A further five chemical plants were completed 
in 1975 and four more in 1976. The capacity of the 
petrochemical industries increased rapidly, with the 
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production of chemicals for industry increasing by an 
average of 125% per, annum between 1972 and 1976. The 
production of fertiliser declined as both domestic and 
export demand reduced, though capacity for the 
production of compound fertiliser was to increase with 
the completion of a large scale plant in 1977. Oil 
refining capacity continued to increase, reaching 
435,000 BPSD in 1976. 
Shipbuilding underwent a transition period as Hyundai 
Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries , 
dramatically 
increased its capacity from 700,000--Gross Tonnes to 2 
million G. T. Shipbuilding capacity increased to 2.6 
million G. T from only 189,000 G. T in 1971. More 
importantly this expansion brought modern shipbuilding 
techniques into the Korean yards. , 
In addition the-automotive industry also experienced 
considerable development, a- long-term plan was 
promulgated by the Korean government in 1974, leading 
to considerable expansion and the appearance of the 
first Korean built cars. 
3.4.1 Industrial Performance 1972-1976 
Prior to discussing the performance and the changes 
that manufacturing underwent during the third plan 
period, it would be prudent to-consider the impact of 
the first oil crisis, since this had a considerable 
bearing on the performance of, the World economy which 
in turn effected the Korean economy. 
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3.4.1.1 The First Oil Crisis 
The rapid rise in oil prices (quadrupled, ) that 
occurred in October 1973, stopped the boom that had 
been experienced in 1972 and early 1973, plunging the 
World economy into recession. This damaged the Korean 
economy especially hard due to the importance of 
exports and its reliance on oil imports. Exports 
growth slowed (detailed in chapter two, section 2.6.1) 
as the cost of imports surged, creating a considerable 
balance of payments problem in 1974 and 1975, though 
there were signs of a recovery in 1976. 
The effect of the first oil crisis on industry was 
severe, as costs rose rapidly and there were problems 
over obtaining oil supplies during the initial period 
following the price rise, which put constraints on 
industry. An indication of the cost of the rise can be 
gained by looking at the value of oil imports, in 1972 
these were $217 million, rising to $296 million in 1973 
and $1,020 million in 1974. Another indicator was that 
wholesale prices rose by 42% in 1974. 
The problems caused by the first oil crisis resulted in 
the balance of payments deficit increasing to $1,937 
million in 1974; this had reduced to $591 million by 
1976, which was comparable to the deficits in 1972 and 
1973. 
3.4.1.2 Performance 1972-1976 
Manufacturing output increased from 3,187 to 13,829 
billion won, easily beating the output target set by 
the third plan, though the size of the increase was 
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distorted by the oil price rise. In real terms output 
increased by 210% against the target of 133%, giving an 
average annual growth rate of 19.5%. The composition 
of manufacturing output continued to change, reflecting 
the growing importance of the heavy industries and the 
impact of the first oil crisis. 
Table 3-12 Manufacturing Output 1972-1976 (%) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 20.7 17.7 16.3 17.0 15.2 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 26.4 27.4 22.0 22.1 22.4 
Wood & Wood Products 
4.7 5.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 
Paper & Paper Products 
4.7 4.3 4.9 4.3 4.0 
Chemicals 
19.3 17.7 21.9 23.7 23.4 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 3.9 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.7 
Basic Metal Industries 
5.1 6.8 8.9 7.1 7.7 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 13.1 15.3 17.1 16.6 18.3 
Others 
2.1 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.2 
Source: National Income Statistics 1984 
Allowing' for the distortion caused by the first oil 
crisis, the composition of manufacturing output had 
changed considerably by 1976. Textiles which had been 
badly effected by the recession had not regained its 
prominent position. The chemicals sector now had the 
largest share of -manufacturing output, but the 
fabrications sector had the greatest amount of growth. 
The four sectors that dominated output in 1971 (78.8%), 
still did so controlling 79.3%. What had changed was 
the share held by each of those sectors. The changes 
show the increase in the influence of the heavy 
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industries at the expense of the light industries. Of 
the other industrial sectors only the basic metals 
sector had any great increase, reflecting the level of 
investment in the industry and the continued expansion 
of the iron and steel industries. 
The figures also highlight the continued growth in 
importance of the heavy industries as the government's 
development policies took effect, with considerable 
growth in electrical machinery, iron and steel and 
industrial chemicals. Even allowing for the effects of 
the oil crisis these three industries had growth rates 
of 47,39 and 27% respectively: in comparison 
manufacturing output averaged 19.5%. 
Table 3-13 Structure of Manufacturing 1972-1976 (96) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Light Industriesa 62.5 
Heavy Industriesa 37.5 
60.3 
39.7 
52.2 
47.8 
52.6 
47.4 
50.6 
49.4 
Source: derived from Output in Manufacturing 
National Income Statistics 1984 
a see Appendix A 
By 1976 the heavy industries were responsible for just 
under 50% of manufacturing output, a dramatic change 
from the 38% in 1971 and if the present trend continued 
then they would be in the majority in 1977. 
An important point to note is that if value added is 
considered then taking a ratio ofý value added to 
output, even with the huge growth of manufacturing this 
ratio hardly changes, moving from . 248 to . 245 
(1971 
and 1976). This is possibly a reflection of the level 
of imports involved in Korean manufacturing. It Is 
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worth noting that using this measure all the industries 
in the basic metal and fabricated sectors showed a 
consistent improvement.. 
When considering the production growth rates, shown in 
Table 3-14, the impact of the first oil crisis is 
evident. 
Table 3-14 Growth Rate of Production 1972-1976 
1980 constant prices) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Manufacturing 16.3 35.8 29.0 19.6 31.7 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 13.4 11.3 6.3 8.9 20.3 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 35.9 40.3 16.1 35.6 33.7 
Wood & Wood Products 
13.8 18.3 -11.3 13.5 30.3 
Paper & Paper Products 
9.9 18.6 15.9 3.6 18.8 
Chemicals 
8.0 25.4 11.6 15.2 27.6 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products -0.8 35.4 9.3 0.0 15.5 
Basic Metal Industries 
19.8 51.5 83.3 9.4 41.5 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 10.8 84.4 85.8 22.8 51.6 
Others 
29.7 18.1 17.2 -21.7 24.1 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1985 
Manufacturing growth fell in 1974 and 1975 and 
then staged a recovery in 1976. Production expanded 
rapidly during the third plan, manufacturing increased 
by an average of 26.5%, in comparison to a growth rate 
of' 22.8% in the previous period. When examining the 
individual sectors, there is a considerable change 
between the two periods. During the period 1967 to 
1971 -the three sectors with the highest average annual 
growth rates were wood (30.8%). textiles (29.0%) and 
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chemicals (28.7%). In comparison between 1972 and 1976 
the sectors were fabrications (51.2%), basic metals 
(41.1%) and textiles (32.3%) indicating the growing 
strength of the heavy industries. 
The very high growth rates experienced by the basic 
metals sector from 1973 onwards reflected the increased 
iron and steel capacity. Textiles recovered rapidly 
from the first oil crisis due to buoyant export demand 
in '1975 and 1976, with the strong performance in the 
fabricated sector mainly due to the growing strength of 
the machinery, electric and electronics and 
shipbuilding industries. 
The electrical sector had production of televisions 
increase tenfold to over 2.29 million, similarly tape 
recorders went from 160,000 in 1972 to 5.1 million and 
comparable increases were seen with condensers, 
transistors, and many other electrical and'electronic 
products. 
With iron and steel production, the transformation was 
as dramatic. In 1972 Korea produced 1,412 MT of pig 
iron, in 1973 454,603 MT was produced and by 1976 the 
output had reached 1,937,395 MT. This type of large 
increase in output was true virtually across the entire 
product range in this sector. 
Table 3-15 shows the pattern of employment in 
manufacturing during the third plan with the textiles 
sector remaining by far the largest employer, 
increasing by over 334,000 since 1971, accounting for 
over 35% of manufacturing employment in 1976. 
131 
The fabrication sector increased its labour force by 
254,000, to represent approximately 23% of 
manufacturing employment. The growing strength of the 
heavy and chemical industries is indicated by the 
greater proportion of the manufacturing labour force 
employed there, 39.4% in 1976 compared to 32.3% in 
1972. Manufacturing now employed 21.3% (2.7 million) 
of the total labour force compared to only 13.6% in 
1971 and 9.9% in 1967. 
Table 3-15 Manufacturing Employment 1972-1976 
(thousands) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 137 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 318 
Wood & Wood Products 
45 
Paper & Paper Products 
57 
Chemicals 
112 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 45 
Basic Metal Industries 
28 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 172 
Others 
60 
143 156 150 156 
391 428 505 609 
52 50 52 62 
57 61 70 72 
139 164 183 224 
52 
. 
61 60 66 
37 46 48 54 
228 280 295 399 
59 53 57 -76 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 'Summary of 
Mining and Manufacturing, various years 
As outlined earlier in section 3-4, and in chapter two, 
the government continued the export oriented policy 
pursued during the first and second plan, using 
manufactured exports as an engine of growth for the 
whole of the economy. Exports rose to $7.751 million, 
against the plan's target of $3,510 million. This huge 
increase in the value of exports was partially due to 
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the increased activity during 1976, following the world 
recovery from the first oil crisis, also the increased 
cost of imports forcing up the price of exports, and 
finally because the government strengthened its support 
for exporters to enable them to enter new markets. 
Manufacturing's share of commodity exports continued to 
increase rising from 85% in 1972 to 90% in 1976. 
Table 3-16 Manufacturing Exports 1972-1976 
(U. S $ millions) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Manufacturing 1,384 2,760 3,913 4,177 6,945 
Light" 1,020 1,982 2,348 2,898 4,404 
Heavya 364 778 1,565 1,279 2,541 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
Once again the continued development of the heavy 
industries is evident from Table 3-16, as the share of 
manufacturing exports increased from 29% in 1971 to 
36.6% by 1976. This was smaller than their increase in 
the share of output (approximately 12%), which 
indicates that a considerable amount, of the `increased 
output was for the domestic economy. Even with the 
growth of exports; from the heavy and "chemical 
industries the light industries continued to dominate 
Korean manufactured' exports. 
The textiles sector continued to be the largest 
exporter, reaching- $3,234 million in 1976,46.6% of 
manufactured exports. The fabrication sector had now 
reached $1,772 million (25.5% against 12% in 1971), as 
wood and wood products declined in importance (5.6% 
from 14.8%). Most. export sectors suffered during the 
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oil crisis, effecting a recovery in 1976 with the heavy 
industries the slower to recover. Textiles which had 
experienced negative growth in 1974 (-6.5%), grew by 7% 
in 1975 and 46% in 1976, while most sectors suffered 
negative growth in 1975 followed by a rapid recovery in 
1976. The basic metals sector's exports reduced by over 
50%, the chemicals sector by 11.9% and fabrications by 
6.8% in 1975. Exports from these three recovered in 
1976, growing by 43.3,34.2 and 78.7% respectively. 
By the end of the third plan the structure of the major 
exporting groups had changed as manufacturing output 
had changed, though clothing and textiles remained pre- 
eminent. There was the emergence of several new 
exporting industries, in particular transport and metal 
products. The increase in the transport industries' 
share of the export market was largely due to the 
shipbuilding industry, which had been designated as a 
strategic industry. 
This, change in the composition of exports was further 
illustrated in Table 3-17 showing the manufactured 
principal exports during the third plan. Examining the 
principal exports shows that there was a definite 
broadening and deepening of the structure and 
composition of exports, with signs of an increased 
variety of exports and an increasing range of products 
from within the different industrial classfications. 
Clothing continues to be a dominant force in exports, 
accounting for 21.4% of all manufactured exports by 
1976, though one of Korea's principal exports during 
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the second plan, wigs and beards by the end of the 
third plan accounted for only 1.0% compared to 7.9% in 
1971. 
Table 3-17 Principal Manufactured Exports 1972-1976 
(U. S $ millions and %) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Clothing & 230 346 410 462 611 
Accessoriesa 16.6 12.5 10.5 11.1 8.8 
Footwear 55 106 180 191 398 
4.0 3.8 4.6 4.6 5.7 
Textile Fabrics 56 193 195 264 435 
4.0 7.0 5.0 6.3 6.3 
Mens & Boys 63 158 188 220 425 
Outer Garments 4.6 5.7 4.8 5.3 6.1 
Plywood & 
, 
Veneers 154 - 273 163 206 339 11.1 9.9 4.2 4.9 4.8 
Thermionic Valves 44 111 168 157 319 
et alia 3.2 4.0 4.3 3.8 4.6 
Textile Yarn 65 133 178 198 304 
4.7 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.4 
Ships & Floating .. .. 105 160 277 Structures 2.7 3.8 4.0 
Mens & Boys 63 100 147 169 269 
Under Garments 4.6 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.9 
Womens & Girls .. .. .. 60 181 Outer Garments 1.4 2.6 
Plates & Sheets of 68 130 233 74 158 
Iron & Steel 4.9 4.7 6.0 1.8 2.3 
Travel Goods .... .. 80 143 1.9 2.1 
Telecommunications .... .... 141 2.0 
Wig's '& Beards 74 82 73 75 70. 
5.3 3.0 1.9 1.8 1.0 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
Korea Statistical Yearbook, various years 
a. Clothing and accessories, knitted or crocheted 
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The table also indicates the rise of the heavy 
industries, led by thermionic valves with 4.6% and 
shipbuilding with 4.0%. Another important point to note 
is that the concentration of manufacturing exports in a 
small number of important export goods was diminishing. 
In 1971, the nine items listed in Table 3-10, 
accounted for 66% of all manufacturing exports, by 1976 
the thirteen items listed only accounted for 54.6%. 
This was a clear sign that Korean manufacturing was 
continuing-to grow and diversify. 
3.4.2 Summary 
By the end of the third plan, the government's emphasis 
on expanding the heavy and chemical industries and 
further developing manufactured exports was having a 
marked effect. Manufacturing now dominated commodity 
exports, with over 90%, and had increased its share of 
G. N. P to close to 30%. 
Manufacturing growth had once again beaten the targets 
set by the third plan, averaging 19.2% between 1972 and 
1976. The economy and manufacturing especially had 
ridden out the problems caused by the first oil crisis 
and by 1976 appeared to be growing strongly once again. 
The, development of the heavy industries had led to 
greater diversification, taking close to 50% of 
manufacturing output, and continuing to increase its 
share of manufacturing exports to 36.6%. The signs of 
the development of Korean manufacturing can be seen in 
the Tables 3-12 to 3-17, with the lessening of the 
dependence on a limited number of key industries, and 
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the greater depth and breadth helping to further 
strengthen Korea's progress to full industrialisation. 
3.5 Industrial Development 1977-1981 
The Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan looked 
to deepen the structure of Korean industry, by 
diversifying the production of the light industries and 
expanding heavy sector. 
The plan stated that "continued growth of the Korean 
economy is dependent on technological innovation and 
continued export expansion" (p7). 
In addition the basic goal of the fourth plan was as 
follows: 
"During the recent international resource crisis it 
became apparent that Korea must direct its attention to 
a number of issues which are belived to be critical for 
the nation's future economic growth. These include the 
achievement of self-reliance in investment financing, 
an equilibrium in the balance of payments and a 
deepening of the industrial structure in order to 
ensure self-sustaining growth" (p10). 
The basic strategy running through the first three 
plans was to continue with the policy of using 
exports as the path to growth for the whole of the 
economy. An important factor in developing the fourth 
plan was the growing belief that Korea's traditional 
light industries would face increasing competition from 
other developing countries and protectionism from the 
industrialised markets. This would mean the growth 
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potential of the light industries was liable to be 
limited. 
Korea's competitive advantages were increasingly seen 
to be in the heavy and chemical industries, notably in 
machinery, electronics and shipbuilding. The policy 
towards industry was described in the Evaluation Report 
of the Third Five Year Economic Development Plan. 
"The most basic economic task of the nation will be to 
develop the most suitable plans for developing the 
right kinds of heavy and chemical industries in order 
to establish a self-reliant industrial structure and 
reduce external dependence. Towards such an end, it is 
important to give priority to the types of industries 
that can' attain sufficient international 
competitiveness, in consideration of inter-industry 
relations, Korea's comparative advantage, the size of 
developable markets, technological requirements and the 
availability of capital" (p149). 
Mining and manufacturing were targeted to grow at 13.6% 
per annum, in comparison to a growth rate of close to 
20% during the third plan. Similarly, its share of 
G. N. P was set to increase to 40.9%, with manufacturing 
representing 39.7%, which required an annual average 
rise of 14.3%. 
Commodity exports were expected to rise to over $19 
billion, giving an average-growth rate of 16.8% (in 
1975 constant prices). Manufacturing exports were 
planned to rise by an average of 16.5% a year, with 
manufacturing's share of commodity exports increasing 
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to 92%. Due to the continuing support given to the 
heavy and chemical industries, their share of 
manufactured goods were expected to rise to 49.5% and 
46% of total commodity exports. 
In line with this increase, the heavy and chemical 
industries were expected to grow at close to 17.3%, 
with machines, electronics and shipbuilding growing by 
21.6% per annum and the basic metal and chemical 
industries by 14.8%. By the end of the fourth plan, 
electronics was expected to represent 13.7% of exports, 
machinery to 10.5%, shipbuilding to 6.4%, chemicals to 
6.6% and-the iron and steel industries 7.3%, reflecting 
the continued support given to the development and 
expansion of the heavy industries. 
The light industries were expected to grow at a much 
slower rate of around 12% per annum, as they 
diversified and improved their product quality. The 
government laid great emphasis on the- development of 
the machinery, electronics and shipbuilding industries, 
as the fourth plan aimed to encourage the further 
development of skilled labour intensive industries (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.7). Even with the continued 
expansion of the heavy industries, the traditional 
export leader, textiles and clothing, was expected to 
remain the largest manufactured export earner, though 
its share was expected to continue to reduce. 
The composition of Korean exports was expected to 
continue to diversify, both in scope and in the number 
of markets reached. Industry was to expand once more, 
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with an improvement in quality with a greater reliance 
on technology, rather than cheap labour. 
As detailed in chapter two (section 2.7), the Fourth 
Economic Development Plan stressed the continued 
development of the heavy and chemical industries by 
targeting the bulk of investment to these sectors. 
Using the figures for domestic investment from the 
summary of mining and manufacture, the government's 
emphasis on the heavy industries becomes apparent. 
Table 3-18 Domestic Investment 1977-1981 
(billion won) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 109 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 316 
Wood & Wood Products 
15 
Paper & Paper Products 
46 
Chemicals 
192 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 109 
Basic Metal Industries 
187 
Fabricated, -Machinery & 
Equipment 345 
Others 
16 
143 364 299 326 
342 463 372 488 
49 89 55 60 
62 110 112 91 
257 359 934 774 
91 188 245 359 
288 911 605 803 
564 882 816 1,060 
24 27 18 33 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 'Summary of 
Mining and Manufacturing, various years 
During the third plan, 53% of the total reported 
investment went to the heavy industries, with 23% going 
to the fabricated sector. Between 1977 and 1981,64.4% 
of the total invested in manufacturing went to the 
heavy industries. With fabrications taking 26%, 
chemicals 18% and basic metals 14.0%, the increased 
investment and greater government encouragement enabled 
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the heavy industries to develop rapidly during this 
period. 
The second phase of the Pohang Iron and Steel mill was 
completed, and the third phase launched, which would 
increase capacity to 5.5 million M. T; in addition plans 
were made to commence. the fourth expansion phase which 
would open in 1981. Total iron and steel making 
capacity rose to 9.3 million M. T by 1980 and to 12.5 
million M. T by the end of 1981, with rolling capacity 
reaching 12 million M. T. In 1978 the government 
promoted the construction of competitively sized zinc, 
copper'and lead refineries, to cope with the demand for 
non-ferrous metals, from the expanding electronic and 
electronics industries and from shipbuilding. 
The expansion of the shipbuilding industry continued 
with the Okpo yard (now, owned by Daewoo) being 
eventually completed in 1981 and the expansion of 
capacity at the Pusan and Kurje shipyards. 
Shipbuilding capacity reached 2.8 million G. T in 1980, 
rising to 4.3 million in 1981; Korean shipbuilding 
yards for the first time launched more than 1 million 
G. T in 1981. 
The petrochemical industry continued its expansion as 
more down-stream plants were built at Yeochon and 
Ulsan. The government encouraged the construction of 
more petrochemical plants (with Samsung building a 
petrochemical plant'at the cost of $120 million), so as 
to reach 70% self-sufficiency in most petrochemical 
products by 1981. Oil refining capacity was increased 
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to over 790,000 BPSD (435,000 BPSD in 1976), with the 
opening of the Ssangyong oil refinery and the 
completion of the Honam refinery. 
The machinery industries were singled out to receive 
special attention, with the government giving top 
priority to their development. To assist with this 
expansion, a large scale engineering industrial estate 
was built at Changwon, with the intention that half of 
all the machinery industries' output should come from 
here by 1981. The automotive industry continued to 
expand following the first appearance of the Korean 
government's plans in 1974, with capacity anticipated 
to reach 280,000 vehicles by 1979 and 350,000 by 1980. 
3.5.1 Industrial Performance 1977-1981 
Once again the economy underwent a number of unplanned 
and unforeseen shocks during the fourth plan; not only 
did the 'Second Oil Crisis' occur but as detailed in 
chapter two, section 2.7.1, the government's excessive 
encouragement of the development of the heavy 
industries brought problems. These had a considerable 
impact on the growth and development of manufacturing 
as the overheating of the economy combined with the 
recession to cause severe problems for Korean 
manufacturing. 
3.5.1.1 Industrial Problems 
The policy of large scale investment in the 
heavy industries as a means to greater growth resulted 
in severe overheating of the economy in 1978 and 1979, 
immediately prior to the second oil crisis. The 
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investment boom had increased demand pressure, allowed 
wages to rise rapidly and had led to serious 
overcapacity, duplication of manufacturing plant and 
using up much needed capital and resources. 
The economy had shown signs of slowing down before the 
oil crisis, and this was linked to the government's 
development policy. Jon Woronoff (1983) stated that 
on top of the unforeen problems one of the causes of 
the difficulties faced by the heavy industries was, 
"the trust in industrial policy and the passion for 
targeting that prevailed in the 1970's. It was felt 
that planners and economists, politicians and 
bureaucrats, to say nothing of top national leaders, 
could choose appropriate industries and projects better 
than ordinary businessmen. While few of the decisions 
were actually imposed on the entrepreneurs, the 
incentives and social pressure were so great that it 
was hard for them to refuse. And the various forms of 
protection, promotion and cheap financing could make it 
more profitable to launch an inherently unviable 
project than one that really corresponded to 
comparative advantage. This mistake also goes a long 
way toward explaining the presence of too many 
enterprises in certain sectors and the existance of 
some with little hope of survival in heavy machinery" 
(p179). 
For example, the government encouraged the 
over development in the machinery industry, which 
resulted in duplication of effort and production. 
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There were also problems over technology, which proved 
much more difficult to acquire than expected. This 
delay in acquiring new technology caused inefficiencies 
in production and resulted in wasted investment. The 
machinery industries caused considerable problems due 
to the attempt to expand too quickly, with the result 
that in 1979 the government had to attempt to persuade 
several of the large industrial manufacturers to merge. 
In the Economic Survey 1979, there was the following 
comment on the investment in the heavy and chemical 
sectors: 
"There were many instances of indiscriminate 
investments by large business interests in heavy and 
chemical industries, which were mearly eager to become 
pioneers in their field, regardless of financing 
capacity, marketability and international 
competitiveness" (p99). 
Also `in the survey they commented that, "On the other 
hand, in the light industrial sector supply bottlenecks 
of certain items including consumption goods developed 
as a result of a shortage of production facilities, 
pushing up their prices and undermining their 
stability" (p100). 
There was a realisation that problems were building up, 
but there was also a reluctance to tackle the problems. 
By the time the government had started to take measures 
to correct the overheating and the imbalance in 
investment, outside events in the form of the energy 
crisis further complicated and exacerbated the 
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difficulties. 
With the second oil crisis, oil prices increased by 
more- than 70%, between 1979 and 1980. This had a 
disastrous effect on the world economy, and struck an 
already weakened Korean economy (see chapter two, 
section 2.7.1). Wages and inflation were pushing 
upwards, wages rising by 34.4% and consumer prices by 
14.4% in 1978. In addition because of the government's 
policies the money supply increased by 35% in the same 
year. 
The oil crisis coupled with the problems of overheating 
meant that the economy and manufacturing in 
particular, suffered during 1980 and 1981. In 1980 
wholesale prices increased by 38.9%, with the cost of 
oil imports increasing from $2.4 billion in 1978 to 
over $6.6 billion in 1980, with the result that the 
trade deficit deteriorated to $4 billion in 1980. 
The government introduced a number of measures to 
overcome the problems being experienced. These 
included an economic stabilisation package, which aimed 
to slow down inflation and control wage increases, with 
a moratorium on further large scale industrial 
developments. In addition they devalued the currency 
by 35%, from 484 won to 659 won per dollar in 1980, and 
allowed a further realignment in 1981. Measures were 
also taken to assist exporters in helping them overcome 
the difficult trading conditions and in reducing some 
of the effects of the distortion introduced into the 
economy by the investment policy. 
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3.5.1.2 Performance 1977-1981 
The repercussions from the overheating and the second 
oil crisis are visible when viewing the performance of 
Korean manufacturing during the fourth plan. 
Manufacturing output grew from 17.6 billion to 55.3 
billion won, output increased by 66% (in real terms), 
in comparison to a 133% rise during the 3rd plan. This 
gave an average growth rate of only 11% compared to 
19.5%, with manufacturing registering negative growth 
in 1980 (see Table 2-17). 
Using Table 3-19, some of the effects of the economic 
difficulties can be seen, the chemicals sector share of 
output surged ahead as. the price of oil increased', 
while the fabrications sector suffered visibly as its 
share diminished rapidly from a peak of 24.2% in 1978 
to only 17.8% in 1981. 
Table 3-19 Manufacturinq Output 1977-1981 (%) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Food, 'Beverages & 
Tobacco 15.2 15.3 14.9 14.7 15.0 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 20.8 20.1 18.5 18.4 18.7 
Wood & Wood Products 
2.9 2.7 2.9 2.2 1.9 
Paper & Paper Products 
3.8 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.2 
Chemicals 
23.2 20.5 21.9 26.8 26.1 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products- 3.9 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.6 
Basic Metal Industries 
7.5 8.1 10.2 11.3 12.4 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 20.4 24.2 22.7 17.8 17.8 
Others 
2.3 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.2 
Source: National Income Statistics 1984 
The only sector to show a consistent improvement was 
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the basic metals sector, reflecting the continued 
demand for its products. As previously mentioned, 
manufacturing growth suffered in 1979,1980 and 1981, 
and this was reflected by poor output growth rates 
registered by the sectors, with nearly every sector 
having slower growth in 1979 and negative growth in 
1980. In general output had surged ahead in 1978, with 
the fabrications sector registering an astounding 
growth rate of 43.1%, with virtually each industry 
within the sector having growth rates of above 30%. 
Even with the problems being experienced by 
manufacturing and the fabrication sectors especially, 
the -heavy industries' share of output continued to 
increase, rising from 49.4% in 1976 to 56.4% in 1981. 
Table 3-20 Structure of Manufacturing 1977-81 (%) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Light Industriesa 48.9 47.3 45.2 44.0 43.6 
Heavy Industriesa 51.1 52.7 54.8 56.0 56.4 
Source: derived from output in Manufacturing 
National Income Statistics 1984 
a see Appendix A 
Once again the effects of the economic problems and the 
oil crisis were evident when considering the ratio of 
value added to output. This had shown a gradual 
improvement in 1977 and 1978, reaching . 247 in 1978. 
Though once the effects of the economic problems 
started to take effect, this dropped to . 243 in 1980 
and 1981, with the ratio for the heavy industries 
retreating from . 225 in 1978 to . 218 in 1980. 
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Table 3-21 further illustrates the problems experienced 
by manufacturing during 1979 and 1980. Manufacturing as 
a whole had experienced high growth rates since the 
midsixties and had continued to grow rapidly, even 
with the first oil crisis, when manufacturing 
production had continued to grow. at 29% and 19.6% in 
1974 and 1975. This time, however, due to the 
attendant structural problems Korean manufacturing was 
badly placed to ride out the crisis. 
Production had expanded rapidly during the 2nd and 3rd 
plans, expanding by an average of 22.8% and 26.5%. 
During the 4th plan, manufacturing production growth 
rates deteriorated, averaging only 13.5%. 
Table 3-21 Growth Rate of Production 1977-1981 
(%, 1980 constant prices) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Manufacturing 20.3 23.8 12.1 -1.9 13.4 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 24.4 21.1 17.7 -1.9 4.9 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 10.7 17.1 5.1 7.6 16.1 
Wood & Wood Products 
14.8 22.9 -4.8 -27.4 12.0 
Paper & Paper Products 
18.6 16.8 13.2 9.7 7.9 
Chemicals 
23.2 21.9 14.8 -0.3 2.4 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 26.8 15.7 10.2 -0.7 0.4 
Basic Metal Industries 
21.9 32.3 29.4 8.1 32.3 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 26.5 41.0 11.7 -14.7 26.0 
Others 
21.8 -15.2 -3.3 4.3 3.2 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1985 
The worst effected of the heavy industries was the 
fabrications sector, where production decreased by 
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14.7% in 1980. Machinery output which had boomed in 
1978, increasing by 52.6%, as the effects of the 
considerable level of investment were felt, stagnated 
in 1979 and fell by 25% in 1980. The chemicals sector 
also suffered, with strong growth in the first three 
years and then stagnating in 1980 as exports and 
domestic demand remained flat, with only a limited 
improvement in 1981. Basic metals, notably the iron 
and steel industries continued to show strong growth 
due to expanding exports, averaging 24.8%, lower than 
the 41.1% registered during the third plan, but much 
higher than any of the other sectors. 
While the problems being felt by the fabrication sector 
were shown by the peaking of production of many 
industries in 1979, as an example, lathes, looms, 
transformers, tape recorders, refrigerators and cars 
all registered their highest levels of production in 
1979. Not all fabrication industries failed to 
continue to increase production, with steel cargo ships 
increasing from 428,689 to 1,129,450 G. T and colour 
televisions reaching 2,246,000 in 1981, a fivefold 
increase. 
Manufacturing employment decreased in 1980 and 1981, as 
unemployment grew from 3.2% in 1978 to 5.2% in 1980, 
reducing by 0.7% to 4.5% by 1981. Within manufacturing 
total employment peaked in 1979 at 3,126,000 reducing 
to 2,872,000 in 1981, a drop of 8.1%. The main losses 
were in the textile and fabrication sectors, though 
textiles had recovered by 1981. The losses in the 
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fabrication sector were not only due to the economic 
difficulties as several key industries (especially 
electronics) were in the process of modernisation. 
Table 3-22 Manufacturing Employment 1977-1981 
(thousands) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 1 169 177 186 181 172 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 658 693 643 622 654 
Wood & Wood Products 
70 80 76 66 63 
Paper & Paper Products 
85 87 93 91 91 
Chemicals 
238 250 257 265 261 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 78 94 102 95 92 
Basic Metal Industries 
71 83 90 90 88 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 469 569 596 535 544 
Others 
81 79 75 71 79 
Source: "Economic Statistics Yearbook, 'Summary of 
Mining and Manufacturing, various years 
Manufacturing employment had climbed to 23% of all the 
labour force by 1979, though this had dropped to 20.4% 
by 1981, down from the 21.3% in 1976. The heavy 
industries continued to increase their influence as 
they now accounted for 43.7% of manufacturing 
employment, up from 39.4% in 1976. 
Exports increased to $21.2 billion, exceeding the 
target of $17.4 billion, though imports had surged 
ahead to $26.1 billion as the effects of the second oil 
crisis took effect, resulting in a trade imbalance of 
over $3.6 billion (see section 2.7.1) in. 1981, with a 
peak of $4.4 million in 1979 and 1980. 
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The competitiveness of exports had been gradually 
eroded due to the use of a fixed exchange rate, coupled 
with the high growth rate in wages. Korean exports 
were slowly being priced out by their competitors. The 
deterioration in Korean exports was evident when 
considering the export: output ratios at the end of the 
third plan and the fourth plan. By 1976 this had 
reached 22%, climbing to 23.7% in 1977, but then 
reducing by 4.5% over the next two years, as Korean 
exports lost their competitive edge. By the end of 
1981, the ratio had improved to 24.2%, reflecting the 
improved position of Korean exports as the government's 
measures took effect. 
Manufacturing exports continued to increase their share 
of commodity exports reaching 91.5%, just short of the 
92% target. Other targets were also missed with 
manufacturing's share of G. N. P falling to 31% and the 
heavy industries reaching only 43.9%, short of the 46% 
target. 
Table 3-23 Manufacturing Exports 1977-1981 
(U. S S millions) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Manufacturing 8,677 11,342 13,515 15,915 19,455 
Light 5,182 6,683 7,398 8,204 9,881 
Heavy 3,495 4,659 6,117 7,711 9,574 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
The heavy industries continued to increase their share 
of manufacturing exports, increasing from 46.6% in 1976 
to 49.2% by the end of the 4th plan. They increased 
their share of manufacturing output by 7%, their share 
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of exports increased by 12.6%, showing that an 
increasing proportion of output from the heavy 
industries was directed towards exports by the end of 
the fourth plan. 
Despite the growth of the heavy industries, the 
textiles sector continued to be the largest single 
export sector, accounting for $7,392 million in 1981, 
(38% of manufactured exports). The fabrications sector 
increased its share of manufacturing exports from 25.5% 
to 32.4% in 1981. 
Manufactured export growth slowed (in real terms) 
during the fourth plan period, increasing by only 0.4% 
in 1979, and reducing by 12% in 1980, with a recovery 
starting in 1981 (6.4%). Virtually every single sector 
suffered negative growth in 1979 and 1980. Of the 
larger export sectors, the worst affected were other 
products, textiles and fabrications in 1980, dropping 
20.8%, 17.1% and 14.9% respectively. The poorer export 
performance of the light industries shows when export 
growth for the whole of the fourth plan period is 
considered. Just taking the largest exporters, 
textiles increased by only 5.9%, while wood products 
actually reduced by more than 40%. In contrast, 
chemicals increased by 56.7%, fabrications 65.5% and 
basic metals by a remarkable 136%. 
The deepening and broadening of Korean exports 
continued as the number-of principal exports increased. 
The traditional exports from the light industries 
continued to decrease in importance. 
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Table 3-24 Principal Manufactured Exports 1977-1981 
(U. S $ millions and %) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Ships & Floating 526 801 514 618 1,411 
Structures 6.1 7.0 3.8 3.9 7.3 
Textile Fabrics 463 776 873 1,005 1,268 
5.3 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.5 
Clothing & 703 842 803 856 1,150 
Accessoriesa 8.1 7.4 5.9 5.4 5.9 
Footwear 488 686 738 875 1,024 
5.6 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.3 
Mens & Boys 458 571 681 668 925 
Outer Garments 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.2 4.8 
Womens & Girls 258 306 358 406 605 
Outer Garments 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.1 
Textile Yarn 255 340 451 624 568 
2.9 3.0 3.3 3.9 2.9 
Plates & Sheets o f 166 298 447 558 564 
Iron & Steel 1.9 2.6 3.3 3.5 2.9 
Thermionic Valves 312 372 491 517 525 
et_. alia 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.2 2.7 
Mens & . Boys 270 365 462 491 519 
Under Garments 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.1 2.7 
Tubes & Pipes .. .. .. 362 515 
of Iron & Steel 2.3 2.6 
T. V Receivers .. 231 301 420 501 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.6 
Rubber Tires .. .. 325 477 456 2.4 3.0 2.3 
Toys, Games & 212 262 301 329 434 
Sporting Goods 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 
Plywood & Veneers 393 415 451 354 395 
4.5 3.7 3.3 2.2 2.0 
Ingots-, of Iron .. .. .. 302 390 & Steel 1.9 2.0 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
Korea Sta tistical Yearbook, various years 
a. Clothing and a ccessories, knitted or crocheted 
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Shipbuilding came to the fore becoming the second most 
important export as Korea became a major shipbuilding 
nation, second only to Japan. Another important factor 
to note is the change in the composition, as the number 
of products increased from thirteen to sixteen, 
including several new product groups. A sign of the 
increasing diversity of manufactured exports, was that 
even though the number of products represented 
increased they now only accounted for 55.8% of 
manufactured exports. There was also a change in the 
principal exports, as shipbuilding increased in 
importance and clothing and textiles decreased. 
It is important to note that of the nine principal 
exports reported in table 3-10 (1967-1971), eight were 
still large enough to be included in table 3-24 (1977- 
1981). Showing that while Korean exports were 
increasingly diversified the original basis of the 
expansion was still important, though they represented 
33% of manufactured exports (1981) down from 66% in 
1971.: The major changes were the complete 
disappearance of wigs and beards which had declined 
from 7.9% in. 1971 to 0.3% in 1981 and- the continued 
decline of plywoods and veneers, which had peaked in 
1968 at 19.3% compared to 2.0% in 1981. 
'3.5.2 Summary 
The Korean government had during the fourth plan 
attempted to continue and expand upon the successful 
policies followed during the third-plan. The emphasis 
was on the expansion of certain key industries, 
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especially in machinery, electronics and shipbuilding. 
The imbalance in the development policies resulted in 
lop-sided development which caused severe difficulties 
for the economy. As the government started to tackle 
the problems the economy was hit by the second oil 
crisis, causing the economy and manufacturing 
especially to undergo a severe reverse. 
By the end of the plan, even though not all the targets 
set for the fourth plan had been reached and some areas 
of manufacturing were still experiencing difficulties, 
the process of change within manufacturing was 
continuing and signs of recovery were evident. The 
government had managed to restore confidence by the end 
of the fourth plan. It was assisting with measures to 
promote diversification and modernisation in the light 
industries and was reviewing investment in the heavy 
industries, supporting measures to rationalise the 
troubled machinery and automobile industries. 
Manufacturing growth had slowed averaging only 11.0% 
during the period compared to 19.3% for the third plan, 
with the heavy industries increasing their share of 
output to 56.4%. Manufacturing exports had continued 
to grow reaching"$19,455 million in 1981,91.5% of all 
exports' a slight increase from the 90% registered in 
1976. The development of the heavy industries had 
continued witha considerable broadening and deepening 
of manufactured exports, with their share increasing to 
49.2%, an increase of 12.6% since 1976. 
The economy and especially manufacturing suffered 
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during 1979 and 1980, with a 
The tasks facing the Koreans 
between the heavy and light 
overcome the difficulties of 
industries, coupled with 
technology, quality and incre 
limited recovery in 1981. 
were to strike a balance 
industries, in order to 
overcapacity facing many 
the need to improve 
ase exports. 
3.6 Industrial Development 1982-1984 
The Fifth Five Year Economic Development Plan was 
formulated during a very difficult period, not only for 
the Korean economy but also for the world economy and 
(most importantly for Korea) the industrialised 
economies in particular. 
The planners of the fifth plan had a number of 
difficult decisions to take. As outlined in chapter 
two, the plan was intended to tackle the problems 
presented by inflation and the structural difficulties 
that had surfaced during the fourth plan. 
The problems seen facing industry in particular were 
detailed as:. 
"Excessive government intervention in the private 
sector - has discouraged private investment and 
efficiency in investments which are vital to the growth 
of a market economy. Allocation of resources among 
industries was not by and large, guided by market 
mechanisms, but rather, subject to priorities 
established by government. The result was a lop-sided 
distribution of limited resources in favour of large 
enterprises and heavy and chemical industries. The 
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industrial system was also ineffectual in both 
promoting balanced industrial growth and in introducing 
entrepreneurial effort to raise efficiency". 3 
The Economic Planning Board in their in their economic 
survey in 1985 saw the problems as follows: 
"Domestically the Korean economy began to. reveal 
structural problems accumulated in the process of its 
rapid growth in the past. These problems led to 
political and social instability, which made economic 
growth difficult. Moreover, the efficiency of the 
economy as a whole went down as the expansiion of the 
money supply accelerated inflation. Similarly, 
excessive investment in heavy and chemical industries 
in the late seventies had become a severe burden to the 
economy, distorting the balance between heavy 
industries and light medium and small industries" 
(p12). 
The emphasis of the fifth plan with regard to control 
of the economy changed as the government reduced its 
direct involvement in the private sector. It limited 
itself to a number of large scale projects and used the 
plan as a general framework and an indication of the 
direction of development, moving to the use of new 
incentive systems. 
Rather than use regulation and protection', emphasis was 
put upon the more efficient allocation of investment 
resources, attainment of an advanced industrial 
structure and the development of a more rational energy 
policy. 
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The fifth plan stressed striking a balance between the 
light and heavy industries, with more emphasis on 
development of manufacturing as a whole, so as to avoid 
the problems of the late seventies, where the light 
industries had suffered from lack of funds and the 
heavy industries had suffered serious overcapacity and 
had wasted scarce resources. The government's new 
targets included the aim to improve technology and 
quality, also increase exports and encourage the 
reorganisation of the heavy and chemical industries. In 
addition the government announced its intention to let 
the private sector have greater autonomy, with the 
government taking an advisory role abandoning the 
previous policy of directing most aspects of the Korean 
economy. 
Exports were once again seen as a vital tool for 
further economic development and expansion. The 
continued emphasis on exports was seen as allowing 
Korean industry to build economically efficient plants 
that domestic demand alone would not justify. In 
addition the competition in export markets would induce 
technological advance, bring in vital foreign exchange 
and exploit Korea's comparative advantage. 
Given that industry was to provide the backbone for 
strong economic growth the government revised its 
policy towards incentives. 
"Industrial incentives, which are now considered to be 
wasteful and ineffective are now under close scrutiny. 
Incentive for investment in internationally competitive 
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industries as well as technological innovation and 
manpower development will be strengthened. Feasibility 
studies of large scale investment projects will be 
encouraged to be made more carefully, and an industrial 
policy review board will be set up to efficiently 
co-ordinate industrial trade and tariff policies"4. 
The targets set (detailed in chapter two, section 2.8), 
included a growth rate of 7.6% , which was much more 
conservative than the 9.2% set for the fourth plan. 
Commodity exports were expected to increase to $53 
billion by 1986, an annual growth rate of 11.5%. 
Manufacturing was expected to grow at 11.0% per annum, 
an improvement on the 9.7% achieved during the previous 
plan. The heavy industries were expected to have an 
annual growth rate of 12,2%, once again less than the 
previous target (17.3%), with the light industries 
increasing by 9.5% per annum. Manufacturing share of 
commodity exports was to continue to increase reaching 
94.5% by 1986. 
Chapter two covered the revision of the the fifth plan, 
brought about by the change in world economic 
conditions, with oil prices actually not rising as 
expected and the early success of the government's 
inflation policies. The revised plan retained the 
basis of the original plan, differing in three 
important areas. 
With regard to industrialisation, greater emphasis was 
now placed on the private sector, looking to improve 
the efficiency of all manufacturing and developing 
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technology oriented industries. This was done because 
Korea no longer had comparatively cheap labour 
available, so that quality and not quantity was 
becoming more important. The new policy looked to 
treat both the heavy and light industries identically 
in order-to remove the imbalance within manufacturing 
and to support exports in difficult trading conditions. 
The projected targets were altered, with the target for 
commodity exports down graded to $35.7 billion, as 
increasing protectionism made trading conditions more 
difficult.. 
The new policy was outlined as follows: 
"Competitiveness on the basis of quality has become 
increasingly important to Korea and strengthening the 
industrial structure by raising the level of technology 
is essential to achieve this. Major aspects of 
industrial strategy will include free market 
competition, increased levels of research and 
development support for the small and medium 
industries, the targeting of 'industrial winners', 
raising agricultural productivity and the improved 
efficiencies in energy use"5. 
The government decided to leave the bulk of development 
to the private sector, though there were several major 
projects planned. These included the construction of a 
new shipyard with further expansion of existing 
facilities and the commencement of a second integrated 
steel mill, to be. built at Kwangyang, which would boost 
production by a further 3 million M. T. 
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Greater emphasis was to be placed on the use of 
industries' comparative advantages. A balanced 
approach to industrial development was adopted to 
develop the weak areas, such as the small and medium 
sized industries and the parts and component 
industries. Within each industry emphasis was to 
be directed towards technological development and the 
growth of research and development, in order to improve 
productivity, quality and international competitiveness 
Table 3-25, shows that at least with regard to the 
reported levels of domestic investment, an even greater 
(than in the last plan) percentage (67.2%) went to the 
heavy and chemical industries between 1982 and 
1984. 
Table 3-25 Domestic Investment 1982-1984 
(billion won) 
1982 1983 1984 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 333 401 509 
Textiles, Wearing Appa rel 
& Leather Products 438 550 674 
Wood & Wood Products 
49 60 70 
Paper & Paper Products 
169 200 267 
Chemicals 
630 700 795 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 168 240 316 
Basic Metal Industries 
1,385 900 412 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 1,153 1,495 1,973 
Others 
39 52 72 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 'Summary of 
Mining and Manufacturing, various years 
On a year on year basis though, the amount of 
investment directed towards the light industries did 
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improve from 27.4% in 1982 to 37.5% in 1984, a sign 
that some balance was returning to investment. The 
fabrications sector took the largest share with 32.9% 
of the total investment, with basic metals 19.2% and 
chemicals 15.1% the next largest sectors. 
The huge amount of investment in the basic metals 
sector in 1982, reflected the continued expansion of 
the iron and steel industry. A second integrated plant 
was built a Kwangyang, with the first phase starting in 
1984. The fourth expansion plan for the Pohang works 
continued, coupled with a general improvement of 
facilities, expansion and the use of new product 
technology. Production capacity continued to increase 
reaching 14.5 million M. T in 1984 an increase of 16% on 
1981. 
The machinery industry was again seen as a vital part 
of manufacturing development for the fifth plan, with 
an incentive system being used to create a more 
competitive industry. The government wanted to improve 
technology to overcome the low levels prevalent in the 
domestic industry and to encourage reorganisation. The 
electrical machinery industry in particular still 
suffered from overcapacity, so there was considerable 
scope for reorganisation, along with renovation, 
modernisation and the promotion of the parts and 
component industry. 
Shipbuilding had weathered the problems of the late 
seventies, as the demand for shipping dropped 
dramatically following the second oil crisis. Capacity 
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was set to continue to increase, reaching 4 million G. T 
by the end of 1982, though there were worries that the 
difficulties in the world market might affect the 
expansion plans. Shipbuilding continued to increase 
its production climbing from 1.4 million G. T in 1981 to 
2.3 million G. T in 1983, with exports accounting for 
91.4% of output. The other major industry in the 
transport grouping was the automotive industry, which 
had moved into the mass production of cars in the late 
seventies, only to be badly hit by the second oil 
crisis. The government had promoted rationalisation 
measures and designated the industry as a strategic 
exporter to assist recovery. The future prospects of 
the automotive industry were highly dependent on export 
demand and the government's willingness to stimulate 
domestic demand. As domestic demand and exports 
increased output of passenger cars rose to 166,000 
units in 1984 and total automotive production topped 
250,000 units. 
The petrochemical industry was to be developed further, 
although any development was to be treated with a 
greater degree of caution given the problems caused by 
the second oil crisis. Development of the industry was 
to be promoted to improve the industrial structure and 
to enhance the foundations of economic growth. The 
industry's comparative advantages were to be emphasised 
and progress was expected in the high technology 
sectors. 
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The textiles and clothing industries, which had 
suffered from a lack of investment, were being 
encouraged to modernise, to improve quality rather than 
quantity, to diversify and to boost research and 
development. However progress had been slow and the 
increasingly difficult trading conditions made these 
aims even more problematical 
Semiconductors, computers, bioengineering and new 
materials were all being promoted to boost the level of 
Korean technological development. Electronics was 
being encouraged to move from a low technology and 
labour intensive industry to producing highly advanced, 
high technology products. The development of the semi- 
conductor industry was considered very important to 
support this process. 
The aims of this stage of development of Korean 
manufacturing had less emphasis on the large (capital 
intensive) projects previously employed, with greater 
stress laid on the modernisation of industry. This was 
to lead to an improvement in technology, research and 
development helping productivity and changing the 
emphasis away from quantity to quality. 
3.6.1 Industrial Performance 1982-1984 
The economy did not start to show signs of a recovery 
until 1983, with a G. N. P growth rate of only 5.4% 
registered in 1982. As outlined in chapter two, 
section 2.8.1, the economy recovered in 1983 and 1984, 
as the world trade conditions improved and the Korean 
government's stabilisation policy reduced consumer 
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inflation to 2.3% by 1984. 
With the success of the Korean government's 
stabilisation policy and the rapid recovery of the 
economy, the government introduced a revised plan in 
1984. The revised plan retained the basic emphasis of 
the original fifth plan, though the new plan did bring 
out a new set of priorities. The new priority for 
industry was as follows: 
"The government will promote sustained export growth by 
strengthening the efforts of Korean firms to penetrate 
new markets abroad while responding effectively to 
changing international economic conditions. 
Second, the revised plan emphasises raising the 
efficiency of Korean industries in all sectors, 
particularly by developing technology oriented 
industries, in order to raise the nation's levels of 
technology and competitiveness closer to those in 
industrially advanced countries. 
To this end, the government will reduce its direct 
intervention in the private investment decisions and 
encourage autonomous growth of the industries. By 
allowing maximum use of private initiative and 
creativity, the government hopes to strengthen the 
competitiveness of Korean industries by encouraging 
technological innovation and improvement of product 
quality. Furthermore, it will promote solid industrial 
development by enhancing industrial efficiency and by 
removing imbalances such as the excessive concentration 
of economic power"6. 
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Table 3-26 Manufacturing output 1982-1984 (%) 
1982 1983 1984 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 15.6 16.0 15.0 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 18.0 17.6 17.7 
Wood & Wood Products 
1.6 1.6 1.5 
Paper & Paper Products 
3.1 3.1 3.4 
Chemicals 
25.6 25.6 25.4 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 3.9 4.0 4.1 
Basic Metal Industries 
12.3 12.3 12.0 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 18.6 18.4 19.9 
Others 
1.2 1.0 1.0 
Source: National Income Statistics 1984 
Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
The figures in table 3-26, show that the share of 
output between the various industrial sectors changed 
very little, with the heavy industries' share 
increasing by only 1% to 57.3%. Between 1982 and 1984, 
manufacturing output grew by an average of 8%, in 
comparison to an 11.0% growth rate during the fourth 
plan and a 19.5% average rate during the third plan 
period. This reflected the problems the economy faced 
in 1982 and the slower rate of recovery in 1983 and 
1984. 
The fabrications sector had started to recover some of 
the share lost from its peak in 1978, as growth 
averaged 30% between 1982 and 1984, well above any of 
the other industrial sectors. 
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Table 3-27 Structure of Manufacturing 1982-1984 (%) 
1982 1983 1984 
Light Industriesa 43.4 43.3 42.7 
Heavy Industriesa 56.6 56.7 57.3 
Source: derived from Output in Manufacturing 
National Income Statistics 1984 
& Economic Statistics Yearbook 1985 
a see Appendix A 
The heavy industries continued to grow at a much faster 
rate recording a 19.8% increase in production in 
comparison to an average of only 9.0% for the light 
industries. 
Table 3-28, illustrates the slower growth experienced 
in 1982, with a sharp recovery in 1983 and 1984 as. the 
World economy recovered from recession caused by the 
second oil crisis. 
Table 3-28 Growth Rate of Production 1982-1984 
1980 constant prices) 
1982 1983 1984 
Manufacturing 5.3 16.4 15.5 
Food, Beveraqes & 
Tobacco 7.4 11.0 7.0 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 7.4 7.2 5.6 
Wood & Wood Products 
1.2 7.2 5.6 
Paper & Paper Products 
7.3 24.7 6.7 
Chemicals 
3.4 16.8 13.7 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 6.6 26.3 9.0 
Basic Metal Industries 
7.6 14.3 10.8 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 8.5 25.4 32.2 
Others 
1.9 16.4 22.2 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1985 
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The average growth rate for the three years was only 
12.4%, compared to 26.5% for 1971 to 1976, when the 
economy was expanding very rapidly. These figures 
tended to confirm that growth would be slower than in 
the mid seventies. Most industrial sectors performed 
poorly in 1982, though foods, chemicals and the 
ceramics sectors all registered improvements on 1981. 
The higher growth rates experienced by both the foods 
and other products sector reflected the government's 
attempts to diversify and enccurage growth of 
alternative industries. 
Fabrications registered the highest average growth 
rates, with both the electronics and transport 
industries registering higher growth in 1983 and 1984 
(30.9 and 67.85 respectively). The machinery industry 
continued to increase in importance though it continued 
to be effected by problems in industries such as sewing 
machines which had never recovered from difficulties 
experienced during the late 1970's and early 1980's. 
Unemployment increased in the wake of the second oil 
crisis, rising from 3.8% in 1979 to 5.1% in 1980, 
though this had fallen back to 3.9% by 1984. 
Employment in manufacturing which had fallen back to 
20.4% of the total employed in the Korean economy in 
1981, started to recover and had reached 23.3% by 1984. 
The major "change in the composition of manufacturing 
employment was the continued increase in importance of 
the heavy industries. 
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Table 3-29 Manufacturing Employment 1982-1984 
(thousands) 
1982 1983 1984 
Food, Beverages &- 
Tobacco 175 188 193 
Textiles, Wearing Apparel 
& Leather Products 663 676 675 
Wood & Wood Products 
Paper & Paper Products 
Chemicals 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 
Basic Metal Industries 
Fabricated, Machinery & 
Equipment 
Others 
62 65 67 
96 98 104 
276 281 293 
95 100 108 
88 95 100 
563 626 709 
l 
81 86 96 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, 'Summary of 
Mining and Manufacturing, various years 
This had led to the heavy industries increasing its 
representation to 47% of workers employed in 
manufacturing. The fabrications sector increased its 
share to over 30%, as the transportation industries, 
electronics and manufacturing continued to expand. 
Exports recovered in 1983 and 1984, rising to $29.2 
billion, an increase of 37% on 1981, while imports grew 
by only 17% to $30.6 billion, which resulted in a 
narrowing of the trade gap. 
Table 3-30 Manufacturing Exports 1982-1984 
(U. S $ millions) 
1982 1983 1984 
Manufacturing 20,396 23,717 27,698 
Light 9,513 9,634 11,055 
Heavy 10,883 14,083 16,643 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
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Manufacturing exports rose by 42% over the same period, 
with the heavy industries taking an increasingly large 
share as they registered growth of 74%, compared to 
only 12% for the light industries. The ratio of exports 
to manufacturing output continued to increase reaching 
28.5% in 1984, reflecting the continued importance of 
exporting to the health of the Korean economy. 
Manufactured exports continued to increase their share 
of the total exports reaching 94.7% in 1984 as the 
heavy industries increased their portion to 60%, 
reflecting their higher growth rates. Of the heavy 
industrial sectors, fabrications increased its share 
from 32.4% in 1981 to 44.4% in 1984, mainly due to 
increases of $3.2 billion in the value of exports of 
ships and $1 billion in electrical machinery and parts, 
though it is worth noting that imports for these two 
product groups increased by $1.9 billion and $1 billion 
respectively. 
The traditional light industries, especially textiles, 
suffered from slower growth as the effect of tougher 
import restrictions against Korean textile exports and 
the increasing competition from less developed 
countries caused difficulties. In addition textiles as 
with many of the other light industries was still 
suffering from the neglect during the late 1970's which 
had resulted in the industry becoming less competitive. 
Even given these problems the textiles sector was still 
expected to be a leading exporter and source of 
employment for the foreseeable future. 
170 
Table 3-31 Principal Manufactured Exports 1982-1984 
(U. S $ millions and %) 
1982 1983 1984 
Ships & Floating 2,832 3,735 4,684 
Structures 13.9 15.7 16.9 
Clothing & 1,139 1,153 1,453 
Accessoriesa 5.6 4.9 5.2 
Footwear 
Textile Fabrics 
Thermionic Valves 
et alia 
Mens & Boys 
Outer Garments 
Womens & Girls 
Outer Garments 
Petroleum Products 
T. V Receivers 
Toys, Games & 
Sporting Goods 
Plates & Sheets of 
Iron & Steel 
Textile Yarn 
Structures 
Radio 
1,154 1,235 1,352 
5.7 5.2 4.9 
1,141 1,234 1,319 
5.6 5.2 4.8 
651 881 1,338 
3.2 3.7 4.8 
867 714 885 
4.3 3.0 3.2 
669 714 793 
3.3 3.0 2.9 
523 792 
2.2 2.9 
380 553 707 
1.9 2.3 2.6 
434 429 675 
2.1 1.8 2.4 
649 570 640 
3.2 2.4 2.3 
499 548 619 
2.4 2.3 2.2 
394 581 558 
1.9 2.4 2.0 
.... 544 2.0 
Ingots of Iron 519 470 
& Steel 2.5 2.0 
Mens & Boys 447 .... 
Undergarments 2.2 .... 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
Korea Statistical Yearbook, various years 
e. Clothing and accessories, knitted or crocheted 
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The continued increase in the value of exports from the 
shipbuilding industries is illustrated by the rise in 
the proportion of exports it represents, increasing 
from 7.3% in 1981 to 16.9% in 1984. The figures also 
highlight the continued decline in importance of 
exports from the textiles sector, though it does show 
that they still were a significant force, with all 
exports from the clothing and apparel industries worth 
over $4 billion in 1984. 
The number of principal export groups declined but 
increased in importance to 59.1% of manufacturing 
exports mainly due to the large increase in the value 
of ship exports: an important point to note, even 
though the Koreans had continued to diversify their 
manufacturing base and had encouraged the development 
of new industries. Of the nine product groups from 
table 3-10 which represented at least 2% of 
manufactured exports in 1971, six were still large 
enough to be reported in 1984, including two that had 
increased their share (footwear and textile fabrics). 
This shows that even with the continual development of 
manufacturing, many of the original export industries 
are still of great' importance to Korea. These six 
industries, clothing & accessories, ' textile yarn, 
footwear, textile fabrics, plates of iron and steel and 
mens and boys outer garments, represented 36.8% of 
manufactured exports in 1971; `this had reduced to 22.6% 
by 1984, which was still significant. 
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Even with this growth in exports it is worth noting 
that Korea has remained heavily dependent on two 
countries for imports and as a destination for its 
exports. 
Table 3-32 Exports & Imports by Country 1966-1984 (96) 
1966 1971 1976 1981 1984 
America 38.3 49.8 32.3 26.6 35.8 
35.4 28.3 16.2 23.2 22.4 
Japan 26.5 24.5 23.4 16.5 15.7 
41.0 39.8 28.4 24.4 24.9 
Hong Kong 3.8 3.9 4.2 5.4 4.4 
10.7 0.8 0.2 0.8 1.5 
India 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.1 3.6 
Saudi Arabia .. .. 8.7 5.3 3.4 
.. .. 10.1 13.6 4.5 
U. K 2.0 1.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
0.3 2.3 0.9 1.5 1.8 
F. R. G 2.8 2.9 5.2 3.8 3.2 
2.8 3.1 1.6 2.6 2.6 
Canada 2.3 2.7 4.1 2.3 3.0 
0.4 1.6 1.1 2.0 2.1 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
In 1966, America and Japan took 64% of Korean exports 
and supplied 76% of imports; by 1984 this had fallen to 
51% and 47% respectively. The figures from table 3-32 
show that although the totals may have dropped America 
remains Korea's principal export target and Japan 
Korea's main source of imports. This does show that 
Korea is still quite heavily dependent on these two 
countries, which makes the Korean economy and 
manufacturing in particular especially vulnerable to 
pressure and protectionist measures from the Americans 
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and Japanese. 
Given the poor resource base of the Korean economy and 
the large inflow of intermediate parts for Korean 
manufacturing, the principal imports have been fuels, 
raw materials, chemicals and machinery. In the 
fabrications sector, in 1984 exports and imports were 
now close to being in balance, with $10.4 billion in 
exports and $9.8 billion in imports. This is a move 
away from the traditional position which has always had 
fabricated imports in excess of exports and again is a 
reflection of the change taking place in the economy. 
Table 3-33 Exports & Imports by Commodity Group 
(U. S S millions) 
1966 1971 1976 1981 1984 
Food & Live 41 70 508 1,081 1,149 
Animals 716 400 627 2,721 1,622 
Beverages & 7 15 78 128 119 
Tobacco 0 4 30 67 65 
Crude Materials 47 95 196 273 328 
154 463 1,550 3,632 3,939 
Mineral Fuels 2 11 145 310 832 
& Lubricants 42 189 1,753 7,786 7,296 
Animal & 0 1 1 9 4 
Vegetable Fats 6 21 63 137 174 
Chemicals 1 15 120 670 845 
134 201 854 2,065 2,709 
Manufactured Goods 84 328 2,337 6,649 7,376 
By Materials 125 363 1,167 2,787 3,788 
Machinery & 10 87 1,280 6,153 10,462 
Transport Equipment 171 685 2,427 6,037 9,817 
Miscellaneous 59 445 3,028 6,534 8,093 
Manufactures 10 67 292 760 1,117 
0 0 23 47 34 
Others 0 1 10 140 106 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
The figures in table 3-33 also illuminate the 
development of Korean manufacturing, which first took 
place -in the, light industries which are mainly grouped 
under the heading of manufactured goods by materials 
174 
and then moved to the heavy industries characterised by 
machinery and transport equipment. 
They also highlight the huge increase in the cost of 
oil imports, which rose by $1.6 billion from 1971 to 
1976 and by $6 billion in 1981, reflecting the growth 
of the economy and the impact of the two oil crises. 
Once again as the economy and manufacturing have 
developed then the nature of the imports has also 
changed, with more imports of machinery, electrical 
parts, ships and oil and less of cotton, fertiliser, 
wheat and textile machinery. 
While the Koreans have had considerable success in 
achieving export. growth they are dependent on the 
inflow of imports to fuel this growth. With the 
development of industry and particular the heavy 
industries and as the economy recovered from the 
difficulties experienced between 1979 and 1982, this 
gap which had increased to over $4 billion in 1979 and 
1980 reduced to $1 billion in 1984. 
3.6.2 Summary - 
The Korean economy started the fifth plan with a number 
of, grave difficulties, resulting from the over heating 
of the economy in the late 1970's and the second oil 
crisis. Thanks to the government's stabilisation 
policies and the gradual recoverynin World trade the 
Korean economy had started to recover strongly by 1984, 
and was well on the way to surpassing the targets set 
in both the original and revised plans. 
Even though the government was now pursuing a policy of 
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balanced development the heavy industries and 
especially the fabrications sector continued to 
increase in importance. This was partially due to the 
continued high level of investment and also because of 
the problems facing the light industries (especially 
the textiles sector) in overcoming the lack of 
investment in the late 1970's and the trading 
difficulties caused by increasing tariff barriers and 
the emergence of new competitors. 
Manufacturing growth continued to slow, averaging only 
8% for the three years, in comparison to 11% during the 
fourth plan and 19.3% for the third plan, reflecting 
the difficult trading conditions, though the Korean 
government had expected growth to slow as the economy 
matured. The heavy industries continued to increase 
their share of output and exports, representing 57.3% 
and 60% respectively, an indication that these 
industries were growing at a-much faster rate. 
Manufactured exports reached $27.7 billion in 1984 with 
a continued reduction in the trade gap as exports, 
especially from the fabrications sector were growing 
faster than imports. Shipbuilding continued to emerge 
as a major export earner-accounting for 16.9% of all 
manufactured exports in 1984. The economy and 
manufacturing especially is continuing to develop and 
grow as the newer heavy industries increase in 
importance. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
The preceeding sections demonstrate the remarkable 
sustained, growth and structural changes exhibited by 
Korean manufacturing during the last two decades. 
With the success of the Korean government's strategy of 
encouraging industrial growth by using exports, 
manufacturing which had represented barely more than 
10% of G. N. P in 1961, had risen to 29% by 1984. 
Manufactured exports now represented over 94% of all 
commodity exports, compared to only 15% in 1961. 
The effects of the development of manufacturing during 
the five year plans become apparent when viewing the 
changes in the composition of manufacturing. Initially 
manufacturing was heavily dependent on the light 
industries until the heavy industries started to 
develop in the late 1960's and 1970's, so that by the 
end of 1984, the heavy industries had become dominant. 
In, 1961 the light industries accounted for 78.7% of 
manufacturing output and the vast majority of 
manufactured exports (over 90%). By the end of 1984 
this had changed with the heavy industries now 
accounting for 57.3% of output and 60% of exports. 
Certain commodity groups have remained important 
exporters even with the development of the heavy 
industries, especially the fabrications sector; these 
are generally all from the textiles-sector which while 
of diminishing importance still accounts for close to 
20% of all manufactured exports. Of the heavy 
industries the bulk of exports comes from the 
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fabriactions sector which had accounted for only 12% 
of manufactured exports in 1971 but had risen to 45% by 
1984. The increase in manufactured exports is 
reflected in their increasing share of commodity 
exports; in 1961 their share was only 22%, this had 
risen to over 94% by 1984. 
Korean manufacturing has developed at a remarkable pace 
during the last two decades, thanks to the relationship 
between the government and business. The Korean 
government has used the economic development plans to 
guide the economy, using the vigorous promotion of 
exports and industrialisation to develop the 
economy. The nature of the planning has changed as the 
economy has developed and increased in complexity and 
the lessons have been learnt from the difficulties 
faced by the economy in the late 1970's and early 
1980's. 
Table 3-34 Country Comparisons 
(Annual average growth rates) 
Korea U. K U. S. A Japan 
G. N. P 1965-1983 6.7 4.8 1.7 4.8 
Exports 1965-1973 31.7 5.0 6.8 14.7 
1973-1983 14.8 4.7 2.8 7.4 
Imports 1965-1973 22.4 6.5 9.4 14.9 
. 1973-1983 7.5 3.8 3.1 1.3 
Manufacturing 
1965-1973' 21.1 2.6 2.9 
1973-1983 11.8 -1.9 1.4 
Source: World Development Report 1985 
Korea has in a short period of time transformed itself 
from a typical less developed country, to become a 
strong industrial competitor. Korea has grown faster 
178 
than any of the developed economies, (see table 3-34), 
outstripping even Japan. 
Using, any of the measures from table 3-34 the Korean 
economy is catching the industrialised economies very 
quickly. 
Since the early sixties the Korean economy has 
undergone a remarkable transformation by changing from 
a nation reliant on aid and only a small manufacturing 
industry to one which has a developed light industrial 
sector: a quickly developing heavy industry which is 
moving towards higher technology to challenge the 
established industrial nations; and with the 
government placing more emphasis on technology, quality 
improvement, increasing value added and taking Korean 
industry to the forefront of industrial development. 
i 
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Footnotes to chapter 3 
1. Evaluation of the Third Five Year Plan pl. 
2. The summary of mining and manufacture is a yearly 
report contained in the Economic Statistics 
Yearbook published by the Ministry of Finance. 
3. Fifth Five Year Economic and Social Development 
Plan p8. 
4. Fifth Five Year Economic and Social Development 
Plan p43. 
5. Fifth Five Year Economic and Social Development 
Plan p43. 
6. Economic Survey 1985 p9. 
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Chapter Four 
Foreign Direct Investment 
4.1 Introduction 
This "chapter examines the attitude of the 
Korean government towards the control of the inflow and 
pattern of foreign direct investment in the Republic of 
Korea. To understand the role played by foreign direct 
investment in the development of the Korean economy we 
have to investigate government policy towards foreign 
direct investment and the circumstances that led to the 
encouragement of foreign private capital inflows. The 
policy pursued by the Korean government= towards foreign 
direct `investment is largely contained in the various 
Foreign Capital Inducement Acts (F. C. I. A) the first 
being introduced in the early 1960's. The changes in 
the F. C. I. A reveal the revisions in the government's 
attitude towards foreign direct investment. 
We then turn to an inspection of the level of foreign 
direct investment, its destination and country of 
origin as this gives a considerable insight into the 
nature of the inflows and their possible impact with 
regard to the expansion of the economy and the 
expansion of manufacturing, as discussed in chapters 
two and three. 
Finally we consider a numberlof previous studies which 
have considered the relationships between foreign 
direct investment inflow and the economies of the less 
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developed countries. In this section we will 
specifically review the published evidence concerning 
foreign direct investment in Korea and its impact on 
the Korean economy. 
4.2 Aid and Development 
Foreign capital inflows have played a very important 
role, at the begining in the form of grants and aid and 
later in the form of public and private capital 
inflows. While the first foreign direct investment 
inflow after-the Korean War did not occur until 1962 as 
the Korean economy started to show signs of recovery, 
Korea does have a long history of foreign investment 
dating - from the Japanese occupation during the 
colonial period from 1910 to 1945. 
Following the end of the Korean war and right up until 
the- demise of the Rhee government in 1960, Korea was 
heavily dependent on aid, with the Rhee government 
following what has been described as an 'aid 
maximisation'`policy. ', This attitude to aid, underwent 
an enforced 'change as-. the American government moved 
away from using direct aid towards developmental grants 
and loans in the late 1950's. The Korean government 
had to agree to this rather than sour relations with 
the Americans who supplied over 95% of all aid, though 
there was considerable friction over this and the 
subsequent discussions on the policies to regenerate 
the economy. - 
Mason (1980) attributes a number of policy moves 
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following this period to the problems the Koreans had 
with the U. S government, he said that there was a 
"realignment of policies and international 
relationships that would save them from being trapped 
in such a compromising position again" (p45). 
Because of these changes and the need to move away from 
aid dependence the Koreans embarked upon the 
regeneration of their economy and turned to other 
sources of finance. The Korean government opened 
negotiations with the I. M. F for a standby agreement and 
reached a settlement with'Japan at the end of 1965 that 
resulted in sizeable inflows of Japanese capital. 
Discussions with the World Bank on an assistance 
programme were also undertaken.. 
During the transition period there was a considerable 
amount of movement as Korea tried to develop 
alternative sources of capital, initially starting with 
official sources, like the World bank and as confidence 
in the Korean economy grew moving to private capital. 
As Cole and Lyman (1971) noted there were practically 
no private foreign loans to Korea prior to 1962 with 
only $23.6 million coming in in 1963 compared to $216.4 
million in aid. 
The move to other. sources of foreign capital definitely 
marked' a watershed in Korean policy and was vital for 
Korean development, as not only were the Koreans able 
to gain access to greater amounts of capital, but they 
also reduced their dependency on a single source and 
consequently were freer to pursue their own policies 
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and were less susceptible to outside influences. 
Even though aid inflows had reduced to less than $100 
million by 1966, less than half their peak value, aid 
did have a vital part to play in the economic 
development of Korea. Not only did aid allow the 
economy to recover from the Korean War, by providing a 
vital breathing space, it also had a number of other 
benefits. It allowed the shattered infrastructure time 
to recover, the American aid furthered a number of 
important reforms without which the Korean economic 
miracle might never have occurred. These benefits 
included land reform, which introduced a much more 
equitable system forcing the Korean -government to 
follow suit. It helped in the rebuilding of Korea's 
educational and banking systems and most importantly, 
enabled Korea to start its expansionary strategy with 
little or no indebtedness. In 1966 the total debt 
repayments came to $15.6 million, giving a debt service 
ratio of only 6.2%. 
The change to using foreign capital as a source of 
development funds was very important for the 
development of the Korean economy. Kim (1985, p7) when 
writing about the role of foreign capital in the early 
development stages as the level of aid reduced stated 
the following, "Foreign capital was actively 
encouraged. Since capital inflow on the whole was used 
for productive purposes, especially for quick-yielding 
export-oriented production, capital inflow itself prior 
to the first oil crisis generated its-own debt service 
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without putting excessive pressure on the Balance of 
Payments flows. Foreign borrowing was only undertaken 
with government authorisation and guarantee, thus the 
government firmly controlled access to foreign capital" 
4.3 Government Policy & Foreign Direct Investment 
In 1982 the Ministry of Finance stated that "foreign 
capital investment has been of major importance in 
Korea's economic growth and is expected to play a vital 
role in the continued development of the country. The 
government therefore encourages foreign investment". 
Naya and Ramstetter (1978) when discussing foreign 
direct investment and the policy environment with 
regard to the Asian N. I. C's and ASEAN countries stated 
that "most of these economies have also regulated 
certain aspects of foreign firm operations'. Korean, 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines all employ 
aggressive industrial policies aimed at influencing the 
behaviour of domestic and foreign investors" (p57). 
Jon Woronoff (1983) in 'Korea's Economy Man-made 
Miracle' stated that "the first serious efforts to 
attract investors were made under Park, as of 1962. 
Reasonably, but not exceptionally' attractive conditions 
were offered. While most sectors were opened to 
foreigners, there was a clear preference for 
manufacturing" (p193). 
As" with other forms of foreign capital the Korean 
government has exerted a considerable level of control 
over the size, type and direction of the F. D. I inflows, 
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though there are signs that this policy has started to 
change since the second oil crisis in the late 1970's. 
The first laws concerning the encouragement and control 
of F. D. I were enacted in 1960. These laws included 
incentives to foreign investors, giving them a number 
of tax concessions including a five year tax holiday 
and guarantees over repatriations of profits and 
investments. 
In 1966 the first of the Foreign Capital Inducement 
Acts (F. C. I. A) became law. This revised and 
streamlined the three previous Acts, the Foreign 
Investment Encouragement Law, the law concerning 
payment guarantees and a law that facilitated the 
introduction of capital goods. Several restrictions 
were removed, foreign investors could invest without 
any floor on-the amount, the old regulation specified 
that domestic investors must own at least 25% of the 
equity in any enterprise was removed and the maximum 
limit of 20% on annual profit repatriation was removed 
completely. 
The F. C. I. A has always been constantly under review and 
revision "so that between the 1966 Act and the new Act 
in 1973 there were a number of changes; for instance in 
1970 the government'enacted legislation to set up the 
first free-trade zone explicitly designed to attract 
F. D. I for export manufacturing. 
The third five year economic development plan in 1971, 
contained measures to increase the level of screening 
of investment projects to ensure their technical and 
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economic feasibility in order to increase investment 
efficiency. Priority was given to projects that 
increased export capacity, developed agriculture and 
fisheries, promoted development of the heavy and 
chemical industries and improved the infrastructure. 
To assist the government in assessing the performance 
of the investment projects a strict management system 
was applied to all foreign financed projects. 
it is worth noting that the Korean government's 
attitude to foreign direct investment during the early 
seventies was coloured by their apprehension concerning 
Japanese investment and the worries that they might 
come to dominate Korean manufacturing. 
The F. C. I. A was considerably strengthened in 1973 
following worries over the possible foreign dominance 
of industry, as the number of projects approved in 1972 
alone were double the total value of F. D. I approved 
since 1962. 
The 1973 F. C. I. A gave specific criteria for an 
investment to be eligible for approval; this was set 
out in article 4 of the act as the following: 
The criteria to be applied when the Minister of Finance 
grants authorisation or approvals in accordance with 
the provisions of this Act shall be as follows: 
1. Projects which greatly contribute to the 
improvement of the balance of payments 
2. Projects which contribute to the development of 
key industries or public utilities, and 
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3. Projects which contribute to the development of 
the national economy and the social welfare. 
And in granting such authorisations or approvals 
priority shall be given to those projects which will 
greatly contribute to the improvement of the balance of 
payments, or to joint venture projects in the case of 
foreign investment. 
The government also issued 'General Guidelines for 
F. D. I', which included greater priority being given to 
joint ventures, and detailed further the restrictions 
on the type of project that F. D. I would be allowed in. 
In most circumstances participation was now limited to 
a maximum of 50% except in special circumstances. 
There were a number of exceptions to this suggested 50% 
limit, these included: 
1. ' Projects that were solely export oriented and did 
not compete with domestic exporters. 
2. Projects that were technology intensive and 
produced important export or intermediate 
products. 
3. Projects that were beneficial but the foreign 
company would normally only invest in a wholly 
owned subsidiary. 
4. Projects in Free Export Zones 
In addition exemption might be granted to investment by 
Korean nationals living abroad and where the investment 
would substantially increase in the future and most 
importantly where the Minister of Finance deemed it 
necessary. The minimum investment was now set at 
Y 
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$50,000 which was increased to $100,000 in 1974. 
Not all measures to encourage and develop foreign 
investment were included in the Act. In 1975 the 
government undertook a number of major policy 
initiatives with regard to foreign capital. These 
included measures to try to diversify economic 
relations in an attempt-to become less reliant on 
investment from Japan and America (see section 4.4.3). 
In 1977 the Economic Planning Board stated that 
"foreign capital inducement is necessary for economic 
development, because it serves: to remedy short-term 
disequilibrium. Continued capital inflow is essential, 
so- long as the investment efficiency of external 
financial resources can be maintained"2. They 
recommended to the government that a list of industries 
in which foreign investment should be promoted be made, 
in addition to clear-cut criteria for approvals and a 
simplification of application proceduresýin an effort 
to expedite investment. 
The Korean government has always kept tight control on 
all aspects of F. D. I, and it is only since the late 
seventies and, early eighties just prior to and 
following the second oil crisis and the difficulties 
experienced by the Korean economy that the government 
has started to, liberalise the restraints on foreign 
investment. 
D. M. Leipzinger in the World Development journal report 
on Korea in 1988, noted that "government, policy was 
generally hostile towards D. F. I in the 1970's for a 
189 
variety of reasons. The stand-offish attitude changed 
in 1980 when, in an attempt to cope with an economic 
crisis featuring high inflation, negative growth, 
growing debt-service difficulties and a large balance 
of payments deficit, abroad based program of trade and 
financial liberalisation was adopted. Among the 
elements of this program were several measures to 
encourage more direct foreign investment. In addition 
to more liberal guidelines and approval procedures, 
these measures permit greater flexibility in decisions 
regarding sourcing of inputs, disposition of output, 
use of financial facilities and the management of 
liabilities" (p151). '* 
The F. C. I. A and the Guidelines continued to be altered 
and revised, generally moves were made to liberalise 
and simplify the system as the economy grew. This 
accelerated following the second oil crisis. The 
'Basic Foreign Investment Policy and Guidelines' in 
1981 stated that: 
"It is the fundamental policy of the Government to 
encourage, protect and manage foreign capital, so that 
it may contribute to the sound development of the 
national economy, the improvement of the balance of 
payments, and the introduction of advanced technology 
in- the economy. In order to promote foreign 
investment, the Government places great emphasis on 
improving the foreign investment climate by simplifying 
administrative procedures concerning investment affairs 
and strengthening services for foreign invested 
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enterprises already established. In addition, the 
government will further exert efforts to diversify 
foreign investment sources"3. 
Of the total of 855 categorised industries (using the 
Korean Industrial Classification System [K. I. C. S]), 
just under. half were 'open' to foreign investment 
(427). Eighty percent of manufacturing allowed some 
F. D. I, though only 51 manufacturing categories out of 
320 were allowed 100% foreign ownership, only 56 out of 
the total of 855 allowed 100% foreign equity. Once 
again the Minister of Finance was allowed to make 
exceptions. 
Eligible projects now included: 
1. Large scale industries which are difficult for 
domestic companies to carry out alone in capital 
intensive fields such as machinery, metals, 
electric and electronic and chemicals. 
2. Energy related industries. 
3. Export oriented projects. 
4. Projects which contribute to domestic resource 
development. 
5. Projects for manufacture of foodstuffs and medical 
products. 
6. Commodity distribution and service industries. 
7. Those industries deemed essential by the Minister 
of Finance. 
The tax exemptions granted in 1966 and 1973 continued 
with very few amendments. The Korean government also 
tried to speed up and simplify the approvals procedure, 
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with the use of a one-stop service set up under the 
control of the Bureau of International Finance, which 
brought together representatives from the various 
Agencies and Ministries. The intention was to be able 
to get an evaluation and an answer back to the 
applicant within 30 to 40 days, with the use of a 
Foreign Capital Project Review Committee for all 
investments of -less than $10 million, 
leaving the 
Foreign Capital Inducement Committee to deal with 
these. 
The F. C. I. A underwent considerable changes in 1983 as 
the Korean government brought in a number of new policy 
measures designed to attract more foreign investment. 
The most important changes were the introduction of a 
'Negative' list system and the use of an 'Automatic 
Approval' system combined with a more relaxed approach 
to wholly owned subsidiaries. 
The previous 'Positive' system specified the categories 
eligible for foreign investment; the new system lists 
only those projects where at present investment is 
restricted or prohibited, giving the foreign investor a 
much clearer picture. Article 9 of the 1983 F. C. I. A 
listed the prohibited projects as follows: 
1. Public projects to be'carried out by the nation or 
public organisations. 
2. Projects which cause harm to the health and 
sanitation of the nationals and maintenance of the 
enviroment. 
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3. Projects which are greatly in violation of public 
policy. 
4. Any other project prescribed by presidential 
decree. 
Of the 999 projects classified under the Korean 
Standard Industrial Classification, some 660 industries 
were eligible for foreign investment, once again the 
majority of these were in the manufacturing sector 
(449). Of the remaining 339 projects, 215 were classed 
as restricted, with the government stating that many of 
these would be opened up as the economy developed. 
The other major change was the introduction of a 
simplified approvals procedure which allowed some 
investments to be approved without being referred to 
the Foreign Capital Project Review Committee. The 
conditions for automatic approval were as follows: 
1. The foreign investment ratio is less than 50% 
(However, in cases where the ratio of exports to 
self-manufactured products is above 60%, or where 
the importation of the same kind of self- 
manufactured products is liberalised and the 
tariff rates of those are below 10%, automatic 
approval is possible even if the foreign 
investment ratio is'above 50%). 
2. The foreign investment amount is below Si million. 
3. No request is made to receive tax exemption. 
4. The foreign investment project is neither a 
prohibited project-nor a restricted project on the 
negative list. 
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In addition the Foreign Capital Inducement Committee 
would now only investigate an investment project on 
request of the Minister of Finance. 
Table 4-1 Classification of Industry by Negative List 
(as of 1.84 and 10.85) 
No 
Industries Prohibited Restricted Allowed 
1984 999 82 215 660 
1985 999 54 183 762 
Agriculture, 
Hunting, 40 16 18 5 
Forestry 40 13 19 8 
& Fishing. 
Mining 26 1 11 2 
26 0 5 21 
Manufacturing 
522 10 61 449 
522 6 33 483 
Electricity, 
Gas &6 3 0 3 
Water 6 3 0 3 
Construction 31 =0 2 29 
31 0 0 31 
Wholesale & Retail 
Trade 139 16 32 90 
Restaurants 139 7 27 105 
& Hotels 
Transport, 53 8 29 9- 
Storage & 53 7 30 16 
Communication 
Financing, Insurance 
Real Estate 75 11 29 21 
& Business 75 5 39 31 
Services 
Community, Social 
& Personal 107' 17 32 42 
Services 107 13 30 64 
1. The 1984 figures has 42 projects omitted due to 
Ministries having yet to specify them. 
2. First set of figur es are 1984, second set 1985. 
Source: Ministry of Fi nance I nvestment Guide t o Korea 
Seoul 1985 
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The revised F. C. I. A introduced in 1984 contained the 
following revised statement directed towards foreign 
investment: 
"Open the door to foreign investors, to liberalise 
technology inducement and to induce smoothly the 
capital and technology necessary for economic 
development"4. 
This liberalisation has continued as witnessed by the 
'Negative' list published (table 4-1) which showed 660 
out of the 999 classifications allowing unrestricted 
foreign investment in 1984 and 762 by the end of 1985. 
The move to a 'negative' list from the original 
'positive' list meant that now only those industries 
that were either prohibited or restricted were listed, 
which greatly eased the task of checking for 
restrictions for foreign investors. 
The bulk of- manufacturing was deregulated by the 
beginning of 1984 with 449 industries cleared for 
unrestricted -foreign direct investment out of a total 
of 522: by the end of 1985 this figure had increased to 
483 (93% of all industries). The manufacturing 
industries that remained prohibited were mainly in the 
publishing sector since this was and still is 
considered to be of national importance. 
The restricted industries only allow foreign =direct 
investment if the Ministry of Finance approves. The 
guidelines stated that the Minister of Finance would 
approve 'foreign investment in the following sectors 
only in the case of joint ventures with an existing 
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Korean company in the same business. 
Construction business in the major classification 
of the Korean Standard Industrial Classification, 
only if it is in collaboration with an existing 
holder of. a construction license. 
Manufacture of internal combustion piston engines 
and ship engines. 
Manufacture of work trucks and stackers. 
Manufacture of electrical transformers (154KV) 
Manufacture of optical fibres, optical fibre 
covered wire and cables. 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and motor-cycles. 
Manufacture of electronic switching systems. 
Non-life insurance business. 
In addition to the introduction of the negative list 
the new F. C. I. A removed the tax advantages that had 
been given to foreign invested enterprises under the 
old Act. There were a number of exemptions to' this 
generally where a project either met certain criteria 
or was deemed of significant importance to the economy. 
The. F. C. I. A set out the following categories for 
foreign direct investment projects to be considered of 
great importance to the development of the economy. 
A. : -A, project which makes a significant contribution 
to the improvement of the international balance of 
payments. 
B. A project which is accompanied by advanced 
technology or large amounts of capital. 
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C. A project in which a non-resident Korean national 
invests in accordance with the registration of 
non-resident Korean nationals. 
D. A project which is located in a free export zone 
in accordance with the Free Export Zone 
Establishment Law. 
E. Any other project designated by presidential 
decree as a project for which tax reduction or 
exemption is essential in order to induce foreign 
investment. 
In addition to being in one of these categories the 
projects also had to meet additional requirements 
depending on the category. For instance category A 
projects have to either meet an obligatory export ratio 
or import-substitution effect. While the category B 
projects where they were coupled to technology had to 
show that domestic development was unlikely or 
difficult or that it was to be used in high-tech 
industries approved by the Ministry of Finance. 
The government's policy towards foreign direct 
investment has changed during the period under 
investigation, moving from one of very strict control, 
directing the type, size and quality of investment 
towards a more open policy. The liberalisation allows 
foreign direct investment inflow without many 
restrictions and is directed towards assisting 
investors. 
Richard Luedde-Neurath (1988), argued that there were 
three basic realities for foreign investment in Korea: 
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1. Tight investment screening 
2. Extensive government interference 
3. Extensive reporting requirements and controls5 
He suggested that what is stated on paper does not 
always represent the reality of the situation. Foreign 
investors often faced restriction due to the activities 
of bureaucrats, inter-departmental rivalry and other 
forms of government interference. Though he did note 
that this does not happen all the time and that the 
continued liberalisation of the controls (in 1984) 
promised to remove many of the restrictions. 
4.4 Foreign Direct Investment 
4.4.1 Importance 
Foreign direct investment inflow into the Korean 
economy has a long history with the Japanese investing 
considerable sums between 1910 and 1945 during their 
occupation of Korea. Modern foreign direct investment 
dates from the early 1960's, with the first official 
approval of any investment being granted in 1962. Even 
though the inflow of investment dates from this period 
the size of foreign direct investment compared to the 
total invested in the economy and to other indicators 
of economic performance has always been quite small. 
Naya and`Ramstetter (1988) noted that "foreign' direct 
investment has not been a major source of external 
deficit financing in-these countries. In Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia these shares were 
relatively large, often close to 50% or greater, but 
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total inflows were small, even totally absent at times. 
In countries with larger total foreign capital inflows, 
Korea, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, shares were 
much smaller, usually under 15%" (p58). 
Farruk Iqbal in the 1988 World Development journal 
report "Korea: -- Transition to-maturity" highlighted the 
position of foreign direct investment, showing that 
unlike most of the other developing countries Korea 
relied on loans which accounted for almost 95% of all 
capital inflows. 
Table 4-2 Shares of Foreign Direct Investment 
Stock of Stock of external Ratio of F. D. I 
F. D. I. debt. to total 
1983 1983 liabilities. 
Countries (billions US dollars) (%) 
Korea 1.8 38.9 4.4 
Argentina 5.8 44.4 11.6 
Brazil 24.6 88.0 21.8 
Mexico 13.6 89.4 13.2 
Indonesia 6.8 30.4 18.3 
Philippines 2.7 23.9 10.9 
Hong Kong 4.2 5.5 43.2 
Singapore 7.9 0.7 91.9 
Malaysia 6.2 15.9 28.1 
Turkey 1.2 17.5 6.4 
Source: World Development Journal, January 1988 p141. 
This is highlighted by comparing the position of 
foreign direct investment in Korea and a number of 
developing countries (table 4-2). 
Korea's ratio of foreign direct investment to debt is 
quite different to the other developing countries, 
indicating that-loans have played an important role in 
financing Korea's expansion. 
Correspondingly Sung-Hwan Jo when considering the 
development of the Korean economy up to 1974 stated 
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that "direct foreign private investment as a source of 
foreign capital inflow financed only a small portion 
(2.3%) of domestic capital formation during the period 
1959-1974. It accounted for 9.5% of the total inflow of 
foreign capital over the same period"6. 
In addition Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981) in a 
paper from the World Bank stated that "only a small 
proportion of'the. inflow of foreign capital into Korea 
has been direct foreign investment. During 1962-1971 
direct foreign investment contributed a mere 4% of the 
net inflow of foreign capital. it contributed 11% of 
the total during 1972-1976" (p22). 
The paper came to the conclusion that "although Korea 
has relied rather heavily on inflows of investment 
resources, the inflows have overwhelmingly been in the 
form of debt, not equity" (p65) though they did note 
that "recent government pronouncements suggest that the 
emphasis may be changing toward'greater encouragement 
of direct foreign investment"(p69) which reflected the 
changing government attitudes towards foreign direct 
investment since the late 1970's. 
Foreign direct investment represented only 7.7% of 
total foreign capital inflows between 1974 and 1984, 
though taking only the period since 1980 this rises to 
over 9%. In 1984 the foreign direct investment inflow 
represented 17.8%-of total capital inflows and in 1985 
this continued to rise to 18.2%, reflecting the growing 
importance of foreign investment. - Even though the 
volume of foreign direct investment inflow was 
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increasing it is worth noting that in comparison to the 
size of exports the inflows only represented 1.7% of 
exports. 
While the foreign direct investment inflows are small 
Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981) reported that "direct 
foreign investment provides a bundle of complementary 
resources, typically including capital, technology and 
management and sometimes including access to specific 
intermediate inputs and to overseas markets" (p17). 
4.4.2 Extent of Foreign Direct Investment 
The first post-war foreign direct investment project 
came in 1962, with Toray Industries Incorporated being 
given approval to invest in the textile sector. 
Foreign direct investment inflows did not start until 
confidence in'the economy increased as the government's 
economic policies took effect. Jon Wornoff (1983) 
reported that, "it took some time for investors to 
come, first wishing to see if the economy was viable 
and determine what opportunities existed" (p193). 
As the Korean economy improved, the growth rate of 
G. N. P increased from only 1.1% in 1960 to an average 
of 6.5% in the next five years. Foreign investors' 
confidence improved as Korean export performance 
improved, with exports averaging a yearly growth rate 
of 40% between 1961 and 1965. 
Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981) stated that, "the 
availability of private foreign capital to Korea has 
largely been in response to the country's good export 
performance" (p13). 
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Table 4-3 Foreign Investment Inflows 
Year No of Projects Total Amount' 
1962 1 575 
1963 1 304 
1964 2 333 
1965 5 20,671 
1966 6 1,116 
1967 12 9,296 
1968 20 8,361 
1969 25 15,581 
1970 50 13,642 
1971 57 25,793 
1972 107 93,072 
1973 194 156,606 
1974 85 74,003 
1975 29 169,398 
1976 35 72,160 
1977 37 65,915 
1978 41 128,438 
1979 42 107,312 
1980 36 140,751 
1981 41 145,327 
1982 55 187,791 
1983 75 267,753 
1984 103 419,049 
Source: Ministry of Finance Investment Guide to Korea 
Seoul, 1985 p90 
Figures are in thousand US dollars 
Approval basis 
Table 4-3 shows the level of approved foreign direct 
investment and the number of projects involved. This 
indicates that the inflows only built up gradually with 
the size and number of projects involved in the first 
few years being very small. The level and number of 
investors increased from 1966 through to 1973 following 
normalisation of relations with Japan in 1967. 
Levels of investment then underwent a reduction as the 
government tightened its policies towards foreign 
direct investment with worries surfacing with regard to 
foreign and especially Japanese domination of Korean 
manufacturing and world wide investment dropped 
following the first oil crisis. 
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Foreign direct investment started to increase in the 
late 1970's as the government decided to change its 
attitudes towards foreign investors due to the changing 
economic circumstances. This was obviously affected by 
the second oil crisis, but since 1981 as the government 
has continued to liberalise the regulations (F. C. I. A) 
concerning foreign investment the number of projects 
and the total invested has increased every year. The 
total invested in 1984 reached $419 million and the 
trend continued in 1985 and 1986, with foreign direct 
investment reaching $531 million in 1985 and in 1986 it 
topped $1 billion. 
4.4.3 Industrial Distribution 
Given the government's policy and administration of 
foreign direct investment, the bulk of investment is in 
manufacturing. -" As table 4-4 indicates by the end of 
1984 manufacturing received over 65% of the total 
invested since 1962, taking the investment prior to 
1980 the total rises to 72%. The table shows how the 
total foreign 
-direct 
investment since 1962 is 
concentrated in certain key industries. The chemical, 
petroleum and chemical products sector (chemicals, 
medical products, fertiliser and petroleum) has 
adsorbed 22.5%; while fabrication (machinery), 
electrical, electronics and transportation took 29% and 
hotel and tourism 22.6%. 
These three sectors (chemicals, fabrications and hotels 
and tourism) alone absorbed 74% of all foreign direct 
investment entering Korea between 1962 and 1984, while 
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the two manufacturing sectors represent 79% of foreign 
direct investment directed towards industry. 
Table 4=4 Foreign Direct Investment by Industry (1) 
(1962-1984) 
Industry Total Amount' Percentage 
Agriculture & Fisheries 15,615 0.74 
. Agriculture 6,918 0.33 
Fisheries 8,697 0.41 
Mining & Manufacturing 1,392,996 65.61 
Mining 3,607 0.17 
Manufacturing 1,389,389 65.44 
Foodstuff 67,161 3.16 
Textiles & Garments 71,742 3.38 
Wood Products 1,113 0.52 
Chemicals 333,645 15.71 
Medical Products 65,771 3.10 
Fertiliser 41,975 1.98 
Petroleum 36,535 1.72 
Ceramics 19,567 0.92 
Metals 70,078 3.30 
Machinery 226,823 10.68 
Electric & Electronics 330,363 15.56 
Transportation 66,566 3.14 
Others 58,050 2.73 
Social Overhead Capital 714,636 33.66 
Financing 103,996 4.90 
Construction 95,021 4.48 
Electricity 3,395 0.16 
Transportation & Storage 31,478 1.48 
Hotel & Tourism 480,746 22.64 
Total 2,123,247 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Finance 1985 
1 Figures are in thousand US dollars 
Approval basis 
The bulk of the investment ($192 million) in hotels and 
tourism has arrived since 1980 with the growing 
interest in Korea and the approach of the Olympic games 
in 1988. 
The figures in table 4-5 show the total foreign direct 
investment inflows over a number of different periods. 
Taking in the early period of economic development from 
1962 to 1971, then the early and late seventies and 
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finally the last three years as the Korean economy 
recovered from the recession and the economic 
difficulties experienced during the late seventies and 
early eighties. 
Table 4-5 Foreign Direct Investment t1Z Industry 
, 
ill 
Industry 62-71 72-76 77-81 82-84 
Agriculture & Fisheries 1,045 5,221 6,350 2,999 
Agriculture 971 1,478 3,324 1,145 
Fisheries 74 3,743 3,026 1,845 
Mining & Manufacturing 82,822 427,388 393,280 489,506 
Mining 0 1,451 812 1,344 
Manufacturing 82,822 425,937 392,468 488,162 
Foodstuff 1,156 1,729 29,267 35,000 
Textiles & Garments 4,807 57,505 2,562 6,868 
Wood Products 0 263 850 0 
Chemicals 11,626 146,143 120,258 55,618 
Medical Products 2,967 2,082 9,377 51,345 
Fertiliser 20,500 21,325 150 0 
Petroleum 7,845 15,407 8,283 5,000 
Ceramics 5,649 4,379 4,231 5,308 
Metals 8,975 30,003 21,318 9,782 
Machinery 5,307 30,330 44,139 147,047 
Electric & Electronics 11,515 82,995 107,765 128,088 
Transportation 40 25,542 19,485 21,499 
Others 2,435 8,234 24,774 22,607 
Social Overhead Capital 11,805 132,630 188,113 382,088 
Financing 1,621 11,340 52,472 38,563 
Construction 3,307 15,856 37,344 38,514 
Electricity 0 0 3,395 0 
Transportation & Storage 783 3,412 24,437 2,846 
Hotel & Tourism 6,094 102,022 70,465 302,165 
Total 95,672 565,239 587,743 874,539 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Approval basis 
Figures are in thousand US dollars 
The table shows that total foreign direct investment 
in Korea during the' 1960's was quite small. Of the 
$95.6 million invested between 1962 and 1971, 
$22million came in between 1962 and 1966, with $20 
million of the inflow going to the construction of two 
fertiliser plants. 
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Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981) stated that, "the 
initial inflows of direct-foreign investment into Korea 
were for import substitution and was almost exclusively 
oriented "toward the domestic market. Direct foreign 
investment made virtually no contribution to the 
expansion of exports during the crucial 1962-66 period" 
(p54). 
While Sung-hwan Jo' noted that "the direction and 
pattern of 'direct foreign investment from its 
commencement in 1962 to the end of 1974 exhibited a 
distinct shift at the end of 1968 from import- 
substituting, U. S dominating investment to export- 
oriented investment in which Japan's share rapidly 
increased"7. 
Taking the figures from table 4-5, this move towards 
the export-oriented industries can be seen. The 
principal recipient of the early foreign direct 
investment' inflow was the chemical, petroleum and 
chemical products' sector which only represented 
approximately 2% 'of manufactured exports while the 
fabrications, ''electric, electronics and transportation 
sector had by the end of the research' period (1984) 
become the major export and investment sector. Between 
1962 and` 1971, the chemicals industries accounted for 
51.8% of manufacturing foreign direct investment, while 
by the final- period 1982-1984 this had dropped to 
22.9%', while fabrication et al had climbed from 20.4% 
to 60.8% during the'same period, illustrating the 
change towards manufacturing exports. The table also 
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shows the effects of the Korean government's control of 
foreign investment during the seventies and the change 
in inflow as they liberalised their policies. The 
total invested between 1972 and 1976 was $565 million 
while the sum of the next five years only increased to 
$587 million. While in the last three years a total of 
$874 million has been invested, which represents 41% of 
the total investment for the whole period indicating 
the greatly increased levels of inflow following 
liberalisation. 
4.4.4 Foreign Direct Investment by Country 
Foreign direct investment in Korea has been dominated 
by two countries, initially the U. S. A and latterly 
Japan. Tables 4-6,4-7 and 4-8 reveal the different 
countries that have supplied foreign direct investment, 
and the different levels of investment from these 
countries. Table 4-6 discloses the dominance of Japan 
and America who between them represent 46% and 31% 
respectively of the total foreign direct investment 
invested between 1962 and 1984. 
Foreign direct investment from the Americans dominated 
the early period, supplying 95% of the total inflow 
between 1962 and 1966, though following the 
normalisation of relations between Korea and Japan in 
1965, Japanese investment has been of greater 
importance. These, two countries have continued to 
dominate the, supply of foreign direct investment to 
Korea, supplying 78% of investment inflows between 1962 
and 1971 and 1972 and 1976: this fell to 72% in the 
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next period, but then rose to 83% in the last three 
years as foreign direct investment inflows accelerated. 
The figures for 1985 indicated that this total has 
risen to 88.8% (Japan 42.8% and America 40.2%). 
Table 4-6 Foreign Direct Investment by Country 
(thousand U. S dollars) 
Country 62-71 72-76 77-81 82-84 Total 
Americas 44,255 116,094 244,473 379,134 783,956 
U. S. A 34,314 67,924 208,097 352,032 662,367 
Asia 41,924 380,407 232,765 412,064 1,067,160 
Japan 40,759 376,940 214,906 373,934 1,006,539 
Hong Kong 258 3,467 16,844 36,075 56,644 
Europe 9,493 68,738 99,531 83,097 260,859 
Netherlands 6,258 58,762 38,895 10,970 114,885 
Switzerland 0 203 15,889 26,447 42,539 
France 0 4,050 7,616 23,728 33,945 
West Germany 2,731 2,798 15,403 8,493 29,425 
United Kingdom 256 2,692 17,237 6,422 26,607 
Middle East 00 10,974 297 11,271 
Total 95,672 565,239 587,743 874,593 2,123,247 
Source: Ministry of Finance 1985 
Approval basis 
This indicates that despite the Korean government 
seeking to widen the scope of foreign direct investment 
they have not managed to attract significant levels of 
investment from other countries. The total investment 
from Europe only represents 12%, the U. K supplied only 
1.25%, the largest European presence coming from the 
Netherlands which has provided 5.4%, though table 4-7 
shows. this'is concentrated in the chemicals industry. 
Table 4-7 shows the destination of investment from the 
different countries, with Japan, America and 
the Netherlands separated out, as they represent 84% of 
all the foreign direct investment approved during the 
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period under investigation. 
Table 4-7 F. D. I by Country and Industry 
1962-1984 
Industry U. S. A Japan Holland Others 
Agriculture & 
Fisheries 3,872 9,565 --- 2,178 
Agriculture 3,622 1,133 --- 2,163 
Fisheries 250 8,432 --- 15 
Mining & 
Manufacturing 582,575 520,766 107,340 148,532 
Mining 270 3,247 --- 90 
Manufacturing 582,305 517,519 107,340 148,442 
Foodstuff 23,538 14,789 --- 27,034 
Textiles & 
Garments 779 65,048 --- 5,915 
Wood Products 1,113 
Chemicals 102,435 116,215 95,642 19,354 
Medical Products 39,823 10,991 2,982 11,975 
Fertiliser 23,500 825 --- 17,650 
Petroleum 5,741 789 30,005 
Ceramics 1,045 13,240 --- 5,282 
Metals 7,544 49,523 --- 10,411 
Machinery 125,779 88,436 139 12,469 
Electric & 
Electronics 172,874 126,382 5,980 25,127 
Transportation 49,592 9,139 --- 7,835 Others 29,655 21,819 1,808 4,768 
Social overhead 
Capital 75,920 476,901 7,500 154,315 
Financing 26,063 11,149 --- 66,784 
Construction 27,036 62,307 --- 5,678 Electricity 3,185 210 --- --- Transportation & 
Storage 14,311 7,465 --- 9,702 
Hotel & Tourism 5,325 395,770 7,500 52,551 
Total 662,367 1,007,232 114,840 338,808 
Source: Ministry of Finance 1985 
Approval basis, thousands US dollars. 
Table 4-8 shows the average investment in each 
classification by using the number of projects to 
arrive at an average. 
Taking table 4-7 first, the figures indicate that while 
Japan is the largest supplier of foreign direct 
investment, the U. S. A supplies more to manufacturing. 
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Of the foreign direct investment coming from the U. S. A 
87.9% has gone to manufacturing, in comparison only 
51.4% of Japanese investment is in manufacturing, with 
39.3% in hotels and tourism. 
The bulk of Japanese investment is concentrated in 
hotels and tourism (39.3%), the fabrications et al 
sector (22.5%), chemicals et al (12.7), textiles et al 
(6.5%) and construction (6.2%), which accounts for 
87.2% of all Japanese investment. In comparison 
American foreign direct investment is concentrated in 
two manufacturing sectors, fabrications, electric, 
electronics and transportation with 52.6% and 
chemicals, petroleum and chemical products accounting 
for 25.9%. 
Foreign direct investment from the Netherlands which 
represents -5.4% of the total is concentrated in the 
chemical, petroleum and chemical products sectors which 
accounts for 84.4% of the Dutch investment. Investment 
from the other countries is spread between social 
overhead capital with 45.5% and manufacturing 43.8%. 
Five sectors comprise the bulk of the investment (80%), 
chemicals et al (23.3%), financing (19.7%), hotels and 
tourism (15.5%), fabrications et al (13.4%) and foods 
(8%). The figures indicate that three sectors have 
attracted, the majority of the investment, in 
manufacturing it is the fabrications, electric, 
electronic and transportation sector with the chemicals 
industries which account for 29.4% and 22.5% of the 
total foreign direct investment and hotels and tourism 
zlU 
with 22.6%. 
Table 4-8 F. D. I by Country and 
(1962-1984) 
Industry (Average) 
Industry U. S. A Japan Others 
Agriculture & 
Fisheries 352 354 311 
Agriculture 362 142 361 
Fisheries 250 444 15 
Mining & Manufacturing 3,552 827 2,897 
Mining 270 271 90 
Manufacturing 3,572 839 2,925 
Foodstuff 1,681 740 8,945 
Textiles & Garments 195 986 2,070 
Wood Products --- 371 --- 
Chemicals 4,268 1,417 8,846 
Medical Products 2,845 1,570 997 
Fertiliser 11,750 825 17,650 
Petroleum 2,871 --- 10,089 
Ceramics 523 576 4,260 
Metals 943 854 946 
-Machinery 7,399 790 600 
Electric & 
Electronics 3,678 826 2,592 
Transportation - 16,531 1,828 7,835 Others 1,141 251 364 
Social Overhead 
Capital 2,373 8,222 5,220 
Financing 13,032 5,575 7,420 
Construction 1,287 3,279 631 
Electricity 3,185 210 --- 
Transportation & 
Storage 2,385 1,244 3,234 
Hotel & Tourism 2,663 13,192 7,965 
Total 3,200 1,411 3,287 
Source: Derived from Ministry of Finance 1985 
Approval basis, thousands US dollars 
Using table 4-8, where the average investment in the 
classifications is compared, it is immediately apparent 
that although the Japanese supplied the largest amount 
of foreign direct investment they have by far the 
lowest average. This arises because out of the 1059 
approvals granted between 1962 and 1984, Japanese 
investors accounted for 714, compared to just 207 for 
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America. The differences between -the average 
amount invested in manufacturing and social overhead 
capital is quite large, with the American investment in 
manufacturing, the figures suggest that the Americans 
invest more in each project, while the converse appears 
to be true when considering hotels and tourism. The 
figures also suggest that while investment from 
countries other than Japan and America is small in 
comparison, they commit larger amounts per project than 
the Japanese especially in manufacturing. 
It is worth noting that although these figures do 
suggest that Japanese investments tend to be smaller 
using the figures supplied by table 4-6 and the number 
of projects approved the following results are 
obtained. 
Table 4-9 Average Investment By Country 
Country 62-71 72-76 77-81 82-84 Average 
U. S. A (average) 798 1,838 3,784 5,266 3,200 
(no projects) 43 37 55 72 207 
Japan 343 992 2,047 3,399 1,411 
119 380 105 110 714 
Others 1,171 3,648 4,196 2,914 3,287 
17 33 37 51 138 
Source: Table 4-6 
Approvals, thousands US dollars 
These figures indicate that the average size of 
investment from both America and Japan is increasing 
and that the majority of Japanese projects (380) took 
place during the period 1972 to 1976. It is also 
evident that the number of approvals is increasing for 
all three as the government continues to liberalise the 
investment regime and interest in the Korean economy 
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continues to increase. 
4.4.5 Investment Ratio 
The Korean government's policy towards foreign direct 
investment with its emphasis towards joint ventures, 
with the foreign company supplying 50% of the equity, 
has obviously affected the pattern of ownership 
indicated in table 4-10. 
The figures show that of the total manufacturing 
foreign' direct investment close to 38% was where the 
project was a joint venture, while in comparison only 
16% of the investment in the social overhead capital 
grouping involved projects of a similar composition. 
Considering the sectors that received the bulk of the 
foreign direct investment, the figures for the 
chemicals sector show that the bulk of the investment 
is in general in either joint ventures, or where the 
foreign investor supplies between 51 and 99% of the 
investment. Only in the chemicals industry is a 
significant amount of the investment where the foreign 
investor has 100% control. 
Within the fabrications sector, the two principal 
recipient industries (machinery $227 million, 
electronics $330 million) show different patterns of 
ownership. With machinery by far the largest amount of 
foreign direct investment (62.2%) is in joint ventures, 
while electronics has 59.1% in projects where the 
foreign investor has complete control. 
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Table 4-10 Investment Ratio 
(1962-1984 percentage total investment) 
Industry Under 50% 50% 51 to 99% 100% 
Agriculture & Fisheries 54.6 20.6 8.7 15.9 
Agriculture 56.9 23.5 19.6 --- 
Fisheries 52.7 18.7 --- 28.6 
Mining & Manufacturing 20.4 37.8 14.6 27.2 
Mining 46.9 26.2 --- 26.9 
Manufacturing 20.3 37.9 14.6 27.2 
Foodstuff 13.8 29.0 54.4 2.8 
Textiles & Garments 14.2 32.5 50.2 3.1 
Wood Products 9.0 35.6 50.6 4.8 
Chemicals 11.7 52.8 3.8 31.8 
Medical Products 9.0 35.6 50.6 4.8 
Fertiliser --- 42.0 58.0 --- 
Petroleum 15.8 84.2 --- --- 
Ceramics 60.2 --- 21.9 17.9 
Metals 27.1 18.0 35.0 19.9 
Machinery 20.9 62.2 3.4 13.5 
Electric & Electronics 23.6 6.9 10.4 59.1 
Transportation 21.2 68.9 8.7 1.2 
Others _ 41.2 
11.1 13.0 34.7 
Social Overhead Capital 27.2 16.2 20.2 36.3 
Financing 70.0 28.1 1.0 0.9 
Construction 14.1 16.1 12.6 57.2 
Electricity 100.0 --- --- --- 
Transportation & 
Storage 41.0 38.1 21.0 --- 
Hotel & Tourism 19.2 12.4 26.0 42.5 
Total 22.9 30.4 16.4 30.2 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Approval basis, thousands US dollars 
Similarly hotels and tourism is dominated by projects 
where the foreign investor has either complete or at 
least majority status. This indicates that the foreign 
direct investment in this industry has largely taken 
place as the Korean government relaxed its attitude 
towards foreign investors. Within manufacturing where 
there is a high percentage of foreign direct investment 
either completely or in majority control, this is where 
the government had to relax its controls to attract 
investors. 
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It is worth noting that as the Korean government 
has relaxed the controls on foreign direct investment 
then a greater proportion of the investment inflows 
have been directed towards projects where the investor 
has total ör at least majority control. 
Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981) noted that "the 
predominant form of ownership of foreign invested firms 
in South Korea is the joint venture type. 682 of the 
733 foreign firms operating at the end of 1974 were 
joint venture companies. Wholly owned subsidiaries were 
mostly concentrated in the electronics industry" 
(p178). 
Since 1980, at least 50% of the yearly approvals have 
been for projects where the foreign investor has 
majority or wholly owned status. The ownership 
structure of Japanese investment up to the end of 1983 
shows that approximately 25% is in industries where 
they are minority investors, 25% in joint ventures, 33% 
in wholly owned subsidiaries and 19% in majority 
projects. This is in contrast to American foreign 
direct investment where 44% was in wholly owned 
industries, 29% in joint ventures, 20% where they were 
in a minority. The high percentage of American 
investment (when compared to other sources) where they 
have total control is a reflection of the size of 
investment in electronic and the chemicals which 
account for 41.6% of the total American investment. 
The size of investment is also influenced by the degree 
of ownership; table 4-11 shows that there is a 
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considerable rise in the average amount invested if the 
investor had total control. 
Table 4-11 Average value of Approved Projects 
(1962-1984 thousands US dollars) 
Industry Under 50% 50% 51 to 99% 100% Average 
Agriculture & 
Fisheries 266 406 338 2,486 347 
Mining 241 472 --- 194 258 
Manufacturing 779 1,971 1,648 2,980 1,560 
Social Overhead 
Capital 3,892 2,577 8,035 32,429 5,906 
Average 1,079 2,007 2,405 4,549 2,005 
This is evident within agriculture, manufacturing and 
especially social overhead capital. 
4.5 Empirical Evidence 
There are a number of studies that have considered the 
impact of foreign direct investment on the economic 
development of the Less Developed Countries, which have 
been discussed in Chapter one, section 1.4.3. 
Constantin Voivodas (1974) in a paper published in 
Economic Development and Cultural Change considered the 
role of exports and foreign capital inflows in relation 
to the growth of the Korean economy. He tested the 
relationship between the growth of exports, the 
increase in the imports of capital goods and the 
increasing amount of foreign capital inflows between 
1962 and 1968. 
With regard to the foreign capital inflow, his research 
discovered that there was a positive and significant 
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(at the 10 percent level) between the inflow and the 
rate of growth of the economy. 
dQ = 3.74 + 0.92* F R2 = . 38 Q- (2.01)Q D-W = 2.7 
Where Q stands for total output, F for foreign capital 
inflow and D-W for the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
In addition to this, his results also indicated that 
there was a positive relationship between capital 
imports and foreign capital inflows but that it was not 
significant at the . 10 percent level. While he did not 
test directly the relationship between exports and the 
foreign capital inflows, the results for the 
relationship between exports (1955-1970) and output 
growth suggested that such a relationship does exist. 
! ý2 = 3.72 + 0.90* F R2 = . 49 Q (3.9) Q D-W = 1.2 
He drew the conclusion that a direct relationship 
should exist between investment (I) and foreign capital 
inflow, which proved to be correct with a positive but 
not significant result being obtained. When he 
separated the foreign capital inflow into private (P) 
and official (0) investment the following results were 
obtained. 
I= 11.37 + 2.47* P+0.110 Rz = . 35 Q (2.07)Q Q D-W = 1.96 
The results showed that a positive and significant 
relationship existed between the private capital inflow 
and investment with official inflows playing little 
part. Though he did show that taking the period 1954 
to 1962 then the official private inflow did give a 
significant result. 
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In addition Voivdas tested the relationship between 
savings (S) and foreign capital inflow obtaining 
positive and significant results. 
S=1.02 + 1.32* P R2 = . 69 Q (3.49)Q D-W = 2.15 
He summarised that, "both exports and foreign capital 
inflow have been beneficial to Korean growth in 
accordance with the predictions of the two gap 
model, when the foreign exchange constraint is 
operative. None of the growth-inhibiting effects of 
foreign capital inflow, attributed to it by its 
critics, obtained either during the 1950's, 
when official capital inflow was predominant, or during 
the 1960's, when private capital inflow was more 
important. On the contrary, during the 1960's, 
foreign capital inflow seems to have had a beneficial 
effect on savings" (p484). 
Edward Chen (1977) tested the assumption that the 
relationship between domestic saving and capital inflow 
tends to be negative. The period examined was between 
1960 and 1970. He found that although the cross- 
sectional studies did suggest a negative relationship 
the results for individual countries tended to 
contradict this. With regard to Korea, he found that a 
positive and significant (at the 5% level) relationship 
existed between savings and foreign capital inflow. 
S=0.022 + 1.243F + 0.114 Y 'R2 = . 874 Y (0.353)Y (0.355) D-W = 2.01 
Where Y represents G. N. P, S savings, F capital inflow 
with Y representing the growth rate of G. N. P and R2 is 
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the corrected coefficient of determination. 
He then split the capital inflow into private (FP) and 
official (FG) inflow and obtained the following results 
for Korea. 
S=0.019 + 1.077FP + 1.697FG + 0.112 Y R2 = . 874 Y (0.403)Y (0.621)Y (0.361) D-W = 2.01 
The results indicated that both private and official 
capital inflows had a positive and significant (at the 
5% level) relationship with savings for the period 
under investigation. 
So that Chen's results tended to agree with those of 
Voivodas suggesting a positive relationship for foreign 
capital inflows. 
We have already seen from Westphal, Rhee and Pursell 
(1981), (see section 4.4.1) that they considered that 
foreign direct investment only supplied a small 
proportion of the net inflow between 1962 and 1971, 
though this did increase from 4% to 11% between 1972 
and 1976. Their research was concerned in inquiring 
into Korean industrial competence and judging where it 
came from. Their investigations led them to the 
conclusion that "Except for industries established 
during the colonial period, technology has been 
acquired from abroad largely through means other than 
D. F. I" (p65). 
They found that most of the industries used to 
establish Korea's industrialisation had little to gain 
from F. D. I, since machinery, technology and access to 
markets was relatively easily obtained. They did note 
that electronics appeared to be the exception to this. 
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"It is an industry in which technology is changing 
rapidly world-wide, product differentiation is based on 
sophisticated technological know-how, and purchasers' 
brand preferences are evident. But it appears to be 
the exception that proves the rule, for electronics is 
precisely . the 
industry in which Korea has extensively 
relied on D. F. I to enter production, particularly for 
export, and has so far failed to gain local mastery of 
fundamental aspects of production know-how" (p67). 
They argue that the role played by F. D. I has been 
peripheral and that licensing and turnkey projects have 
played a much greater part in Korea's 
industrialisation. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the attitudes, control and 
pattern of foreign direct investment inflow in Korea 
since 1962, though there is a long history of foreign 
investment prior to the second world war when Korea was 
under Japanese control. 
Foreign capital inflows have played an important role 
in the development of the Korean economy since the end 
of the Korean war, initially as aid, principally from 
America, who supplied 95% of aid inflow into Korea 
following the end of the Korean war. The. Korean 
government had to develop further sources of foreign 
capital as the Americans changed their aid policy, 
which forced the. Rhee government to move away from 
their aid maximisation policy. The aid inflow played a 
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vital' role in allowing the Korean economy to gain a 
vital breathing space enabling a recovery from the 
effects of the Korean War. 
Korea continued its transformation towards an 
export-oriented outward looking economy during the 
early sixties. As the performance of the economy 
improved then Korea became an increasingly attractive 
proposition for foreign investors, which led to the 
first foreign direct investment in 1962. 
Foreign capital inflow has always been subject to 
considerable degree of government control as the Korean 
government has controlled the size, type and direction 
of foreign direct investment. Most of the controls are 
embodied in the, -Foreign Capital Inducement Acts the 
first of which was introduced in 1966. 
An example of the government's control of foreign 
direct investment-is their attitude towards the level 
of ownership. Prior to the 1966 F. C. I. A, the 
government had a stated intent that Korean 
participation in- any project must be at least 25%. 
While this was dropped in 1966 the government 
deliberately gave emphasis to joint ventures and it was 
not until the late seventies and early eighties that 
this was relaxed. - 
One consequence of the Korean government opening up the 
economy and trying to attract foreign capital was the 
normalisation, of relations with Japan in 1965. This 
led to a'surge in the inflow of foreign capital and 
foreign direct investment (see table 4-3). Worries 
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regulating foreign investment led Won-Young Lee (1987) 
to claim that, "the government's policy of regulating 
the quality of D. F. I is probably the main reason that 
evidence of the harmful side effects of D. F. I is 
difficult to find in Korea. Only those investments 
that are- considered to be beneficial to the Korean 
economy are allowed to enter" (p37). 
We have shown that the size of the foreign direct 
investment inflow is small in comparison to the total 
inflow, though it is rising, since it represented only 
about 5% of the total in the early years, 7.7% between 
1974 and 1984,9% for the eighties and the latest 
figures give 17.8% for 1984 and 18.2% for 1985. In 
addition though the amount invested was small it is not 
just the monetary value of the investment that has to 
be taken into account. 
The first post Korean war foreign direct investment 
gained approval in 1962; table 4-3 shows that the 
initial build up of investment was slow as investors 
needed to gain confidence in the economy and relations 
with Japan were not normalised until 1965. As the 
economy grew so did the amount invested and the 
investment became more export oriented. Taking the 
figures-up to 1971, over half-the total foreign direct 
investment went into the chemicals sector, which was 
largely import-substitution investment. Since then the 
bulk of investment has been in the export oriented 
fabrications sector (46.3%). 
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We have shown 65% of all foreign direct investment has 
gone to Korean manufacturing and that the two 
industrial sectors (chemicals and fabrications) coupled 
with hotels and tourism, which has gained in importance 
during the eighties, account for 74.1% of all foreign 
direct investment between 1962 and 1984. In addition 
the published data shows the effect of the 
government's attitude towards foreign direct investment 
during most of the seventies and the subsequent 
liberalisation as the level of investment stagnated 
during the seventies but accelerated rapidly between 
1981 and 1984. 
Despite the Korean government's intention to widen the 
source of foreign direct investment America and Japan 
remain the two principal sources. Between them they 
account for 77% of the total foreign direct investment 
approved between 1962 and 1984. Europe in contrast 
supplied only 12%', with the U. K's foreign direct 
investment totalling only 1.25%. 
There are differences in the composition of American 
and Japanese investment. The Americans have the bulk 
of their investment in manufacturing and even though 
the Japanese supplied more foreign direct investment 
the Americans have a greater amount in manufacturing. 
The Americans have the bulk of their foreign direct 
investment in fabrications (52.5%) and chemicals 
(25.9%), while Japanese investment was spread out in 
hotels and tourism (39%), fabrications (22.5%) and 
chemicals (12.7%) taking the largest amounts (see table 
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4-7). Also the data shows that while the Japanese 
supplied more foreign direct investment the average 
size of an American project was twice that of one from 
Japan and in manufacturing this rose to fourfold. 
Further to this the evidence from the foreign 
investment data suggests that the average size of the 
investment is increasing with time (see table 4-9). 
The pattern of ownership is obviously affected by the 
Korean government's control of investment as the data 
shows that over half the total invested was in either 
minority projects or joint ventures. Within the three 
principal sectors (see table 4-10), there is a 
different pattern of ownership, in the fabrications 
sector electrics and electronics had over 59% of 
foreign direct investment in wholly owned ventures, 
while the other industries in the sector had over 60% 
of the inflow associated with joint entures. The 
chemicals sector had the majority of investment in 
joint ventures and hotels and tourism had 42.5% as 
wholly owned enterprises. The differences are an 
indication of the flexible approach to investment when 
key, industrial sectors such as electronics were 
concerned. There are also differences with American 
and Japanese investment with the Americans having 44% 
as wholly owned subsidiaries, which reflects the 
considerable investment in electronics, while the 
Japanese. -only have 33%. Also the data highlighted that 
as the level of foreign participation increased then 
the amount invested increased. 
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The empirical evidence suggests that a relationship 
does exist between foreign capital inflows and the 
economy. Both Voivodas and Chen's results indicate 
that we can expect to find a strong relationship 
between savings, imports, exports and output and 
foreign capital inflow. Whestphal, Rhee and Pursell 
argue that foreign direct investment's role has not 
been significant in industry except possibly in 
electronics and that they see licensing and turnkey 
projects as having a greater effect. Won-Young Lee 
(1987) argues that, "D. F. I has been an important source 
of valuable foreign exchange and technology in recent 
Korean economic development, and that it has had few 
harmful side-effects". 
In conclusion we have seen that foreign direct 
investment has been strictly controlled by the Korean 
government who originally preferred joint ventures. 
The regulations have gradually undergone 
liberalisation, which started in the late seventies, 
which has greatly increased the levels of foreign 
direct investment. The two principal suppliers of 
foreign direct investment are Japan and America and 
the principal recipient sectors are chemicals, 
fabrications and hotels and tourism. The empirical 
research does suggest that there may be a link the 
inflow and the performance of the Korean economy but 
there does-appear to be some doubt as to the influence 
that foreign direct investment has had on Korean 
industry. 
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Chapter Five 
Impact of FDI on The Korean Economy: 
An Exploratory Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter five and chapter six contain the analysis of 
the foreign direct investment inflow into Korea and its 
affect on the performance of the economy. This chapter 
contains the 'exploratory' correlation analysis, which 
examines the relationships between the direct foreign 
investment inflow and the Korean economy on a macro and 
micro level. Chapter six includes the regression 
analysis which examines the various hypotheses 
suggested by the research. 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the 
relationship between the various economic and 
manufacturing indicators and the levels of foreign 
investment inflow, using various measures of foreign 
investment. The analysis is being used as an 
'exploratory' approach acting as an indicator of the 
possible relationships that exist between the 
variables. 
To carry 
standard 
two-tailed 
number of 
approach, 
and then 
out the correlation analysis we have used a 
Pearson correlation coefficient, employing a 
significance test. The analysis is in a 
distinct segments, initially taking a macro 
which uses the whole of the Korean economy 
moving to more detailed' micro view, which 
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considers manufacturing alone. In addition to taking 
the whole of manufacturing we have also disaggregated 
manufacturing into its constituent industrial sectors 
fora more detailed view of the possible relationships. 
5.2 Data 
The analysis carried out in both this chapter and 
chapter six employs the same foreign direct investment 
variables, though there is some variation to the 
economic indicators used. The experimental analysis 
makes use of a number of industrial indices, which are 
not used for the regression analysis. The correlation 
and regression analysis covers the period from 1971 to 
1984, though the stock foreign direct investment 
variables includes all the inflow since 1962. The 
variables, where necessary have been standardised, 
transforming all the data to Korean won and changing 
them to a constant price basis using 1980 as the base 
year. We used the deflator for Gross National Product 
where necessary. The data used has, come from official 
published Korean sources (detailed in Appendix A), 
except for the private foreign direct investment 
figures (see section 5.2.1). 
5.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment Data 
The foreign direct investment data used comes from two 
distinct sources, one is the official published data 
available from the Ministry of Finance, the second set 
of figures are also from the Korean 
government but from a private source. 
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We have had to use the two different sets of foreign 
direct investment figures because it proved impossible 
to obtain a detailed and accurate breakdown by 
industrial' group using the published data for the 
period 1971 to 1984. The private figures provided 
purport to be the original foreign direct investment 
data, from which the official tables are derived. 
Unfortunately we have been unable to make these two 
sets- match identically and it proved to be impossible 
to reconcile the differences, so where possible we have 
used both-sets of data. 
The private figures enabled us to separate the foreign 
direct investment on a micro rather than a macro' basis 
for the period under observation, permitting detailed 
analysis of the inflow into manufacturing. Because of 
the way that the private figures were detailed, we were 
able to allocate the investment to its industrial 
sector using the Korean Standard Industrial 
Classification. This allowed us to identify the 
investment on an approved or arrival basis in each of 
the nine industrial sectors which make up the whole of 
Korean manufacturing. This unfortunately we were 
unable to do with the official data. 
The foreign direct investment figures are presented in 
two' distinct forms for both the official' and private 
data. Firstly for approvals, which is the investment 
approved by the Korean government and secondly in 
arrival form, this is the year in which the approved 
investment was purported to have arrived in Korea. It 
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is difficult to use the arrival figures with total 
accuracy as it may well be that not all the investment 
did arrive in that year, but this is the closest 
approximation we have to actual arrival date, hence we 
have used it in conjunction with the approvals. 
In addition to using both the official and private data 
on a yearly basis, we have also aggregated the data to 
arrive at the total invested to date, calling this the 
stock of foreign direct investment. This has been used 
because it may well be that the effect on the 
performance of the economy is a result of the total 
invested rather than the yearly investments. 
From this we arrived at four foreign direct investment 
variables for both the official and private figures: 
these are as follows: 
a. Approvals 
b. Stock of approvals 
c. Arrivals 
d. Stock of arrivals 
Using the private figures as described above we were 
able to derive a number of additional foreign direct 
investment figures which enabled us to move from the 
macro to the micro economic level. So in addition to 
the four variables above by examining and collating the 
private figures we were able to derive the following 
additional foreign investment figures: 
e. Manufacturing approvals 
f. Stock of Manufacturing approvals 
g. Manufacturing arrivals. 
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h. - Stock of manufacturing arrivals 
i. Japanese approvals 
j. Stock of Japanese approvals 
k. American approvals 
1. Stock of American approvals 
M. Other approvals - 
n. Stock of other approvals 
The manufacturing variables refer to the foreign direct 
investment inflow into this sector alone, while the 
three--. country subsets (Japanese, American and others) 
refer to the investment coming from those countries 
alone (both for the whole of the economy and 
manufacturing). In addition-by using the private data 
we were able to detail-and assign the manufacturing 
investment to its constituent industrial sectors. We 
singled out the Japanese and American investment 
because as chapter'four, section 4.4.4, shows, these 
two countries have supplied the bulk of the foreign 
direct investment. 
In addition to the foreign direct investment variable, 
we were able to develop a figure for domestic 
investment in manufacturing, using the data supplied by 
Economic Planning Board in their 'Summary of 
manufacturing and Mining". Which enabled us to see 
the differences between domestic investment and the 
manufacturing' foreign direct investment when carrying 
out the-explanatory analysis. 
5.2.2 Economic Variables 
A detailed explanation of these variables and the micro 
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variables can be found in Appendix A. All of the 
variables employed have come from official published 
sources, in general either from data from the Bank of 
Korea or the Economic Planning Board. Where necessary 
the variables have been standardised and converted into 
Korean won. 
The macro variables used in the explanatory analysis 
were as fo llows: 
Al. Gross Domestic Product 
A2. Gross National Product 
A3. Overall balance 
A4. Total exports and non-factor services 
A5. - Total imports and non-factor services 
A6. National savings 
A7. Foreign savings 
A8. Foreign assets 
A9. Foreign, liabilities 
The micro variables used relate to both manufacturing 
and the constituent industrial sources: 
B1. Production capacity index 
B2. Productivity index 
B3. . Industrial production index 
B4. Shipments index 
B5. Small Scale manufacturing-index 
B6. Manufacturing output 
B7. Manufacturing exports 
B8. Manufacturing imports 
B9. Output (500) 
B10. Total remuneration 
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The indices were used to allow the explanatory analysis 
to investigate if there is any relationship between the 
various measures of industrial performance and foreign 
direct investment. The output (500) variable refers to 
the output from Korean firms with more than 500 
employees and is used as a concentration measure. A 
detailed explanation of the source and meaning of the 
variables is available in Appendix A. 
5.2.3 Industrial Sectors 
Korean manufacturing can obviously be broken down into 
its constituent industries, but the Koreans tend to 
report manufacturing data by breaking it into nine 
constituent industrial sectors. These "sectors are 
detailed in full in'chapter three, by using the private 
data and the K. I. C. S information provided we were able 
to `assign the individual investments to their 
industrial sectors. 
The nine industrial sectors are: 
Si. Food, beverages and tobacco 
S2. Textiles, wearing apparel and footwear 
S3. Wood and wood products 
S4. Paper and paper products 
S5. Chemicals and petroleum products 
S6. Non-metallic mineral products 
S7. Basic metals 
58. - Fabrications, electrical, electronics and 
transportation. ' 
S9. Other products. 
This allowed us to'examine the individual performance 
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of the sectors in detail to observe any differences 
that arose during the exploratory analysis. 
From the data presented in chapter four, section 4.4.3, 
we know that two of the industrial sectors (chemicals 
and fabrications) receive close to 80% of all foreign 
direct investment inflow targeted towards Korean 
manufacturing. Given this we may well expect to see 
some differences arise between these two sectors and 
the rest. 
5.3 Exploratory Analysis 
The analysis explores the relationship between the 
inflow of foreign direct investment and the variables 
outlined in section 5.2, using correlation analysis. 
The analysis is split as previously explained into a 
number of different segments. These examine the macro 
and micro (manufacturing) implications of the inflow. 
Table 5-1 Foreign Investment Variables 
Variable Letter 
Official approvals Fl 
Stock of official approvals F2 
Official arrivals F3 
Stock of official arrivals F4 
Private approvals F5 
Stock of private approvals F6 
Private arrivals - F7 
Stock of private arrivals - F8 
Manufacturing approvals M1 
Stock of manufacturing approvals M2 
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Table 5-1 Foreign investment Variables (continued) 
Variable Letter 
Manufacturing arrivals M3 
Stock of manufacturing arrivals M4 
Japanese approvals C1 
Stock of Japanese approvals C2 
American approvals C3 
Stock of American approvals C4 
Other approvals C5 
Stock of other approvals C6 
Japanese manufacturing approvals CM1 
Stock of Japanese manufacturing approvals CM2 
American manufacturing approvals CM3 
Stock of American manufacturing approvals CM4 
Other manufacturing approvals CM5 
Stock of other manufacturing approvals CM6 
Domestic manufacturing investment F9 
The results are tabulated with the foreign investment 
variables down the left hand side and the independent 
economic indicators across the top. The variables have 
all been assigned an individual nomenclature to enable 
easy identification. The letters used for the economic 
variables correspond to those used in section 5.2.2, 
whilst the foreign direct investment variables have 
the above notation. 
The official and private approvals and arrivals refers 
to the source of the data, official coming from the 
published sources and private" from the private 
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unpublished data. The foreign direct investment 
variables used to examine manufacturing and the source 
country all are derived from the private data. This 
nomenclature is used throughout this chapter and 
chapter six. 
The only analysis not to use a number' of different 
measures of foreign investment are those concentrating 
on the industrial sectors, where we have only used one 
foreign investment variable, since we are concerned 
with the differences between the sectors. Given this 
we used the variable for the stock of manufacturing 
approvals, since from the manufacturing correlation 
results seen in table 5-3 and 5-4 we know that this 
gives a significant result for manufacturing as a 
whole. 
With all the tables only those correlation results that 
give a significant score at either the . 01 or . 001 
level have been included. The level of significance is 
indicated by either * for . 01 or ** for . 001. 
5.4 Exploratory Analysis Results " 
The analysis as outlined in section 5-2, is split into 
two parts. Initially an examination of the 
correlation between the total foreign direct investment 
and a series of macro economic variables, the results 
of which are tabulated in tables 5-2 and 5-3 and in 
tables 5-4 and 5-5 when the investment inflow is 
identified by source country. 
The second segment contains the largest section of the 
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exploratory analysis. This uses only the private 
foreign investment data to examine the correlation at a 
micro level, concentrating on manufacturing and its 
constituent industries. Tables 5-6 and 5-7 tabulate 
the results obtained for manufacturing as a whole, 
while tables 5-8 and 5-9 show the results by country of 
origin. Then manufacturing was broken down into its 
constituent industries and the correlation results are 
tabulated in tables 5-10 and 5-11. 
5.4.1 Macro Analysis Results 
The correlations consider the economy at a macro level, 
using both official and private data for foreign direct 
investment. 
Table 5-2 Macro Analysis (A) 
Variable Al A2 A3 A4 A5 
F1 .... .... .. 
F2 . 8520**. . 8556** .. . 8334** . 8414** 
F3 .... .... .. 
F4 . 9623** . 9578** . 9503** . 9559** 
F5 .... .... .. 
F6 . 9854** . 9809** .. . 9794** . 9544** 
F7 .... .... .. 
F8 . 9683** . 9709** .. . 9469** . 9668** 
The results tabulated in table 5-2 "consider the 
significant correlations between the foreign direct 
investment variables and G. D. P, G. N. P, overall balance, 
exports and imports in that order. 
The first result from the correlations was that none of 
the yearly approval or arrival figures were 
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significant and were not included in the table. This 
may well be due to the fluctuating nature of the 
foreign investment inflow, with the volume of 
investment fluctuating from year to year and really 
only settling into a pattern as the government 
liberalised their control on the inflow of foreign 
direct investment. It could also be a reflection of 
the size of the foreign direct investment: as an 
example, in 1971 official approvals topped $25 million 
while exports were in excess of $1.2 billion and in 
1984 when more than $400 million was approved, exports 
totalled $19.3 billion. 
In comparison the stock foreign investment variables 
all show significant and positive correlations. In 
general there does appear to be a slightly stronger 
correlation with G. N. P and G. D. P than with exports and 
imports, but this difference does appear to be quite 
slight. With regard to the differences between the 
different measures of foreign direct investment, taking 
the stock variables, there does appear to be a stronger 
relationship with the private rather than the public 
figures. We were unable to find any (significant) 
correlation between the foreign direct investment 
inflow and the overall balance of payments.. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from these results 
is that while. there does not appear to be any 
significant correlation between the yearly inflow and 
the economic variables, when we take into account the 
long term build-up of foreign direct investment, then 
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there does appear to be a relatively strong linkage 
apparent. This suggests that foreign direct 
investment has a long-term positive impact on these 
economic indicators. It also suggests that there is a 
positive correlation with both exports and imports and 
from these results it is difficult to draw any 
conclusion as to which it influences the most. 
The results in table 5-3 which tabulates the results 
for national savings, foreign savings, foreign assets 
and liabilities at the-macro level, once again shows 
that there is no (significant) correlation with the 
yearly arrival and approval figures, but when the stock 
variables are used a significant correlation occurs. 
Table 5-3 Macro Analysis-(B) 
Variable A6 A7 A8 A9 
F1 .... .... 
F2 . 8042** . 8394** . 7186** 
F3 .... .... 
F4 . 8456** .. . 9347** . 8928** 
F5 .... .... 
F6 . 9008** . 9543** . 9368** 
F7 .... .... 
F8 . 9055** . 9444** . 8553** 
The results of- the analysis show that there are no 
significant correlations with the yearly arrival and 
approval figures and that even using the stock 
variables that no relationship exists with the foreign 
savings variable (A7). The strongest correlation is 
with foreign assets and this applies across all the 
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stock variables. The possible implication of these 
results is that the long-term affect of foreign direct 
investment is positive and significant towards national 
savings, foreign assets and liabilities, though the 
effect is greater towards assets rather than 
liabilities implying a beneficial relationship. 
Turning to the correlation results by country of 
origin, using the identical independent macro 
variables. The results in table 5-4 show a similar 
pattern to those in table 5-2. 
Table 5-4 Macro Country Analysis (A) 
Variable Al A2 A3 A4 A5 
Cl .... .... .. 
C2 . 7665* . 7717* . 7593* . 7445* . 7585* 
C3 .... .... .. 
C4 . 8574** . 8563** . 8514** . 8472** . 8717** 
C5 .... .... .. 
C6 . 9945** . 9896** . 9932** . 9882** . 9822** 
Once again the stronger correlations, for each of the 
foreign direct investment stock variables is related to 
G. N. P, G. D. P and output, though the actual magnitude 
differs depending on the source. The results show that 
of the positive and significant correlations Japanese 
investment has the weakest association with investment 
from countries other than Japan and America the 
strongest. This may be due to the. average magnitude of 
the investment (see table 4-9-, p31) since except for 
the last three years of the period under investigation 
investment per project tended to be larger. 
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In general the results suggest that all three sources 
have a long-term. positive and significant impact on the 
macro economic variables and even though the other 
countries supplied by far the smallest amount it 
appears that their investment may have had the greatest 
impact. This result may well be associated with the 
amount invested per project (table. -4-9), where 
the 
average investment from other countries was much 
higher. In addition there does appear to be a slightly 
stronger correlation between imports (A5) and the 
Japanese and American investment, suggesting that they 
may have an adverse long-term affect with regard to the 
balance of trade. 
Table 5-5 gives a similar set of. results to those in 
table 5-3, in that-foreign savings has no significant 
correlation and that foreign assets has the strongest 
correlation. 
Table 5-5 Macro Country Analysis (B) 
Variable A6 A7 AS A9 
C1 .... .... 
C2 . 7335* .. . 7567* 
C3 .... .. 
C4 . 7859** .. . 8371** . 7688* 
C5 .... .... 
C6 . 9055** .. . 9699**- . 9281** 
Once again the strongest correlation results are those 
for countries other than Japan and America. This 
again appears to suggest that the greater long-term 
impact on these macro economic variables comes from 
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countries other than Japan and America. As with the 
results for table 5-4 this is probably associated with 
the average amount invested per project. The 
correlation results for Japan are very weak which 
indicates that any positive benefit for savings and 
assets is liable to minimal. 
5.4.2 Micro Analysis Results 
The micro correlation analysis concerned the 
relationships that possibly exist between Korean 
manufacturing and the inflow of foreign direct 
investment targeted at it, as outlined in section 
5.2.3. 
The analysis splits into two segments: the first 
concerns manufacturing as a whole, while the second 
concentrates on the nine industrial sectors that make 
up Korean manufacturing (see appendix A). 
The first part of the analysis uses the foreign direct 
investment figures taken for approvals and arrivals and 
by country of origin. In addition we also used the 
domestic investment variable derived from the summary 
of mining and manufacturing. 
5.4.2.1 Manufacturing 
The first correlation uses a number of manufacturing 
performance indices: these in order are, production 
capacity, productivity, industrial production, 
shipments and small scale manufacturing. 
As with the correlation results for the macro 
variables, none of the yearly foreign direct investment 
variables give a positive and 'significant result, 
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though in contrast the domestic investment variable 
does. 
Table 5-6 Manufacturing Indices 
Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
Ml .... .... .. 
M2 . 8628** .. 
8196** . 8729** . 8767** . 8633** 
M3 .... .... .. 
M4 . 8861** . 8432** . 8949** . 8986** . 8825** 
F9 . 8788** . 8109** . 8871** . 8901** . 8692** 
In relative terms the strongest correlations for all 
three significant results are with the shipments index, 
while the weakest are all connected to the productivity 
index. The results suggest that in relative terms 
using the indices as a measure of effectiveness, 
foreign direct investment increases production and 
shipments but has a weaker relationship towards the 
improvement of productivity, which has implications for 
resource usage. 
Table 5-7 Manufacturing Performance 
Variable B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
M1 .... .... .. 
M2 . 8898** . 8689** . 8211** . 9584** . 8766** 
M3 .... .... .. 
M4 . 9093** . 8903** . 8357** . 9687** . 8954** 
F9 . 9103** . 8437** . 8951** . 7775* . 9411** 
Turning to the correlation results in table 5-7, -where 
we used output, exports and imports, the output (500) 
measure and remuneration, the subsequent results show a 
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slightly different tale, as there is no longer a 
consensus as to which of the independent variables has 
the strongest and weakest relative relationship. 
The two stock measures for manufacturing foreign direct 
investment approvals and arrivals both indicate that 
the strongest correlation is with the output (500) 
measure, indicating that there is possibly a strong 
link between the performance of the larger 
manufacturing concerns and foreign inflows. The 
weakest of the correlation results was connected with 
manufactured imports. While with domestic investment 
output related to the largest companies gave the 
weakest response, with the strongest correlation 
connected to remuneration. 
The results tend to suggest that the long-term effect 
of the foreign direct investment inflow has a much 
greater impact 
. 
when, associated with larger companies. 
In addition the results indicate that the inflcw into 
manufacturing may well encourage exports to a greater 
extent than imports. This result does appear to be 
different to the outcome of the correlations tabulated 
in table 5-2, which indicated very, little difference 
between exports and imports. 
With regard to domestic investment the implication here 
is that the investment is-tied to wages and output in 
general. The relationship is very weakly significant 
when using the output of the larger companies, which is 
where the bulk, of investment has been made. . 
In 
addition it does appear-that domestic investment may 
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encourage greater imports than exports. 
The results from the correlations of- investment by 
country of origin (table 5-8). tend to mirror those 
from table 5-6, with the largest relative significance 
being given to the shipments index and the weakest to 
productivity. In addition the results show that the 
foreign direct investment from other countries provides 
the strongest correlations. 
Table 5-8 Manufacturing Indices by Country 
Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
CM1 .... -. 6641* -. 6660* 
CM2 . 8449** . 7908** . 8572** . 8617** . 8444** 
CM3 .... .... .. 
CM4 . 7762* . 7484* . 7893** . 7928** . 7886** 
CM5 .... .... .. 
CM6 . 9656** . 9239** . 9645** . 9666** . 9455** 
But with these results the weakest come from the 
American investments, which is in direct contrast to 
them having the largest share of manufacturing foreign 
direct investment. Although the stock figures suggest 
that Japanese inflows may have a greater correlation 
than American inflows, we also have results that show a 
weak but significant negative relationship between 
shipments and production. This implies that although 
the long-term view may indicate a positive 
relationship, the'yearly inflow appears to depress the 
performance of manufacturing. 
The -results tabulated in table 5-9, indicate that 
foreign direct investment from countries other than 
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Japan or America give the greater levels of correlation 
and as with tab le 5-8 Ja panese investment moves into 
second place, using the overall size of the 
correlati on. 
Table 5-9 Manufacturing Performance by Country 
Variable B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
CM1 -. 6733* .. .... -. 6851* 
CM2 . 8780** . 8469** . 8107** . 9425** . 8744** 
CM3 .. .. .... .. 
CM4 . 8056** . 7992** . 7409* . 9262** . 7821* 
CM5 .. .. .... .. 
CMG . 9708** . 9464** . 9029** . 9460** . 9582** 
The results indicate that for both Japanese and 
American investment by far the strongest correlation is 
with the output of larger companies (output 500), while 
with the other foreign direct investment total output 
is strongest. Also the correlation results indicate 
that manufactured imports have the weakest correlation 
for all the stock variables. 
The results suggest that within manufacturing 
the Japanese and American foreign direct investment 
once again has less influence than the much smaller 
amount invested by other countries. Furthermore the 
major impact of investment from Japan and America is 
directed towards the larger companies, whilst the 
investment from the rest of the world has a more 
general impact. In addition as with the results-from 
table 5-8, the general implication is that for 
manufacturing the stock of foreign direct investment, 
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regardless of source, has a greater impact on export 
performance. In table 5-8 and 5-9, there are a number 
of results that suggest that the Japanese yearly inflow 
of foreign direct investment has a weak and negative 
relationship on production, shipments, output and 
remuneration, suggesting that while Japanese 
investments may have a long-term beneficial affect that 
in the short-term the inflow may well have an adverse 
impact. 
5.4.2.2 Industrial Sectors 
The correlation analysis for the industrial sectors 
uses the same independent variables as for 
manufacturing as a whole. The principal difference is 
that only one foreign direct investment variable is 
used. in addition only eight of the nine industrial 
sectors can be examined, as the paper and paper 
products sector has received no foreign direct 
investment, because this has remained a prohibited area 
for investment. 
Two industrial sectors have been the principal 
recipients of the bulk of foreign direct investment 
during the period under investigation, (section 5.2.3). 
With several of the sectors (wood and wood products, 
ceramics) the total amounts of foreign direct 
investment are quite small so that results from these 
sectors must be treated with care. The-two industrial 
sectors that received the majority of foreign direct 
investment are represented by S5 (chemicals and 
petroleum products) and S8 (fabrications, electrics, 
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electronics and transportation). 
Table 5-10 Industrial Sector Indices 
Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
Si . 9685** . 9014** . 9321** . 9404** . 9359** 
S2 . 7186* . 7628* . 7581* . 7553* 
S3 . 7164* . 8806** . 8069** .. . 9198** 
S5 .. . 7414* . 7729* . 7921* 
S6 .... . 8772** . 8712** 
S7 .. . 8934** . 9124** . 9065** . 8948** 
S8 . 9921** . 7049* . 7050* . 7107* 
S9 .. . 8725** . 9132** . 9139** . 8584** 
If we initially compare the results to those obtained 
for the whole of manufacturing (table 5-6), then the 
results for the individual sectors shows a considerable 
amount of deviation from these. 
While the results for the aggregated stock variable 
(M2), shows that the weakest correlation is for the 
productivity index with shipments giving marginally the 
strongest figure, this does not hold for the industrial 
sectors. looking at the eight sectors the weakest 
results vary from sector to sector as do the strongest. 
The results indicate that the food, beverages and 
tobacco sector appears to have the best overall 
relationship. 
Taking the two principal sectors (S5 and S8), the 
results for the fabrications sector (S8) indicate no 
significant relationship with production capacity, a 
weak set of results for all the other variables except 
for productivity. With the chemicals sector (S5) only 
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three of the variables give significant results, 
shipments having the sligh tly strongest cor relation. 
The results suggest that the affect of the foreign 
investment inflow -may be very difficult to quantify 
when - applied to industr ial sectors, gi ven the 
volatility of the figures, which possibly in dicates a 
complex relationship. 
Table 5-11 Industrial Sector Performance 
Variable B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
S1 . 9464** . 6604* .. . 9225** . 9286** 
S2 . 8140** .. . 7643* . 9537** . 6977* 
S3 . 6821* .. . 9795** .. . 8600** 
S5 . 7953* . 6786* . 7388* . 9100** . 7551* 
S6 .... .. . 7928* . 8499** 
S7 -. 9362** . 9161** .. . 9665** . 9209** 
-S8 . 7394* . 6720* . 6999* . 9459** . 6693* 
S9 . 8602** . 9396** .... . 8605** 
The correlation results in table 5-11 can be compared 
to those in table 5-7 (using M2). The results from 
table 5-7 suggested that there was a strong association 
between the output of the larger companies (B9) and the 
investment variable and that the weakest correlation 
was linked to imports (B8). 
Considering the results tabulated in table 5-11, we 
again see that there is a considerable amount of 
variation between the industrial sectors, with a number 
of the correlations giving no significant figures. 
Taking imports only four sectors have any significant 
results and only one indicates a distinct correlation 
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(wood and wood products) and we have already indicated 
that this sector received very little foreign direct 
investment ($1.1 million). 
If we leave out the two sectors where foreign 
investment was small (S3 and S6), then four of the 
remaining six all give B9 as the strongest correlation. 
This includes the two principal recipients of foreign 
direct investment chemicals (S5) and fabrications (S8). 
With these two sectors the correlation results are 
quite similar with the figure for B9 standing out from 
the rest of the results, which does suggest that the 
foreign direct investment in the chemicals and 
fabrications sector may well be connected to the 
performance of the larger companies. It is also note 
worthy that for both sectors there is an indication 
that the long-term affect of the investment inflow 
might influence imports to a greater extent than 
exports. Additionally, the only variable to give a 
significant result throughout was remuneration which 
indicates that there may well be a link between pay and 
investment. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The main use of this chapter's analysis was as. an 
exploratory measure'of the possible relationships and 
associations that might exist between the foreign 
direct investment inflows and the macro economic and 
micro manufacturing variables. The conclusions that 
can be drawn from this exploratory analysis are of a 
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tentative and speculative nature and any deductions 
must be tempered with the knowledge of the difficulties 
presented in gathering the data. In addition it 
is realisated that the foreign investment inflow has 
only been a small component of the total capital inflow 
(Chapter 4, section 4.4.1) and that they are quite 
small in comparison to many of the economic and 
manufacturing variables. 
Given these provisos the correlation results are 
interesting not just for the size of the figures, but 
rather for the pattern of results and the information 
that this may well reveal about the nature of any 
possible associations. 
The results revealed that there appears to be no 
significant relationship between the yearly inflow of 
foreign direct investment,,. regardless of the source of 
the data. Whilst the results with the stock variable 
indicate that the effects of the foreign direct 
investment inflow are liable to be long-term and linked 
to the build-up of investment. 
The macro correlation analysis (tables 5-2 and 5-3) 
do appear to show that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between foreign direct 
investment and' the measures of economic performance 
(G. D. P. G. N. P and output), arguing that the long-term 
effect of the inflow is beneficial to the economy. 
With exports and imports the macro results give little 
indication as to whether the foreign direct investment 
inflow benefits adversely affect the trade balance. 
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The correlation results from table 5-3 support the 
suggestion that the inflow of foreign direct investment 
has a beneficial impact with regard to savings, even 
though this does appear to be a long-term relationship. 
In addition the inflow does appear to have a positive 
balance when comparing assets and liabilities, which 
again indicates a positive effect on the economic 
condition of Korea. 
With the correlations by country for the macro 
variables, much the same overall picture emerged, with 
a strong positive and significant correlation towards 
the -economic performance indicators. One of the 
interesting issues to arise from this analysis was the 
relative strengths of the correlations from the 
countries. The results consistently gave the strongest 
correlations with the investment from the countries 
other than Japan and America, which represents only a 
very small amount of the total invested (20%, see 
chapter 4, section 4.4.4). The possible explanation 
for this comes from Table 4-9, which shows that while 
the investment from the other countries may be much 
smaller in total, the average investment tended to be 
larger. The correlation results tend to suggest that 
Japanese investment has the least impact and that both 
investment from Japan and America has a long-term 
adverse effect on the trade balance, which could point 
to a serious problem given the dependence of Korea on 
these two countries as a source of foreign direct 
investment. 
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The micro analysis considered the relationship between 
Korean manufacturing and the foreign direct investment 
inflow targeted at this sector. We used the private 
figures only as we were unable to obtain 
satisfactory official figures and in addition using the 
private data allowed us to investigate the 
relationships at the industrial sector level. 
The correlation results using the indices (table 5-6) 
showed that the strongest results were obtained with 
the shipments index and the weakest with productivity. 
The results suggested that the foreign direct 
investment inflow acts as a greater stimulus to output 
rather than efficiency, with the correlation towards 
output mirroring the macro results. The results from 
table 5-8 (country) also showed the same pattern, 
though here the position between American and Japanese 
investment was reversed. Moving to the industrial 
sector correlations (table 5-10), remembering that the 
bulk of the foreign direct investment is in two sectors 
(S5 and S8), using the same variables gave a completely 
mixed picture with results varying widely from sector 
to sector. 
The economic indicators in table 5-7, tended to support 
the premise that there is a long-term 'beneficial 
relationship: between the inflows and output, though 
here the results suggested that the largest companies 
gained the greatest benefit. In contrast to the macro- 
results, the micro correlations indicated-that there 
appeared to be a positive bias towards exports, again 
254 
in the long-term; whilst domestic investment appears 
to support imports more than exports. The correlations 
by country (table 5-9) show that for the Japanese and 
American investment both give by far their strongest 
correlations with the output (500) measure and that all 
three country measures show that exports have a better 
correlation than imports. When moving to the 
industrial sector analysis (table 5-11), once again 
the results vary across the sectors, though taking the 
principal recipients of foreign direct investment (S5 
and S8) both show very strong correlations with the 
output from the larger companies, but in contrast to 
the results for manufacturing as a whole they both 
suggest that there is a long-term effect on the balance 
of trade, which is the opposite of the other results. 
In conclusion though this is only an 
exploratory analysis, the results obtained do suggest a 
number of possible associations. Firstly, that the 
relationship is long-term rather than short-term, which 
is in contrast to what we might have expected from the 
correlations given the research evidence from chapters 
one and four. Secondly, that the greatest overall 
association is with the various measures of output and 
that this is true at all levels of the analysis. 
In addition, when moving to a micro level and 
considering manufacturing alone, then a very strong and 
outstanding correlation exists between- the foreign 
direct investment inflow and the output from the larger 
companies. Also that the overall trade balance appears 
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to have a positive relationship for manufacturing, in 
contrast to the relatively neutral position for the 
whole economy. 
With the country analysis, the major impact appears to 
come from the other countries, which is possibly 
explained by the average size of their investments, 
Japan having the weakest macro effect, though this 
changes to American investment for manufacturing. The 
correlations at both the macro and micro level 
emphasise the relationship between the output measures 
and the country variables, though with exports and 
imports the strength of the correlations turns around 
when we move from macro to micro for both Japan and 
America. The weak correlations for Japanese foreign 
direct investment and the whole of the economy compared 
to those for manufacturing leads one to the supposition 
that Japanese investment in areas other than industry 
has little significant impact. 
The individual industrial sectors show a large amount 
of variability. Taking the two principal sectors, the 
chemicals sector and the fabrications sector both give 
in general weak correlations, except in the case of the 
productivity index for fabrications and the output 
(500) variable for both sectors. In addition there is 
some evidence to suggest a stronger link-with imports 
than exports. 
Finally, we must stress-that these correlations are 
experimental and that the implications arising from the 
results are long-term effects. - 
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Footnotes to chapter 5 
1. From the Economic Planning Board's Economic 
Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
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Chapter Six 
The Impact of FDI On The Korean Economy: 
A Statistical Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the exploratory correlation 
analysis in chapter five, by examining a number of 
hypotheses suggested by the theory of foreign direct 
investment, and the results from chapter five, using 
data from Korean manufacturing and previous studies. 
This available evidence concerning the relationship 
between foreign direct investment and a variety of 
economic and manufacturing indicators suggests that a 
relationship exists. The methodology builds on 
correlation analysis and attempts to test the 
relationship between foreign direct investment and 
other economic indicators by employing OLS regression 
techniques. We have, however to remember, that the 
magnitude of the inflow of foreign direct investment 
into South Korea has been quite small in comparison to 
total foreign capital inflows, representing less than 
8% of the total inflow during the period under 
examination. 
As with the correlation analysis in chapter five, data 
available from official and private sources relating 
to foreign direct investment inflow are used. The 
regression analysis initially relates to the whole of 
the Korean economy. We then move from the macro 
analysis to a more detailed micro analysis of 
258 
-manufacturing and the two principal manufacturing 
sectors; chemicals and fabrications. These two sectors 
received the majority of foreign direct investment 
inflows into Korean manufacturing between the years 
1971 and 1984. 
The discussion in chapters one and four indicates that 
the role played by foreign direct investment in Korean 
development is contentious and complex. While the 
studies on the impact of foreign investment on 
development in Korea (chapter four, section 4.5) do 
suggest a. link, some argue that the overall influence 
is small, especially in industry; hence the reason for 
examining the relationship between foreign direct 
investment and development of Korean manufacturing at 
both the macro and micro levels. 
6.2. Data and Regression Analysis 
1 6.2.1 Data 
The time period covered in the analysis is the fourteen 
year period from 1971 to 1984. The data collection 
issues have been discussed in Chapter 5. The 
quantification of the foreign direct investment 
variables has been fully discussed in chapter 5 
(section 5.2). Both -official and private sources of 
data on foreign direct-investment are used in analysing 
the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
development at the macro level. When considering only 
the manufacturing sector we utilise the data from 
private sources, as detailed in chapter five. 
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Data on independent variables considered was gathered 
from official published data, using the Bank of Korea, 
National Income Statistics and Korea Statistical 
Yearbook and the Economic Planning Boards, Economic 
Statistics Yearbook as the` principal sources. 
The three principal economic indicators used were, 
Gross National Product, Exports, and Imports. These 
were treated by initially considering the economy at a 
macro level, then secondly at a micro level for the 
manufacturing sector and finally disaggregating the 
manufacturing sector figures into its constituent 
industrial sectors and using these to examine the 
relationship between foreign investment and the 
variables in the- two principal industrial sectors 
(chemicals and fabrication). 
The economic variables used in the regression 
analysis were as follows: 
a. Gross National Product 
b. Exports 
c. Imports 
d. National Savings V 
e. Foreign Assets 
f. Foreign Liabilities 
g. Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
º h. Long-term-Capital Inflow 
i. Manufacturing Earnings 
j. Manufacturing Employees 
k. Output of the Largest Firms 
(For sources and detailed description: see Appendix A). 
The other variables in the analysis were used at 
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either the macro level for the whole economy or only at 
the micro level for manufacturing. The exception to 
this was Gross Domestic Capital Formation (G. D. C. F) 
which has been used to consider the total gross 
domestic capital formation and then manufacturing gross 
domestic capital formation. As with the data in' 
chapter five all the figures used have been calculated 
in constant price terms (1980) in Korean won. 
6.2.2 Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is a powerful, tried and tested 
method of analysis widely used for hypothesis testing 
and has been used by the previous studies cited in 
chapters four and one. 
When estimating the regressions for the manufacturing 
sector, it was impossible to accurately break down the 
official foreign direct investment figures. It was 
possible to obtain yearly inflow figures for the 
manufacturing sector using the private source. We have 
included in the regression results for manufacturing 
regressions using the official figures, since close 
to 70% of-the official approval and arrivals during 
this -period'-went to the manufacturing sector we can 
expect that the-results will give an indication of the 
relationship. 
The dependent variables were weighted to act as a 
smoothing device to control the difficulties presented 
by-serial correlation which is a prevalent problem when 
using time series data and to assist in removing the 
volatility- because of the small size of the foreign 
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direct investment figures in relation to the other 
variables. 
The weighting formula used was: 
mean(variable2)/variable2 
This acted as a filter to control serial correlation. 
The presence of serially correlated or autocorrelated 
variables can cause difficulties with the fit of the 
model, which would distort the estimates. We used the 
Durbin-Watson test to indicate the presence of serial 
correlation because this is a problem with time series 
data. 
6.3 Hypotheses and Regression Results 
To facilitate the presentation of the results, we have 
detailed each hypothesis and then tabulated the results 
of the regression analysis. 
When using the three principal economic indicators 
(gross national product, exports and imports) in 
addition to breaking them into two segments, -a macro 
one considering the whole economy and a micro one for 
manufacturing, 'we used first differences to isolate the 
possible relationship caused by the changes in 
magnitude-'of the-variables. 
The tables consider each dependent variable against the 
different 'measures of foreign direct investment. The 
derivation of these figures has been discussed in 
chapter five. To reiterate, the approval figures refer 
to the foreign direct investment approved in that year 
by the Korean authorities. The arrival figures are the 
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actual reported arrivals of foreign direct investment, 
and the stock values refer to the total amount of 
investment approved or on arrival basis. 
The dependent variables considered were as follows: 
Variable No Description 
1 Private approvals 
la* Private approvals 
(manufacturing) 
2 Stock private approvals 
2a* Stock private approvals 
(manufacturing) 
3 Private arrivals 
3a*- Private arrivals 
(manufacturing) 
4 Stock private arrivals 
4a* Stock private arrivals 
(manufacturing) 
5 Official approvals 
6 Stock official approvals 
7 Official arrivals 
8 Stock official arrivals 
*b&c for principal manufacturing sectors 
With regard to the presentation of the results in the 
tables that f ollow, the figures in parenthesis are the 
figures for students t test, which has been used to 
check the hypotheses presented the superscript 
stars have been used- to indicate levels of 
significance, - *indicates significance at the 5% level 
while ** indi cates significance at the 1% level. 
263 
6.4 Gross National Product 
6.4.1 Hypothesis la 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive impact on 
Gross National Product. 
This hypothesis argues that foreign direct investment 
inflows will stimulate the growth of the whole of the 
economy. 
The results of the regression analysis shown in table 
6-1a, reveal that the sign of the slope coefficient is 
as expected, except for the private arrivals variable 
(No3), which is negative but not significant. The 
results do indicate that there is evidence to support 
the hypothesis that foreign direct investment inflows 
have a positive impact on grossnational product. 
Table 6-la Gross National Product 
Variable Intercept -B R2 D-W 
1 32,272.51 109.56 . 3545 0.7448 (1.815) 
2 -32,934.30 28.32 . 9274 0.4347 (8.754)** 
3 40,968.44 -6.58 . 0222 0.0665 (0.369) 
4- 12,231.96 16.26 . 6457 0.3829 (3.307)** 
5- 32,118.62 72.39 . 8308 0.1891 (5.427)** 
6 18,613.06 17.32 . 9466 0.3108 (10.311)** 
7 35,818.17 62.60 . 0393 0.0807 (0.495) 
8 4,447.90 , -, 29,10 . 8868 0.3649 (6.857)** 
Taking only those results that gave indications of a 
high level of significance, these are all except for 
one- variable connected to the stock. variables and are 
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significant at the 1% level. 
These results suggest that foreign direct 
investment inflows (taking them either on an approval 
or arrival basis) do not have a significant immediate 
impact, but have a lagged effect which is similar to 
the results from the correlation analysis in chapter 
five. 
This is possibly due to their relatively small values 
in comparison to .. 
the independent variables: as an 
example G. N. P topped $75 billion in 1984, when the 
inflow of foreign direct investment was only $419 
million. Rather their effect is felt over a longer 
period of time as the total amount invested builds up. 
We can say that the results do appear to support the 
hypothesis that foreign investment inflows have a 
positive impact on the economic performance of the 
Korean economy at the macro level, but that this is in 
the long-term rather than the short-term. 
These results do not agree with those of Voivodas (see 
chapter 4, section 4.5), which suggest a' positive and 
significant relationship between foreign direct 
investment inflows on an annual basis and G. N. P growth 
rate. 
it should be noted that Voivodas's exercise included 
total capital inflows including private and official 
flows. Early in the research we attempted to replicate 
the results obtained by Voivodas, but unfortunately we 
were unable to obtain similar results for the same 
time period (1962-1968). This was possibly due to 
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difficulties in duplicating the data (which we could 
not replicate to our satisfaction and were unable to 
arrive at a satisfactory answer and we could not 
contact Voivodas as he had died). 
These regression results have to be interpreted with 
caution given the high levels of auto-correlation 
indicated by the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
6.4.2 Hypothesis 1b 
Foreign Direct Investment has an impact on Gross 
National Product when using the yearly changes in 
values. 
Hypothesis lb proposes that we can show a positive 
relationship between the changes in the value of G. N. P 
and the variation in the value of the inflows of 
foreign direct investment. 
Table 6-1b Gross National Product 
(1st Differences) 
Variable Intercept B R2_ D-W 
1 2,225.89 0.39 . 0045 1.6614 (0.094) 
3 2,235.05 3.52 . 0965 1.5602 (0.911) 
5 2,282.00 -3.30 . 0195 1.6444 (-0.397) 
7 2,203.59 4.89 . 0295 1.5556 (0.474) 
Here we have to acknowledge that we can not accept the 
hypothesis. The sign of the slope is positive except 
for the official approval figure (no5), but none of the 
regressions show any sign of being significant nor of 
explaining any significant amount of the relationship. 
The explanation for the failure to prove the hypothesis 
may again relate to the size of- the foreign direct 
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investment in relation to the variable and this is 
liable to be true for not only G. N. P but also for 
exports and imports (see section 6.3.1). 
6.5 Manufacturing Gross National Product 
6.5.1 Hypothesis 2a 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive impact on 
Manufacturing Gross National Product. 
Hypothesis 2a moves from the macro analysis of the 
whole of the economy to the micro analysis of 
manufacturing. Given the stronger emphasis of foreign 
direct investment towards manufacturing we would once 
again expect a positive relationship, and possibly one 
that is even stronger than for hypothesis la. 
Table 6-2a Manufacturing Gross National Product 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
la , 9,573.52 50.92 . 1551 0.3593 (1.050) 
2a -20,584.13 21.69 . 9239 0.5194 (8.534)** 
3a 12,160.98 -23.03 . 0099 0.2536 (-0.245) 
4a- -17,505.32 23.14 . 8840 0.5230 (6.762)** 
5 7,940.14 -30.28 . 8116 0.1883 (5.084)** 
6 2,106.12 7.40- . 9588 0.3102 (11.823)** 
7 9,879.21 20.96 . 0244 0.0660 (0.388) 
8 -4'0-182.53 12.63 . 9626 0.2874 (8.675)** 
The foreign direct investment variables used for 
hypothesis 2a still contain-the official figures for 
the whole of the economy, which we are using as an 
indicator of performance since the vast majority of 
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6.5.2 Hypothesis 2b 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
manufacturing Gross National Product when using 
the yearly changes in values. 
Hypothesis 2b suggests that there is a positive 
relationship between changes in the value of the 
manufacturing component of gross national product and 
inflows of foreign direct investment into 
manufacturing. 
Table 6-2b Manufacturing Gross National Product 
(1st Differences) 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
la 898.81 -0.73 . 0169 1.2481 (-0.312) 
3a 894.26 -2.14 . 0870 1.3160 
(-0.751) 
5 898.12 0.20 . 0006 1.2922 
(0.091) 
7 890.61 2.26 . 0522 1.1075 (0.687) 
These results do not show a significant relationship 
between foreign direct investment and growth of 
manufacturing gross national product. In fact there is 
a suggestion of a negative relationship when data from 
private sources are used, while the official figures, 
which can only be used for indicative purposes, show a 
positive relationship. 
6.5.3 Hypothesis 2c 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Manufacturing Gross National Product when 
considering the principal recipient sectors. 
We would expect that there is a stronger relationship 
between foreign direct investment inflow into the 
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Korean manufacturing industries and the two principal 
industrial sectors (see chapter 4, section 4.4.2), 
chemicals and fabrications. 
Table 6-2c Manufacturing Gross National Product 
(principal industrial sector) 
a. Chemicals sector. 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1c 11,536.19 -74.29 . 3626 0.3125 
(-2.134) 
2c -17,066.74 61.16 . 8230 0.3272 (6.098)** 
3c 10,963.47 -59.59 . 0506 0.1632 (-0.653) 
4c -8,725.09 58.61 . 9154 1.2772 (9.303)** 
b. Fabrications sector. 
Variable Intercept B Rz D-W 
Id 7,606.37 -8.03 . 0011 0.1369 
(-0.095) 
2d -4,419.47 73.93 . 9006 0.5896 (8.512)** 
3d 9,123.98 -75.48 . 3640 2.3934 (-2.14) 
4d -39,104.12 72.97 . 8692 0.4506 (7.290)** 
We have only used the private foreign direct investment 
figures as it was unfortunately impossible to use the 
official figures at a sector level; the reasons for 
this were explained in chapter five (section 5.2.1). 
The results show a number of interesting trends; 
firstly there are differences in the impact of foreign 
direct investment between the chemicals and 
fabrications sectors. Secondly these regression 
results differ from those obtained for hypothesis 2a. 
Considering the sectors' results against those obtained 
for manufacturing, the chemical sector indicates 
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negative results for both yearly approvals and 
arrivals, though neither are significant and the 
regressions using the stock of foreign direct 
investment variables show positive and significant (at 
the 1% level) results with stronger coefficient values. 
The fabrications sector gives results similar to the 
chemical sector with even stronger B values but lower 
Rz, which suggests that the effect of foreign direct 
investment in the two sectors is greater than with the 
whole of manufacturing. This does tend to support the 
hypothesis that the long-term affect of the foreign 
direct investment inflow into these sectors has had a 
positive and greater impact than with the rest of 
manufacturing. 
6.6 Exports 
6.6.1 Hypothesis 3a 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Exports. 
We. are hypothesising-that the foreign direct investment 
inflow at a macro level acts as a positive 
encouragement towards all, of Korea's exports, 
regardless of source country. From the evidence we 
would expect that there would be a positive 
relationship between foreign direct investment inflow 
and exports. 
The results of. the regression analysis are similar to 
those for hypothesis la, with all of the regressions 
using stock of foreign, direct investment variables 
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giving positive and significant results, while only one 
of the yearly arrival figures (official approvals) does 
so. The results in table 6-3a compared to thoseI for 
gross national product, show that the effect of 
foreign direct investment (stock) is significant (at 
either the 5% or the 1% level) and in general gives 
slightly higher R2 values. 
Table 6-3a Exports 
Variable Intercept B RZ D-W 
1 10,479.27 49.13 . 1712 0.6494 
(1.113) 
2 -33,680.57 18.46 . 9466 0.3507 (10.313)** 
3 15,114.25 -11.18 . 1536 0.0830 (11.044) 
4 -4,280.31 10.63 . 6623 0.9306 (3.430)* 
5 8,937.66 45.36 . 7836 0.2043 (4.661)** 
6 -60.34 11.28 . 9641 0.7251 (12.695)** 
7 13,537.83 7.92 . 0015 0.0470 (0.095) 
8 -7,875.27 17.81 . 7977 0.4245 (4.864)** 
Unfortunately once again we have to acknowledge the 
presence of auto-correlation, but we can accept the 
suggestion that there does appear to be positive 
relationship between exports and foreign direct 
investment in the long-term, with a weak but positive 
relationship in the short-term. 
6.6.2 Hypothesis 3b 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Exports when using the yearly changes in values. 
This hypothesis suggests that as with hypotheses lb and 
2b we can show that a positive relationship does exist 
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between the changes in the variables using first 
differences. 
Table 6-3b Exports 
(1st differences) 
Variable, Intercept B R2 D-W 
1 1,226.96 1.16 . 1368 2.0033 
(1.129) 
3 1,223,19 -3.10 . 2509 1.9468 (-1.614) 
5 1,200.70 1.78 . 0189 2.0738 
(0.341) 
7 1,215.73 3.04 . 0381 2.0244 
(0.580) 
The regression analysis results indicate that we can 
not support hypothesis 3b, with none of the results 
being of any significance, which again may be traced to 
the relative small size of the foreign investment 
variables in comparison to the independent variable. 
6.7 Manufacturing Exports 
_6.7.1 
Hypothesis 4a 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Manufacturing Exports. 
This hypothesis as with hypothesis 2a moves from the 
macro (whole economy) to the micro (manufacturing). 
Once again given the greater volume of foreign direct 
investment in manufacturing we would expect a stronger 
relationship between the inflow and manufacturing 
exports. 
The regression results are similar to those for the 
other hypothesis, with the stock foreign investment 
variables giving significant results. All the 
equations (excepting for private yearly approvals and 
273 
arrivals) show slightly higher R2 values and relatively 
larger slope coefficients, implying that foreign 
direct investment inflows do have a greater influence 
on manufacturing exports than total Korean exports. 
Table 6-4a Manufacturinq Exports 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
la 10,206.39 36.53 . 0322 0.2275 (0.447) 
2a -39011.50 34.27 . 9291 0`. 3378 (8.870)** 
3a 11,887.39 -11.17 . 0009 0.0853 (-0.075) 
4a' -35,653.47 '37.75 . 9486 0.2880 (10.520)** 
5 5,999.75 48.38 . 8300 0.3170 (5.412)** 
6 -3,367.64 11.85` . 9904 0.6170 (24.934)** 
7 9,932.25 21.81 . 0107 0.0559 (0.254) 
8 -11,513.48 18.66 . 8150 0.2206 (5.142)** 
In addition it is also worth noting that the size of 
the slope coefficient for all-the significant foreign 
investment variables is larger for exports than for 
manufacturing gross national product (table 4a), which 
possibly indicates a greater influence of foreign 
direct investment on exports than on manufacturing 
G. N. P. Again we cannot prove the hypothesis for the 
yearly approvals but we can say that there is evidence 
to support the hypothesis-that the inflow of foreign 
direct investment has a long-term effect. 
6.7.2 Hypothesis 4b 
Foreign Direct Investment has apositive effect on 
Manufacturing' Exports when using the yearly 
changes in values. 
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Hypothesis 4b suggests that there exists a positive 
relationship between the changes in the value of 
manufacturing exports and the variation in the inflow 
of foreign direct investment directed towards 
manufacturing using first differences to isolate the 
changes., 
The regression results in table 6-4b, once again show 
that we can not demonstrate a positive relationship 
between the variables when using first differences. The 
results suggest a weak but statistically insignificant 
negative relationship. 
Table 6-4b Manufacturinq Exports 
(1st differences) 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
la 1,150.63 -1.54 . 0407 1.8712 
(-0.601) 
3a 1,151.96 -1.25 . 0161 1.9818, (-0.334)_ 
. 5 1,160.77 -0.28 . 0006 1.8874 (-0.089) 
7 1,128.19 5.84 . 1894 1.5981 (1.290)_ 
6.7.3 Hypothesis 4c, 
Manufacturing Foreign. Direct, Investment has a 
positive effect on Manufacturing Exports when 
considering the principal recipient sectors. 
Here we expect to find a similar relationship to 
hypothesis 4a, but. would expect this to be more 
pronounced in these sectors (chemicals and 
fabrications), since they received over 50% (over 70% 
of manufacturing inflow) of all the. foreign investment 
during the period 1971 to 1984. However we may expect 
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the results for the two sectors to differ from each 
other as much of the investment in the chemicals sector 
was oriented towards replacing imports while 
investments in the fabrications sector were primarily 
to boost exports. 
We were only able to use data on foreign direct 
investment from private sources due to the lack of 
accurate official figures (as in section 6.4.3). 
The regression results again (as in the case of 
hypothesis 2c) show a considerable difference in the 
impact of foreign direct investment between the two 
sectors and between the sectors and manufacturing as a 
whole. The fabrications sector shows a much stronger 
relationship between foreign direct investment and 
exports which may be expected given that this is one of 
the key export sectors, accounting for over 35% of all 
exports in 1984. The results for the chemicals sector 
indicate a weaker effect, exports from the chemicals 
sector represented less than 7% of all exports in 1984. 
This weaker result suggests that while the stock 
foreign investment in the chemicals sector has 
stimulated exports, the investment may have had other 
purposes, such as import substitution (see hypothesis 
6c). 
When comparing the results with those in table 6-4a 
which covers the whole of manufacturing, the 
fabrications sectors regression results are mixed. 
Some of the coefficients for the stock variables show 
an increase in significance while others weaken, but 
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the slope of both the coefficients of the stock 
variables does increase indicating that the inflow has 
a greater impact in this sector, whilst the converse is 
true for the chemicals sector. 
Table 6-4c Manufacturing Exports 
(principal industrial sector) 
a. Chemicals sector. 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
lb 720.78 -5.23 . 1072 0.4112 (-0.980) 
2b -2,479.46 6.99 . 6403 0.3307 (3.774)** 
3b 696.88 -5.21 . 0231 0.3165 (-0.435) 
4b --1,693.89 
7.22 . 8280 1.0221 (6.206)** 
b. Fabrications sector. 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1c 2,883.32 22.55 . 0191 0.4196 (0.395) 
2c -33,233.20 52.27 . 9774 0.4959 (18.585)** 
3c 4,056.34 -34.85 . 1684 1.6881 (-1.273) 
4c -28,068.07 49.14 -. 8556 0.3822 
(6.884)** 
Comparing these results with those of'hypothesis 2c, we 
see that the impact on manufacturing G. N. P for the 
chemicals sector is much stronger and that the 
coefficient of the slope for the fabrications sector is 
also higher. This suggests that the impact of foreign 
direct investment inflow, is more pronounced on output 
than exports which is in-line with the, results from 
chapter five, (section. 5.4.2.1, table 5-7). 
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6.8 Imports` 
6.8.1 Hypothesis 5a 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Imports. 
Hypothesis 5a proposes that at a macro level, there is 
a positive 'relationship between foreign - direct 
investment inflows and total imports, suggesting that 
foreign direct investment increases imports in addition 
to its positive' relationship with exports. This is in 
line with the research results from chapter five and 
the report written by Constantin Voivodas (see chapter 
4, section 4.5). 
Table 6-5a Imports 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W' 
1 13,35.73 39.25 . 2148 0.5712 (1.281) 
2 -15,435.74 12.24 . 8183 0.5630 
(5.198)** 
3 16,264.06 -0.07 . 0000 0.0574 (-0.008) 
4 2,785.79 7.78 . 6983 0.2987 (3.727)** 
5 12,855.58 29.81 . 6654 0.1431 (3.454)* 
6 7,039.75 7.33 = . 8016 0.1844 (4.923)** 
7 15,411.71 11.61 ' . 0064 0.0496 (0.196) 
8 -353.14 13.45 . 8948 0.7220 (7.145)** 
The regression results do suggest that not only does 
foreign direct investment increase exports in the long- 
term '_(see table 3a) but it also has a similar 
impact on imports. Comparing the regression results in 
tables 6-3a and 6-5a, we note that the coefficients of 
the slopes for the significant regressions are all 
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lower for imports than for exports, though again we are 
except for one variable only taking into consideration 
the stock of foreign direct investment. This would 
suggest that the foreign direct investment inflow has a 
positive trade effect. 
The regression results indicate that the influence of 
foreign direct investment is greater with regard to 
exports than -imports. The values for R2 give mixed 
results, with some stronger and some weaker for imports 
and also the Durbin-Watson tests indicate a high level 
of auto-correlation, so any conclusions must be taken 
with caution. 
6.8.2 Hypothesis 5b 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Imports when using the yearly changes in values. 
Hypothesis 5b suggests that we can show a positive 
relationship between the changes in the value of 
imports and variations in the value of foreign direct 
investment inflows. 
The regression analysis results show that we can not 
accept this hypothesis. The sign of the coefficient 
for the slope of the variables is positive, except for 
the official approval variable, though none of the 
results are significant. As with the previous 
hypothesis we have to relate-this failure to prove the 
hypothesis to the size and the variability of the 
foreign investment inflow in comparison to imports. 
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Table 6-5b Imports 
(1st differences) 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1 1,128.21 0.18 . 0018 1.6632 (0.081) 
3 1,133.20 1.96 . 0597 1.7512 (0.731) 
5 1,185.05 -3.39 . 0408 1.6132 (-0.592) 
7 1,102.61 5.45 . 0731 1.4212 (0.817) 
As an . example of the comparison in the changes 
in 
imports and foreign direct inv estment, the former 
increased by $4,000 million betwee n 1983 and 1984 while 
the latter only increased by $151 million. 
6.9 Manufactured Imports 
6.9.1 Hypothesis 6a 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Manufactured Imports. 
Moving from the macro analysis to the micro level, 
we are now only considering manufactured imports. This 
hypothesis postulates a positive effect from the 
foreign direct investment inflow, which would 
correspond to the research results presented by 
Constantin Voivodas (chapter 4, section 4.5). 
The results of the regression are quite similar to 
those for hypothesis 2a and 4a, with the stock foreign 
direct variables positive and significant and the 
yearly figures proving insignificant except for the 
official approvals data. Though there are differences 
in the results when comparing and contrasting them with 
those in tables 6-2a and 6-4a we can come to a number 
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of tentative conclusions. Firstly the private arrivals 
stock variable (4a) proves to be not significant and 
all the other coefficients of the stock variables are 
only significant at the 5% level in contrast to the 
coefficients for G. N. P and manufactured exports which 
are significant at the 1%. 
Table 6-6a Manufactured Imports 
Variable Intercept B Rz D-W 
la 5,978.28 61.78 . 3004 0.5763 (1.605) 
2a -12,820.35 14.26 . 5249 0.6574 (2.575)* 
3a 10,980.61 -84.81 . 1771 1.7215 (-1.136) 
4a -9,879.40 14.47 . 4549 0.7639 (2.238) 
5 5,236.84 25.98 . 7814 0.3072 (4.631)** 
6 1,438.00 5.38 . 6673 0.9477 (3.469)* 
7 4,212.17 54.75 . 2194 0.2855 (1.299) 
3 -3,235.10 9.26 . 6559 0.3544 (3.382)* 
Taking the significant results and comparing and 
contrasting the results with those from tables 6-2a and 
6-4a, we can draw the conclusion that the effect of the 
foreign direct investment inflow into Korean 
manufacturing in the long-term, is less directed 
towards encouraging manufactured imports than at 
improving the export and output performance. 
Unfortunately unlike Voivodas we were unable to prove a 
direct positive and significant relationship between 
the yearly inflow of foreign direct investment' and 
manufactured imports. 
Comparing these regression results to the macro 
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analysis of imports we would suggest that 
the coefficients point to a stronger and definitely 
more significant effect with total imports than with 
manufactured imports, which possibly indicates that the 
foreign investment in areas other than manufacturing is 
attracting significantly more imports. 
In comparison to the results for the macro analysis of 
G. N. P, exports and imports, where the greatest long- 
term effect was felt by G. N. P, the micro results 
indicate that the order of influence is exports, output 
and imports. 
. 6.9.2 Hypothesis 
6b 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Manufactured Imports when using the yearly changes 
in values. 
Hypothesis 6b suggests that we can show a positive 
relationship between the changes in value of 
manufactured imports and the foreign direct investment 
directed towards manufacturing. 
Table 6-6b Manufactured Imports 
(1st differences) 
Variable Intercept B Rz D-W 
la 690.68 -0.55 ' . 0026 
1.3646 
(-0.124) 
3a 683.76 -2.65 . 0362 1.3387 
(-0.550) 
5 656.21 2.19 . 0193 
1.4955 
°(0.401) 
7 671.48 4.43 . 0543 
1.3310 
(0.708) 
The regression results indicate that we have to reject 
the hypothesis, as none of the t tests were 
significant at the 1% or 5% level. Once again as with 
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the other regression analysis using first differences 
we appear to have problems due to the relative size of 
the foreign direct investment and its volatility. 
6.9.3 Hypothesis 6c 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
manufactured imports when considering the 
principal recipient sectors (chemicals and 
fabrications). 
Table 6-6c Manufactured Imports 
(principal industrial sector) 
a. Chemicals sector. 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
lb 1,544.21 -11.71 . 2734 0.7060 
(-1.735) 
2b -3,909.57 11.76 . 9255 0.2720 (9.971)** 
3b 1,589.26 -17.79 . 1368 0.3144 
(-1.126) 
4b -1,864.15 9.91 . 7939 2.2519 (5.551)** 
b. Fabrications sector. 
Variable Intercept. B R2 D-W 
is 4,068.55 -4.42. . 0021 0.3577 (-0.131) 
2c .' -13,865.82 25.55 . 6829 0.6691 (4.151)** 
3c 4,593.68 -27.46 . 3057- 2.4345 (-1.877) 
4c -12,241.83 25.43 . 6701 0.5173 (4.031)** 
From the results from hypothesis, 4c (table 6-4c), the 
coefficient of the slope-of the significant variables 
in the chemicals sector was lower than -average and 
higher than average for the fabrications sector. 
Further more, we also know that much of the investment 
in the chemicals sector was aimed at. import- 
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substitution. Given this we might expect that the two 
sectors would again give very different results, with 
the chemicals sector attracting less imports and the 
fabrications sector'a greater amount. 
The results of the regression analysis when taken in 
conjunction with those for the whole of Korean 
manufacturing show that all the stock variables have 
positive and significant (at the 1% level) 
coefficients. in addition the foreign direct investment 
inflow has less effect, with regard to imports, in the 
chemicals sector but is linked to higher manufactured 
imports in the fabrications sector. 
We are able to come to this conclusion by comparing the 
relative values of the coefficients of the slopes of 
the regression results with those from table 6-6a. 
These also indicate that when considering the net 
effect of the inflow (the effect on exports against 
-imports) for the two sectors, the chemicals sector has 
a negative trade balance and the fabrications sector a 
strong positive balance. 
When comparing the results for manufacturing for the 
three key variables (G. N. P, exports and imports), the 
sectors have the strongest relationship with G. N. P 
rather than exports (see section 6.8.1), and also 
differ with manufacturing as a whole since the-inflow 
stimulates imports more than exports in the chemicals 
sector and the vice versa is true in the case of the 
fabrications sector. 
The important conclusion to be drawn from these 
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results, is that the inflow into the two principal 
industrial sectors has had its greatest overall effect 
in the long-term on-output and has also performed 
different functions in the two sectors. In chemicals 
the inflow of foreign direct investment has not 
stimulated exports and appears to have keep import 
demand lower than for` manufacturing as a whole, while 
in-the fabrications sector it has stimulated demand for 
both exports and imports. While we can not prove the 
hypothesis using the yearly arrival figures we can say 
that there is strong support for the'hypothesis in the 
long-term. 
6.10 Other Hypotheses- 
6.10.1 Hypothesis 7 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
National Savings. 
The evidence from existing research and specifically 
Voivodas and Chen (chapter 4, section 4.5), supports 
the hypothesis that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between foreign investment inflows and 
savings. 
The regression results show that the coefficients of 
all the slope variables are positive but that the 
level of significance is generally poor. Unlike the 
previous results none of the stock variables yield 
significant results, while both of the measures for 
foreign direct investment approvals are positive and 
significant. The results lend some support to the 
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hypothesis and suggest that foreign direct investment 
inflows influence national savings in the short-term 
rather than in the long-term which were the conclusions 
drawn from the analysis of G. N. P, exports and imports. 
It does appear that the yearly inflow of foreign direct 
investment acts as a vehicle for savings. 
Table 6-7 National Savings 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1 6,638.56 60.25 . 6020 0.8485 (3.012)* 
2 -5,434.37 6.39 . 2648 0.7556 (1.470) 
3 10,864.06 2.61 . 0195 0.1479 (0.346) 
4 8,014.54 1.78 . 0435 0.2325 40.522)- 
5 8,274.17 24.74 . 5447 0.2598 (2.679)* 
6 5,578.91 4.39 . 3416 0.4208 (1.764) 
7 5,028.19 83.28 . 3904 0.3013 (1.960) 
8 2,700.49 6.80 . 2719 0.6628 (1.497) 
6.10.2 Hypothesis 8 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Korean Foreign Assets. 
The hypothesis suggests that the inflow of foreign 
direct investment would encourage the growth of Korean 
assets abroad. The support for this is that foreign 
direct investment inflows makes Korean industry more 
competitive, outward looking, increases the level of 
technical sophistication and hence-encourages Korean 
investment abroad. - 
The regression analysis shows. that the coefficients of 
the stock variables have positive slopes and the t 
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tests are significant (at either the 5% or 1% level). 
The anal ysis does lend support to the hypothesis, 
though i n the long -term rather than the short-term, 
since w hile the official app rovals v ariable does 
indicate a positive and significa nt relat ionship, the 
two priv ate figures for yearly a pprovals and arrivals 
indicate that the converse may be true (even though 
they are not signifi cant). 
Table 6-8 Foreign Assets 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1 3,844.72 -3.03 . 1720 0.5864 
(-1.579) 
2 -1,858.34 2.34 . 7045 0.6705 (5.349)** 
3 4,170.58 -7.40 . 1836 0.4474 (-1.643) 
4 -1,687.79 3.57 . 8736 1.4686 (9.108)** 
5 3,487.94 10.34 . 8091 0.1655 
(5.024)** 
6 1,736.38 2.33 . 8178 0.3284 (5.189)** 
7 3,581.85 14.93 . 1063 0.1288 (0.845) 
8 565.96 3.32 . 5502 0.8842 (2.709)* 
6.10.3 Hypothesis 9 
Foreign Direct Investment has a negative effect on 
Korean Foreign Liabilities. 
Here we are arguing that foreign direct' investment will 
enable the Korean. economy to reduce its foreign 
liabilities in contrast-to hypothesis 8. 
The, evidence presented by the regression results would 
appear not to support the hypothesis and seems to 
strongly suggest the opposite. Comparing the results 
from the two tables (tables 6-8 and 6-9) these suggest 
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that foreign direct investment tends to increase the 
overall level of foreign liab ilities rather than 
assets, which would imply that t here may be some long- 
term detr imental eff ects to the K orean economy. 
Table 6-9 Foreign Liabilities 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1 6,478.36 -6.98 . 1274 0.2611 (-1.323) 
2 -6,588.05 5.37 . 5163 0.3334 (3.579)** 
3 7,454.81 -19.12 . 1712 0.4865 (-1.574) 
4 -7,536.74 9.12 . 7912 0.4640 (6.865)** 
5 1,601.26 57.48 . 7557 0.5084 (4.308)** 
6 -10,240.34 14.64 . 9760 0.1544 (15.620)** 
7 7,101.33 14.54 . 0031 0.0771 (0.136) 
8 -20,905.69 23.54 . 8373 0.1240 (5.556)** 
6.10.4 Hypothesis 10 
Foreign'Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Gross Domestic-Capital-Formation. 
Hypothesis 10 argues that foreign direct investment 
inflows will have a stimulating effect on domestic 
capital formation. 
While the regression results all produced the expected 
sign showing that it could be argued that foreign 
direct -investment was beneficial to gross domestic 
capital formation, only one variable (stock official 
arrivals) showed any significance (5% level). If we 
took the 10% significance level for the coefficient of 
the slope then variables 1,2,5 and 6'would also be 
significant. We can say that there is some evidence to 
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support the hypothesis but that it is insufficient to 
prove it. 
Table 6-10 Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1 9,483.28 48.30 . 4875 0.7923 (2.389) 
2 -5,254.43 7.07 . 4095 0.8231 (2.040) 
3 12,438.12 6.93 . 1737 0.0857 (1.123) 
4 5,820.32 4.18 . 3021 0.3106 
(1.611) 
5 10,760.23 20.13 . 4545 0.2097 (2.236) 
6 7,621.21 4.32 . 4178 0.3249 (2.075) 
7 9,617.66 47.20 . 1581 0.1803 
(1.061) 
8 2,068.11 8.90 . 5871 0.8949 (2.921)* 
6.10.5 Hypothesis 11 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Manufacturing Gross Domestic Capital Formation. 
This is similar to hypothesis 10, though this 
hypothesis suggests that there is a relationship at a 
micro level. Considering that manufacturing has 
received the majority of total foreign direct 
investment inflows we can expect that a stronger 
relationship should exist. 
Comparing and contrasting the results of the analysis 
for hypotheses 10 and 11, we see that the evidence 
presented suggests that except in the case of one 
variable (private approvals) we can not support 
hypothesis 11. 
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Table 6-11 Manufacturing G. D. C. F 
Variable Intercept Beta R2 D-W 
la 1,351.90 19.64 . 5253 0.7133 
(2.577) 
2a 2,437.30 -0.26 . 0029 0.2819 (-0.133) 
3a 2,816.84 -23.14 . 2281 1.5736 (-1.332) 
4a 3,024.62 -0.77 . 0225 0.2201 (-0.371) 
5 1,952.23 0.93 . 0175 0.3222 (0.327) 
6 2,073.52 -0.01 . 0005 0.3217 (-0.018) 
7 1,187.37 11.96 . 1811 0.3217 (1.152) 
8 1,446.48 0.50 . 0325 0.5238 (0.449), 
Furthermore the results from the two tables suggest 
that the -foreign direct investment inflow into 
manufacturing has a very much weaker relationship and 
may well have little or no bearing on manufacturing 
gross domestic capital formation. Four of the results 
suggest that it may have a dampening effect, though the 
support for this hypothesis is very weak. 
6.10.6 Hypothesis 12 
Foreign Direct'Investment has a negative effect on 
Long-term Capital Inflows. 
This hypothesis argues that while the foreign direct 
investment inflow has only been a small proportion of 
the total foreign capital, inflow, that as it has 
increased in importance it has replaced the other 
forms of long-term capital. 
In chapter two (section 2.3.1) we discussed Korea's 
move from dependence on aid as a source of capital to 
loans. We suggest here that foreign direct investment 
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a substitute for long-term portfolio capital inflows. 
The results give some support for this hypothesis, with 
all except one of th e equations indicating a negative 
effect. Th e analysi s suggests that foreign direct 
investment is repla cing the other forms of long-term 
capital but that this is a function of the stock rather 
than the flow vari ables, though the sign of the 
coefficient of the slope does lend support for the 
hypothesis. 
Table 6-12 Long-term Capital Inflows 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1 1,573.78 -7.58 . 4063 1.3848 (-2.026) 
. 2 5,490.47 -1.73 . 8290 0.1784 (-5.393)** 
3 1,000.37 0.14 . 0025 0.6083 (0.123) 
4 2,888.60 -1.08 . 6870 0.1006 (-3.629)* 
5 1,440.64 -3.75 . 5332 1.3320 (-2.223)** 
6 2,297.97 -1.02 . 7905 0.1610 (-5.510)** 
7 1,162.47 -2.05 . 0101 0.6881 (-0.247) 
8 3,250.31 -1.81 . 8240 0.0897 
(-5.299)** 
6.10.7 Hypothesis 13 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
Manufacturing Earnings. 
Hypothesis 13 suggests that there is a significant 
relationship between manufactured earnings and foreign 
direct investment which was implied by the regression. 
results in chapter five (section 5.4.2.1). 
The regression results do lend some support to the 
hypothesis, as all the coefficients of the stock 
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variables are significant at the 1% level. In 
addition the other results using the flow variables 
lend support to this conclusion (except for private 
arrivals). Though once again we a re looking at a long- 
term effect rather than one whic h is associated with 
the yearly approvals and arrivals, which suggests that 
foreign direct investment will increase manufacturing 
earnings which may introduce some inflationary pressure 
in the rest of Korean industry. 
Table 6-13 Manufacturing Earnings 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
1 5,143.74 25.22 . 3376 0.4098 (1.749) 
2 -4,277.89 7.00 . 8544 0.6626 (5.933)** 
3 6,350.42 -9.12 . 0138 0.2579 (-0.290) 
4 -3,018.67 7.26 . 7717 0.6914 (4.504)** 
5 4,984.46 9.35 . 6824 0.1504 (3.590)* 
6 3,145.72 2.31 . 8303 0.1954 (5.418)** 
7 5,755.71 4.06 . 0081 0.0518 (0.222) 
8 805.75 4.25 . 9303 0.5446 (8.946)** 
6.10.8 Hypothesis 14 
Foreign Direct Investment inflow has a positive 
relationship with Manufacturing Employment. 
We are proposing that at the micro level we should be 
able to detect a positive and significant relationship 
between the inflow and manufacturing employment. 
The regression analysis results suggest that such a 
relationship does exist, though it is a long-term 
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rather than short-term one. The coefficients of the 
slopes for the stock variables are significant (only 
one at the 1% level). This does suggest that the 
long-term effect of the foreign direct investment 
inflow into manufacturing is beneficial to employment. 
Table 6-14 Manufacturing Employees 
Variable Intercept B R2 D-W 
la 1,969,424 3,851.37 . 2469 0.2127 (1.403) 
2a 564,708 1,046.62 . 5984 0.1578 (2.990)* 
3a 2,267,856 -4,878.83 . 1239 0.9677 (-0.921) 
4a 735,556 1,098.34 . 5544 0.1433 (2.732)* 
5 1,899,860 1,824.44 . 8148 0.0903 (5.138)** 
6 1,619,666 388.55 . 7359 0.0773 (4.088)** 
7 1,902,871 2,815.82 . 1227 0.0736 (0.916) 
8 1,303,901 651.35 . 6859 0.1112 (3.619)* 
6.10.9 Hypothesis 15 
Foreign Direct Investment has a positive effect on 
output, when considering the output of the largest 
firms only. 
Hypothesis 15 considers the relationship between the 
output of Korean firms with more than 500 employees and 
foreign direct investment inflow into manufacturing. 
The premise is that the investment tends to be directed 
towards larger firms and that this should be reflected 
in their output, which does-appear to be the case from 
the exploratory analysis in chapter five (section 
5.4.2.1). 
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The results of the regression analysis show that the 
hypothesis is supported in the long-term, rather than 
the short-term. The table shows that the long-term 
effect of foreign direct investment inflow is to expand 
the output of the larger companies. 
Table 6-15 Output of Largest Firms 
(firms in excess of 500 employees) 
Variable Intercept Beta R2 D-W 
1 19,169.21 131.83 . 1159 0.2643 (0.809) 
2 -59,230.98 56.68 . 8453 2.1280 (5.227)** 
3 25,283.76 -33.51 . 0023 0.2661 (-0.106) 
4 -54,703.40 63.36 . 8786 2.6160 (6.015)** 
5 15,917.58 70.24 . 5624 0.4938 (2.535) 
6 1,101.77 18.39 . 7970 1.2472 (4.430)** 
7 26,984.60 -36.87 . 0093 0.3385 (-0.216) 
8 -14,065.44 31.08 . 7538 2.4132 (3.912)** 
Comparing and contrasting the coefficients of the 
slopes of the stock variables with those for 
manufacturing G. N. P (table 2a), we see that while those 
from table 2a are also significant, the results for 
hypothesis 15 all have much larger coefficients. 
This leads to the conclusion that foreign direct 
investment in the larger companies has a greater effect 
on output than with manufacturing as a whole. 
6.11 Multiple Regressions 
In addition to the hypotheses testing we estimated 
four multiple regressions in order to determine the 
relative impact of foreign direct investment on various 
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economic indicators for the period 1971 to 1984. The 
four dependent variables were, exports (X/Q), imports 
(M/Q), savings (S/Q) and gross domestic capital 
formation (C/Q), where Q was gross national product. 
The independent variables included annual inflows of 
foreign direct investment (F), average earnings (E), 
and (I) domestic investment. We have included the 
BETA weights, which are the coefficients of the 
independent variables when all variables are expressed 
in standardised (Z-score) form. This enables us to 
make slightly more accurate comparisons between the 
various slope coefficients as taking BETA weights makes 
the regression coefficients slightly more comparable. 
6.11.1 Exports 
X= -0.039 + 1.80E + 4.79E - 1.491 
QQPQQ 
(1.491) (5.832)** (-1.673) 
[. 2273] [1.2581 [-0.3091 
R2 = . 8864 F= 26.02** D-W = 0.9218 
note: figures in parenthesis () are t tests 
figures in [) are BETA weights 
The multiple regression suggests that average earnings 
appears to be the best predictor of exports. It is 
noticeable that none of the other variables are 
significant and that the BETA weights also suggest that 
average earnings is the strongest predictor. The 
equation shows that' yearly foreign direct 
investment inflow is positive but is still not 
significant, as were the results for the single 
regressions in table 6-3a, indicating that we cannot 
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prove that the yearly inflow 
impact on the volume of exports. 
6.11.2 Imports 
M=0.14 - . 306F + 2.64E + 
QQQ 
(-0.617) (7.792)** 
[-0.050] [0.8957] 
s have a significant 
0.321 
Q 
(0.873) 
[0.0861 
R2 = . 9678 F= 100.07** 
D-W =1.6522 
note: figures in parenthesis () are t tests 
figures in [] are BETA weights 
The results for the import multiple regression indicate 
that earnings is the only significant (at the 1% level) 
predictor of import performance. Which suggests that 
as earnings improve then the demand for imports by the 
Korean's increases. None of the coefficients of the 
other variables are statistically significant, with 
foreign direct investment indicating a negative slope. 
The values of the BETA weights also reflect the 
relative importance of earnings as a predictor of 
imports. 
6.11.3, Savings 
S=-. 0004, + 1.64F + 4.28E - 0.65X 
QQQQ 
(1.682) (3.890)** (-2.371)* 
[0.344] [1.864] [-1.070] 
Rz = . 7041 F=7.930** D-W =0.9021 
note: figures in parenthesis () are t tests 
figures in (] are BETA weights 
The multiple regression for savings indicates that 
earnings is the best predictor, indicating that as 
earnings increase savings will also increase. Foreign 
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direct investment is positive, which again suggests 
that the inflow is encouraging the growth of savings. 
In addition the results suggest that exports may act as 
an inhibitor for the growth of savings. 
This agrees with the regression results from Voivodas 
and Chen (see chapter 4, section 4.5). When comparing 
the results with those obtained using the single 
regressions, the results for foreign direct investment 
still indicate that'the yearly inflow is an important 
predictor of savings. The BETA weights reflect the 
relative importance of earnings and exports as 
predictors of savings. 
Williamson (1979) showed that between 1960 and 1974, 
the marginal public saving rate was 23.5%, while the 
marginal private saving rate was only 13.8%, indicating 
the low saving rate in Korea. 
Comparing" the period 1960 to 1974 and the period we 
investigated (1971 to 1984), the ratio of savings to 
GDP increased from 13.2% to 18.3% over the two periods, 
indicating an increasing level of savings, though the 
amount represented by private savings remained at just 
over 50% for both periods. Taking these figures and 
the results from the regressions it is possible to 
argue that the continued growth of the economy and the 
increasing inflow of foreign direct investment have 
improved savings levels. 
6.11.4 Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
The results of the multiple regression for gross 
domestic capital formation indicate that earnings is 
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the best predictor. Foreign direct investment inflow is 
not significant and has a negative slope coefficient. 
C_ _ . 19 - 0.685F +'2.76E 
QQQ 
(-0.969) (4.483)** 
[-0.1671 (0.7741 
R2 = . 7935 "F= 
12.80** 
D-W = 2.2241 
note: figures in parenthesis () are t tests 
figures in (1 are BETA weights 
The results of the multiple regression are in direct 
contrast to the single regression (table 6-10), which 
indicated that although none of the flow variables for 
foreign direct investment inflow were significant there 
was signs of' a" positive relationship between the 
variables. 
In addition to using the-independent variables shown in 
the 'multiple regression we carried out multiple 
regression trials using foreign direct investment as a 
share of the total investment (F/I), investment as a 
percentage of total capital formation (I/C) and also 
included gross national product per capita as an 
additional independent variable. With all these trials 
the results were less satisfactory than the original 
multiple regressions. 
6.12 Conclusions 
The ' regression analyses point to a number of 
conclusions concerning the nature of the relationship 
between foreign direct investment and the Korean 
economy. Before discussing these we must add a note of 
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caution that the results and the conclusions drawn do 
have a number of limitations. These include the 
relatively small size of the inflow of foreign direct 
investment in relation to the other variables, the 
difficulties caused by the volatility of the inflow and 
the problem of auto-correlation. Nevertheless, taking 
these limitations into account, we can draw a number of 
important conclusions. 
We have seen that the expected relationship between the 
flow measures of foreign direct investment and the 
variables have to a great degree not materialised; 
instead we have seen that the major importance of 
foreign direct investment inflows is with the stock 
variables. This indicates that foreign direct 
investment is likely to have an impact on development 
over the long run rather than the short run. 
As we moved from the analysis of macro level data, 
which considered the whole of the economy, to the micro 
examination of Korean manufacturing, we saw that there 
were a number of differences in the relationship 
between foreign direct investment and the three 
principal variables (G. N. P, exports and imports). At 
both the macro and micro level it was the long-term 
stock variables of foreign direct investment that 
proved to have' a significant relationship with the 
variables, but there were a number of differences in 
the results. 
Taking the macro regression analysis for G. N. P, exports 
and imports (Table 6-1a, 6-3a and 6-5a), the results 
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indicated that foreign direct investment inflows 
stimulated output (G. N. P), exports and imports. 
Comparing the coefficients of the slopes it became 
apparent that the greatest long-term effect was with 
G. N. P, then exports and imports. 
In contrast the micro analysis using manufacturing 
G. N. P, exports and imports (tables 6-2a, 6-4a and 6-6a) 
showed a number of differences. The results for the 
stock variables indicated that the greatest impact of 
foreign direct investment on the economy was on 
exports, then G. N. P and finally imports. When 
comparing and contrasting the macro and micro analysis, 
the foreign direct investment inflows had a. lot less of 
an impact on manufacturing output than an output for 
the whole economy, while influencing exports to a 
slightly greater extent and imports to a slightly lower 
extent. This is possibly a reflection of the 
channelling of foreign direct investment inflows into 
two key sectors. . 
The micro analysis using the principal industrial 
sectors, chemicals and fabrications (which includes 
metals and machinery), showed that the emphasis was 
different between the two sectors and against 
manufacturing as a whole. The regressions for both 
sectors, using the stock variables showed that the 
relationship with the inflow of foreign direct 
investment and each sector's G. N. P was very strong, 
giving much higher beta figures than for the whole of 
manufacturing. In addition the results showed that 
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both exports and imports were influenced more by the 
inflows into the fabrication sector than in the rest of 
manufacturing, while the relationship between foreign 
direct investment and the variables was weaker. with the 
chemicals sector. 
These results showed that inflows of foreign direct 
investment into these two sectors had given rise to 
considerably different relationships for exports and 
imports. Within the fabrications sector there was a 
strong bias towards exports, while the chemicals sector 
showed a slightly stronger inclination for imports. 
This suggests that the inflow had different purposes, 
in fabrications it was aimed strongly * towards 
increasing exports, while the chemicals sector foreign 
direct investment appears to have suppressed the level 
of imports and may well have been used to encourage 
import-substitution. 
The results from table 6-15, showed that in addition to 
there being a- strong relationship between output 
(manufacturing G. N. P) and the two principal recipient 
industrial sectors, this was also true when 
considering output from the larger manufacturing 
companies (output . 500). This leads us to the 
conclusion that while foreign direct investment inflow 
into the manufacturing sector may not have had a 
significant impact on output, it may have had a strong 
impact on the principal sectors and the larger 
companies. 
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The other variables (national savings, foreign assets 
and liabilities, gross domestic capital formation, 
long-term capital, manufacturing earnings and employees 
and output of. the largest firms) examined showed that 
these also were strongly influenced by the stock of 
foreign direct investment. We showed that both foreign 
7 assets and liabilities of Korea (table 6-8 and 6-9) 
have a positive and significant relationship with the 
coefficient of the stock variables, though the 
relationship appears to be stronger in the case of 
liabilities than assets. 
In the case of G. D. C. F (table 6-10) all the 
coefficients of the slopes had positive signs, 
indicating that there is some support for the 
hypothesis. The converse was true for manufacturing 
G. D. C. F (table 6-11), where the regression results were 
very much weaker, suggesting little or no influence 
given the negative slope of four of the variables. The 
inference could be drawn that there is some weak 
evidence to suggest that the inflow of foreign direct 
investment into manufacturing is replacing domestic 
capital. 
With long-term capital inflows the results (table 6-12) 
indicted that the coefficients of the slopes were 
negative and significant (at either the 5% or 1% level) 
for- the foreign direct investment stock variables. 
This suggests that in the long-term foreign direct 
investment inflows may well be replacing other forms of 
capital inflow. 
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Considering the effect of the inflows on 
earnings and employment in manufacturing we indicated 
that there is 'evidence to suggest that there is a 
strong relationship between the stock of foreign direct 
investment and earnings and employment (tables 6-13 and 
6-14). Both indicated that the inflow has a positive 
effect in the long-term. 
When we tested the hypothesis for national savings 
(hypothesis 7) in comparison to the pattern that had 
emerged from the other regressions we found that all of 
the coefficients of the slopes were positive, with two 
significant at the 5% level and both were flow measures 
for- approvals (private and official). This indicated 
that the interaction between the variables may well be 
linked to the flow (yearly figures), which would agree 
with the reports published by Voivodas (1974) and Chen 
(1977), who both showed that there was a significant 
relationship between foreign direct investment on a 
yearly basis and savings. 
The savings multiple regression continued to give 
support to the hypothesis that the inflow of foreign 
direct investment is a positive influence on the level 
of national savings. 
It was noticable that the theme running through all the 
multiple regressions was the positive and significant 
impact of earnings on'all the dependent variables. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the analysis are that 
the relationship is with the stock of foreign direct 
investment rather than the flow measures. Given this 
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we are looking at a long-term rather than a short term 
effect of the foreign direct investment inflows. The 
results indicated that G. N. P, exports and imports are 
all positively related to the foreign investment 
inflow. Even though the effect of foreign direct 
investment on manufacturing G. N. P is weaker, this does 
not hold true for the chemicals and fabrications, nor 
when considering the larger companies where the 
relationship for all three was stronger. 
There definitely appears to be benefits to be gained 
from encouraging the inflow of foreign direct 
investment, but apart from its positive influence on 
national savings, these may accrue only in the lbng- 
run. 
., 
304 
Chapter Seven 
Policy Implications 
7.1 Introduction 
This. chapter reviews the policy implications of the 
main findings of the study, concentrating on the 
empirical results of the statistical exercise in 
chapter six. 
7.2 Research Findings 
The regression results pointed to the importance of the 
stock of foreign direct investment rather than annual 
inflows. Given the nature of foreign direct investment 
in Korea, where the yearly inflow has varied 
considerably (table 4-3) as the government has 
alternatively tightened and relaxed the controls on 
investment, we showed annual inflows to have little 
impact on other economic indicators. The stock figures 
show the build up of investment over time, and 
results in chapter, six provide evidence of a 
considerable impact of stock of foreign direct 
investment on other economic indicators. It is likely 
that the build up of investment exerts an impact 
because of the economies of scale involved in various 
lines of economic activity. 
Another important finding in the previous chapters is 
that foreign investment from countries other than Japan 
and the, U. S. A had a much more, significant impact on 
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Korean development (tables 5-4,5-5,5-8 & 5-9). This 
may be because the average size of investment per 
project in the case of foreign direct investment from 
countries other than U. S. A and Japan was relatively 
large, prior to 1982. With regard to sectoral 
composition investments from most countries were 
concentrated in the chemicals sector, financing, hotels 
and the fabrications sector, with the possible 
exception of the financing sector where Japanese 
foreign direct investment dominated. There does not 
appear to be any evidence that foreign direct 
investment from the "other" countries differed 
significantly from that of Japan and U. S. A with regard 
to transfer of technology, or regulation by the Korean 
authorities. 
The evidence from the regression results with regard to 
the association between foreign direct investment and 
other forms of capital inflow indicates that foreign 
direct investment may be increasingly replacing other 
forms of capital inflow. This is borne out by the 
figures for foreign direct investment and total capital 
inflow in chapter four (section 4.4.1). Foreign direct 
investment contributed only 4% of the total capital 
inflow between 1962 and 1971, while by 1984 this had 
risen to 17.8%, indicating its increasing importance. 
One reason for the rise is that the actual total volume 
of capital inflow has decreased and at the same time 
the level of foreign direct investment has increased 
with the Korean government's liberalisation of controls 
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on inward investment. 
From the regression results we have seen that foreign 
direct investment has. an impact on output, exports and 
imports. In the light of the mechanisms that have 
brought about this impact, we have to take into 
account the beneficial aspects of foreign direct 
investment. 
We have Argued that the foreign direct investment 
inflow has enabled the Koreans to increase productive 
investment and improve the allocation of scarce 
resources. In addition there are the linkage and 
multiplier effects, which would improve the ability of 
Korean industry and the economy to grow as the number 
of projects and level of investment has increased. 
Furthermore, the presence and partnership of foreign 
companies with local companies has provided a stimulus 
to domestic companies and assisted in raising the 
efficiency of Korean industry. - 
These factors could apply to any of the economic 
indicators, though one special factor would affect 
imports; the lack of primary resources, which would 
mean that the increased economic activity generated by 
foreign direct investment would attract greater imports 
of raw materials. This is confirmed by the regression 
results for manufacturing where the apparent effect of 
foreign direct investment inflows on manufactured 
imports was not as, strong as with total imports. 
Similarly the impact of foreign direct investment on 
manufactured exports was stronger than total exports, 
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which could be explained by the targeting of the 
fabrications sector. 
The regression results for the manufacturing sector 
showed results slightly different from those for the 
economy as a whole; with the foreign direct investment 
inflow having a stronger impact with exports than 
imports. Other interesting results for manufacturing 
were centred around the output (500) variable and the 
sector correlations. 
The results for the output (500) variable suggest that 
the impact of the foreign direct investment inflow is 
much higher in the case of larger companies than for 
manufacturing as a whole. The inference here is that 
foreign direct investment 
"associated with 
larger 
companies has a greater impact, which may well be due 
to the size of the projects, given that joint ventures 
or wholly owned foreign projects involving large 
foreign companies will attract larger than average 
investments per project. This implies that the scale of 
the project may well have a bearing on its economic 
impact. This is also collaborated by the individual 
sector' correlations (table 5-11), especially for the 
two principal 'recipient sectors (chemicals and 
fabrications). 
The sector correlations and regressions highlighted the 
differences across the sectors but more importantly for 
the two principal industrial sectors. The regression 
results for exports and imports indicated that foreign 
direct investment in these two sectors had been put to 
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different uses. 
The results for the fabrications sector indicated an 
above average affect on both exports and imports, 
implying that the impact of foreign direct investment 
stimulated exports but at the same time led to higher 
levels of imports. These imports would be associated 
with the increased manufacture of electronics, the 
increased demand from transportation and the need for 
machinery to expand Korean industry amongst others. 
in contrast the foreign investment in the chemicals 
sector gave lower values for both exports and imports. 
This implies that the investment was not targeted 
towards stimulating exports but rather replacing 
imports, with the increasing demand for chemicals from 
Korean industry. 
The output results for both sectors showed that the 
impact of foreign direct investment was much greater in 
these two sectors (table 6-3c) than for manufacturing 
as a whole, indicating that investment in these areas 
was much more effective at introducing such factors as 
improved efficiency. The influence on output was also 
highlighted by the correlation results in table 5-11, 
which showed that by far the strongest correlations 
were with the output (500) variable, linking foreign 
direct investment efficiency to the larger 
manufacturing companies. 
Another factor from the correlation analysis- that 
points to the influence of foreign direct investment in 
the fabrication sector is the high correlation with 
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productivity, which again indicates that the investment 
stimulated the efficiency of the sector. 
The results for savings indicate a short term effect, 
rather than long term. This could occur because the 
inflow of foreign direct investment increases 
government revenues, through taxes and remittances to 
the government. In addition the inflows enabled the 
government to make most efficient use of its scarce 
foreign exchange. This coupled with the increase in 
economic growth brought about by the foreign direct 
investment would enable savings to increase. 
7.3 Implications 
When discussing the policy implications of foreign 
direct investment weýhave to remember that the level of 
foreign direct investment in Korea is still relatively 
low and that the nature of the relationship between the 
inflow and the economy is complex and intricate 
in nature. Nevertheless given the economic policies 
followed by successive Korean governments, with their 
outward oriented, export promoting strategies the role 
played by foreign direct investment and the 
implications for future strategy are important. 
One of the first conclusions to be drawn from the 
research is that the Korean government's use of the 
various F. C. I. A's, which may have inhibited the early 
growth of foreign direct investment, could have 
prevented adverse effects from the build-up of 
investment. This may be a lesson for other developing 
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countries, viz, that there is a need for relatively 
tight but fair control at the early stages of 
development, but also that this control has to be 
flexible and pragmatic enough to change as the economy 
develops. 
Another policy conclusion from the research, is that 
the effects of the foreign direct investment inflow 
may be evident only in the long term, which means that 
governments cannot look to this form of investment as a 
'quick fix' for their economies. Again this 
highlights the need to take the long term view of not 
only foreign direct investment but also the development 
of the economy. 
The size of the investment project does appear to be 
important, indicating that the Korean government should 
look towards encouraging large projects (in terms of 
capital) and- that these are liable to have a greater 
impact on the economy if they are associated with large 
(or growing) companies. This is not to say that small 
projects should be discouraged they do have a 
beneficial impact, but any effort spent on attracting 
foreign direct investment should be focused on the 
larger projects. 
As to the country effect, it has been noticeable that 
the average size of investments from Japan and the 
U. S. A is increasing, so that we may expect the 
influence of foreign direct 'investment from other 
countries to diminish. Nevertheless it"does appear 
that the Korean government should continue in its 
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efforts in attracting investment from other countries. 
Another factor to emerge was the 
differing results from the manufacturing sectors, which 
indicates the difficulties in applying any broad rules 
to the foreign direct investment inflow. What the 
analysis also indicated is that the government's 
targeting of the inflows does appear to have worked, 
with investment in the chemicals sector replacing 
imports and stimulating exports in the fabrications 
sector. This indicates that although the Korean 
government- has relaxed the F. C. I. A it must still 
monitor the destination of investment and be prepared 
to act if it believes that the inflows are becoming 
inefficient. 
The government's early policy of emphasising joint 
ventures is now no longer in place and the results 
indicate that it is the size and targeting of the 
investment that appear to be the more important 
factors. 
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Chapter Eight 
Summary and Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
The -primary objective of this research was to examine 
the relationship between the inflow of foreign direct 
investment and the-development of the Korean economy. 
A secondary objective was to develop a better 
understanding of the Korean economy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the evidence 
presented on the growth of the Korean economy and 
the influence of foreign direct investment in Korea. 
We will then summarise and report on the correlation 
and regression results, concluding by commenting upon 
the extent to which the objectives of the study have 
been met. In addition we will review the limitations of 
the study, the policy implications and areas for 
further research. 
8.2 Review 
The Korean economy has undergone a complete 
transformation since the early sixties when Korea was 
one of the poorest countries in the world. ' Korea has 
become an economic power, classed as being second only 
to Japan within the Pacific rim and with aspirations to 
join the O. E. C. D. Korea's economic transition dates 
from the early sixties as the Korean government moved 
from an aid to a trade'centred policy. 
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Korea is one of a small number of developing countries 
that are known as the Newly Industrialising Countries 
some of whom are making the transition to an 
industrialised economy. A number of specific 
prerequisites were identified as being instrumental for 
the successful economic development of these countries. 
These included, political stability, a limited natural 
resource "base, educational attainment and an outward 
oriented economic policy, all of which could be applied 
to Korea. Korea is now experiencing increased 
political and social unrest, which might act to slow 
down the future development of the economy. 
The control and direction of the Korean economy has 
been centralist in nature with the Korean government 
playing a key role in economic planning and 
development. The principal manifestation of the Korean 
government's economic policies has been a series of 
five year economic development plans, the first of 
which started in 1962. 'In addition the five year 
economic development plans have been supported by 
yearly reviews and economic management plans. These 
economic development plans have been used as the basis 
for Korea's remarkable development, and have aimed to 
build up a strong industrial base using manufacturing 
and manufactured exports as the engine for growth for 
the rest of the economy. 
The nature of the plans has changed as the economy has 
developed and the Korean government has had to face up 
to changing economic conditions. Initially the plans 
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were highly directive with the Korean government and 
its agencies controlling and directing many areas of 
business development. As the economy developed the 
government started to promote the development of the 
heavy- and chemical industries, starting in the late 
sixties and' accelerating this process throughout the 
seventies. The plans developed in sophistication with 
the Korean government not only looking to promote 
industry but also social and, regionalýdevelopment, and 
savings to name a few. 
Because of the nature of the government's management of 
the Korean economy, Korea has been identified as a 
developmental *state. This is where the state is 
described as plan rational; setting goals for both 
economic and social development. With a developmental 
state the government plays a central role in developing 
the, economy, promoting a structure. which enhances the 
nation's development and competitiveness. While the 
Korean government was central to development in the 
early plans they are now liberalising and relinquishing 
direct control over the economy. Another factor, that 
influenced the role played by the, Korean government was 
their pragmatic approach to policy. making and a lack of 
ideological constraints, both of which enabled the 
government to solve problems and define goals. 
Manufacturing was encouraged to develop, as this was 
seen as the corner-stone of the Korean government's 
economic development- plans. At the beginning 
development was based on the light industries, such as 
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textiles, clothing, and wood products, which were 
already in place. This changed as the economy expanded 
with the development of the heavy industries, including 
chemicals, iron and steel, electronics, machinery and 
transportation. The development of Korea's heavy 
industries started during the second plan, with the 
inauguration of the first integrated iron & steel mill, 
and the first oil refinery, which led to the 
development and expansion of petrochemical industries. 
Major expansion of manufacturing and especially the 
heavy industries took place during the seventies and 
continues in the eighties. The fabrications sector 
expanded, first with basic electrical goods and 
fabricated products, secondly with the devlopment of 
shipbuilding and machinery industries which were 
encouraged to establish-themselves and expand; and 
latterly,, automotives and electronics as the Koreans 
develop the high skill and high technology industries. 
Some of the, traditional light industries 
still remain important especially textiles, clothing 
and footwear. Though these industries have suffered 
from a" lack -of investment especially" during the 
seventies, -, which resulted in poor productivity, and 
have also had to face -rising protectionism 
in the 
developed, - countries in the eighties and increasing 
competition from less developed-countries. 
Problems developed as the economy started to overheat 
in the late seventies as a result of the Korean 
government's plans for the development of the heavy 
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industries. The government's expansion plans had 
led to sever structural faults developing in 
manufacturing, particularly in the machinery 
industries. The development policies had resulted in 
duplication of plant, with the mis-allocation of 
resources and considerable inefficiency developing. 
The resulting distortions and inefficiencies in the 
economy had started to reveal themselves in the late 
seventies and the government had started to propose 
stabilisation measures in 1979.. Before any of the 
measures could be implemented the second oil crisis 
struck. This caused severe world wide economic 
recession which effected Korea's export markets and 
pushed the economy into recession as growth declined 
and inflation increased rapidly. 
The economic and structural difficulties facing the 
Korean economy led to a radical change in planning, 
which was reflected in the, fifth economic and social 
development-plan. The fifth plan laid more emphasis on 
the liberalisation of the economy, with less direct 
control from the Korean government and with the 
government taking an, enabling rather-than directional 
role. The plan looked to encourage business both in the 
light and -heavy industries to improve its efficiency 
and productivity. 
Throughout this period exports and especially 
manufacturing exports have -always been seen as an 
important ingredient-to economic development. ., The 
government, while still considering exports important 
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now also gave equal priority to stabilising the 
economy, encouraging efficiency and greater 
productivity and promoting a more balanced and 
equitable economy. 
With the plans and the government's encouragement to 
develop the economy, the Korean economy has made a 
considerable transition since 1961, (chapter two 
section'2.2.1). G. N. P in 1961 was barely $2 bn, while 
exports totalled $40 million and imports $ 283 million. 
In comparison the economy was worth $79 billion in 
1984, exports had increased to $29 billion though 
imports had reached $30 billion, an indication of the 
growth experienced by the economy since the early 
sixties. An even greater change is visible when 
considering the position of manufacturing, which 
accounted for only 15% of G. N. P in 1962, this had 
increased to 32% in 1984. ' Manufactured exports which 
had been only $11.6 million in 1961, rose to $27.6 
billion in 1984. 
The heavy industries which had represented less than 
20% of manufactured output in 1961, increased their 
share to 57.3% in 1984. Similarly with exports, heavy 
industries supplied 60% of manufactured exports in 
1984, compared to only 28% in 1961. Major manufactured 
exports in 1962 were- plywood, cotton fabrics and 
clothing, totalling $5.2 million. While in 1984 
shipbuilding alone accounted for $4,684 million, which 
shows the change in the composition of manufacturing. 
It is' worth noting that we found that the Koreans 
318 
remained heavily dependent on the U. S. A and Japan as a 
target for exports and as a source of imports, 51.5% 
of exports went to these two countries and they 
supplied 47.3% of imports. 
The evidence collected for foreign direct investment 
from chapter one shows that perceived' costs and 
benefits of the inflow into less developed countries is 
a contentious issue. There are a large number of costs 
and benefits purported to be associated with foreign 
direct investment in less developed countries. 
The position is that foreign direct investment inflow 
provides a package of possible benefits, both economic 
and non-monetary, covering managerial, social and 
cultural. When viewing the inflow of foreign direct 
investment we. have to take into account the political 
and social dimension as well as-the possible economic 
benefits and costs. It is not a simple matter, nor a 
simple equation, and as Kindleberger (1971) described 
it is a non-zero-sum calculation. 
The empirical evidence shows that there is a linkage 
between foreign direct investment and output, exports 
and domestic savings. The research also indicated that 
the relationship is quite intricate and that it is 
difficult to generalise because of different economic 
conditions and industrial structures. * 
The information in chapter four showed that the first 
approval for foreign direct investment in Korea since 
the Korean war was granted in 1962. Foreign direct 
investment inflow into Korea has only been a small part 
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of the total foreign capital inflow, only 4% of net 
inflow 1962-1971, while between 1974 and 1984 it 
represented 7.7%. As the Korean government relaxed 
the controls on foreign direct investment in the late 
seventies, the proportion of the foreign capital 
represented by foreign direct investment has increased 
to 9% between 198O and 1984 and in 1984 it represented 
17.8% of total capital inflow. Even with the increase 
of the value of the inflow it is still small in 
comparison to the size of the economy, for instance the 
foreign direct investment inflow in 1984 equated to 
only 1.7% of the value of exports. 
The Korean government has, up until the early eighties, 
kept strict control of_all aspects'of foreign direct 
investment using the Foreign Capital Inducement Acts, 
the first of which was promulgated in 1966. The Korean 
government set criteria for eligibility, limited 
investment to 'specific industries, and limited 
ownership, preferring joint ventures, though the 
minister of finance had wide 'powers to vary the 
restrictions if the project was considered to be of 
importance to the development'of the economy. 
The Korean government started to relax the 
restrictions in the late' seventies, as foreign direct 
investment became to be seen as important for the 
continued development of the economy and to enable 
Korean manufacturing to develop the new higher 
technology industries. These were seen by the Korean 
government as being vital 'to the continued expansion of 
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the economy. 
A large number of alterations were made to make it 
easier to invest including simplifying. the 
administration, introduction of negative list in 1983, 
speeding-up approvals and an automatic approval system. 
By 1984,66% of industry classified by Korean 
Industrial Classification Standard were open to foreign 
direct investment with the aim to continue the 
liberalisation and opening up of Korea to foreign 
investment. 
Foreign direct investment in Korea, while small in 
comparison to the total inflow, is very concentrated by 
sector. The bulk of the foreign direct investment has 
been concentrated in manufacturing; by the end of 1984, 
65% of the total inflow since 1962 had gone to 
manufacturing. In addition foreign direct investment 
is concentrated in two manufacturing sectors, chemicals 
and fabrications. These two sectors accounted for 
51.5% of all the foreign direct investment since 1962, 
also the hotels and tourism sector received 22.6% 
though most of this entered Korea after 1980. 
Not only is it concentrated by sector, foreign direct 
investment is also concentrated by origin, with the 
U. S. A and. Japan dominating investment (chapter four, 
section 4.4.4). Between them they account for 77% of 
all foreign direct investment, though there are 
differences between the two countries. 
The Japanese have supplied more foreign direct 
investment than the Americans, $1 billion compaired to 
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$662 million. Though the'U. S. A is responsible for more 
of the foreign direct investment in manufacturing than 
the Japanese, $582 million against $520 million. 
Comparing the number of projects and average size of 
investment, though the Japanese were involved in many 
more-projects 714 compared to 207, investment from the 
U. S. A was twice the average size of that from Japan, 
$3.2 million against $1.4-million (chapter 4, section 
4.4.4). 
In addition the figures from table 4-9, also 
indicate that the average invested in a foreign direct 
investment project is increasing. 
The pattern of ownership was affected by the 
government's attitude towards foreign direct investment 
where they gave preference to joint ventures. So that 
by 1984, of the total foreign direct investment over 
half the projects were in either minority or joint 
ventures; though- there were differences between 
Japanese and U. S. A investment and between the sectors. 
Investment from the U. S. A had 44% in wholly owned 
subsidiaries while the Japanese-only 33%. 
Taking the two principal industrial sectors, chemicals 
had a majority in joint ventures, while with 
fabrications, electronics had 59% in wholly owned 
subsidiaries, the other industries having 60% in joint 
venture projects; indicating the importance of 
electronics and the need to, let wholly owned- foreign 
companies in. 
322 
The empirical evidence from Voivodas (1974) and Chen 
(1977) indicated that a relationship does exist between 
foreign capital inflows -and a number of economic 
variables, including output, exports, imports and 
savings. The evidence presented by Whestphal, Rhee and 
Pursell (1981) did argue that foreign direct-investment 
did not play a significant role in industry. They 
argued that foreign direct investment had only played a 
peripheral role and that licensing and turnkey 
arrangements were of greater importance. Though they 
did acknowledge- that the role of foreign direct 
investment was likely to expand as manufacturing 
continued to develop., our data has shown that foreign 
direct investment inflows have continued to increase 
since 1981 with investment continuing to be 
concentrated, in the chemicals and fabrications sectors 
in manufacturing. Our results show that foreign direct 
investment has had a long term"influence. 
8.3 Summary of Analysis 
The analysis of the relationship°between foreign direct 
investment and the performance of the Korean economy 
was split into two parts, initially an, exploratory 
correlation analysis followed by a regression analysis. 
This allowed us to test a number of variables in the 
exploratory analysis, investigating the relationship 
between foreign direct investment and these variables. 
Using these results enabled us to reach a series of 
hypotheses which were tested using the regression 
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analysis. 
Both the correlation and regression analysis took place 
at the macro and micro level, considering the economy 
. as a whole and then moving to the micro 
level using 
manufacturing and the sectors within manufacturing. 
Due to the nature of the data relating to foreign 
direct investment, we have used two distinct sets of 
figures. These are the official figures published by 
the Ministry of Finance and a private set which 
purported to be the raw foreign direct investment data. 
Both sets of data aggregated the foreign direct 
investment by approval and arrival date. In addition 
the private figures enabled us to assign the inflow to 
industry and the individual industrial sectors using 
the Korean Industrial Classification System to assign 
the investment. This enabled us to carry out our 
analysis at both a macro, taking the whole of the 
economy and a micro, considering industry only, level. 
8.3.1 Exploratory Analysis 
Throughout the correlation analysis significant results 
were associated with stock measures of foreign direct 
investment, rather than with the yearly approvals and 
arrivals, which indicates that the effects of the 
inflow are liable to be long-term and linked to the 
build-up of investment. When we discuss significant 
correlations, we are considering only those associated 
with the stock measures of foreign direct investment 
unless otherwise stated. 
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The results showed that the greatest significance was 
attached to the various measures of economic 
output, (G. N. P, G. D. P and output) both at a macro and 
micro level. The correlation results at the macro level 
indicated that the strongest long-term results were 
associated with the output measures. At the micro 
level when comparing the correlations the measure that 
stood out was the output (500) variable (which only 
measures output from companies with more than 500 
employees) with this having by far the strongest 
correlation. This was confirmed when the individual 
sectors were used as the two major recipients of 
foreign direct investment both had very high 
correlations with the output (500) variable. 
With exports and imports the correlation results were 
not as strong with the macro analysis giving little 
indication of bias towards either one. While at a 
micro level they gave a positive bias towards exports 
for all manufacturing, though with the two principal 
sectors there is some evidence to suggest the opposite 
occurs. 
The correlation analysis using foreign investment from 
Japan, the U. S. A and other countries, gave some 
nteresting results. At the macro level, while the 
results for each country gave the same relative 
importance to the relationship with output.. The 
different strengths indicated by the correlations for 
the three. different origins, showed that the foreign 
direct investment from countries other than Japan and 
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the U. S. A had a much higher correlation for all 
variables. A possible reason for these results is the 
relative size of the investments, since while 
the total foreign direct investment from the other 
countries is much smaller, the average value per 
project has been higher. 
The correlation results also showed that Japanese 
inflows had the weakest effect at the macro level and 
in addition there was a suggestion that imports might 
outweigh exports. At the micro level'' the results 
showed- that foreign direct investment from the U. S. A 
had the weakest correlations. Both Japanese and U. S. A 
investment gave their'strongest correlations for the 
output (500) variable'-and all three origin measures 
gave stronger correlations to exports than imports. 
In addition the other correlations showed that there 
was a strong relationship between savings and foreign 
direct investment and the manufacturing performance 
indices indicated that the weakest'correlation was with 
productivity while the highest was with shipments, 
which would confirm the strong relationship with 
output. 
At a sector level the correlation analysis results 
using the indices, indicated a high degree of 
variability. Taking the two principal recipient 
industrial sectors, (chemicals'and fabrications), the 
results indicated a very weak correlation to any of the 
variables for the chemicals sector, and the`only'strong 
correlation for fabrications was with the productivity 
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index. With the other variables, both the sectors had 
a strong relationship with the output (500) variable, 
indicating a possible connection between foreign direct 
investment inflow and the larger companies. 
8.3.2 Regression Analysis 
As with the correlation analysis the yearly flow 
measures did not result in any positive and significant 
results except for national savings. Once again the 
indication from these results is of a long-term effect 
from the foreign direct investment inflow. 
The results for the three principal independent 
variables (G. N. P. exports and imports) did differ as we 
moved from macro to micro and at the sector level. 
With the whole of the economy the greatest effect was 
felt with G. N. P, but the regression results for 
manufacturing indicated a much weaker relationship than 
for the whole of the economy. However when we tested 
the regression of output from the- larger companies, 
using the output (500) variable, then. there were very 
strong results from the analysis, which led us to the 
conclusion that the foreign direct investment inflow 
has a significant impact on the performance of the 
larger companies. 
The regression results did also show that both the 
macro and micro analysis indicate that-influence of the 
foreign direct investment inflow is greater on exports 
than imports and that this is even stronger with 
manufactured exports. -. 
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The micro analysis for the industrial sectors showed 
that the results of the inflow had a different effect 
on the two principal recipient sectors. The results 
showed that the effect on manufacturing G. N. P in these 
sectors was much stronger than average for 
manufacturing as a whole. This was also true for the 
results for the output from the larger companies. 
In addition the regression results indicated that the 
inflow into fabrications appeared to stimulate both 
exports and imports to a much greater extent than for 
the average for manufacturing. The results for 
fabrications indicated a positive trade balance, 
whereas the chemical sector- showed a slight bias 
towards imports though at a much lower level than the 
average for manufacturing, suggesting that the inflow 
may suppress imports in the chemicals sector. 
Of the other regression analysis results possibly the 
most interesting was the one obtained for national 
savings which indicated a positive and significant 
relationship with the flow measures and a weakening one 
over time. This suggested the conclusion that the 
inflow of foreign direct investment has an immediate 
positive impact on domestic savings, as some of the 
inflow finds its way into national savings, though this 
impact lessens over time. 
The other regression analysis results suggested that as 
with G. N. P, exports and imports the significant effect 
of any foreign direct investment is long-term rather 
than short-term. The results from the analysis tend to 
328 
support the, conclusion that the inflow of foreign 
direct investment into Korea has been beneficial and 
also supports Egbe (1984) that the beneficial impact of 
the inflow is not immediate but rather takes time as 
the investment builds up. 
8.4 Conclusions 
The limitations of this study focus on the problems of 
data collection and the reliability of the data, which 
has been discussed in chapter 5. The difficulties 
presented in gathering, the data have been numerous and 
we have had a serious problem with the foreign direct 
investment figures as the official and private data do 
not fully agree with each other. This is the reason 
for using both sets of data, which obviously has 
complicated the analysis. 
In addition we were constrained over the time period we 
could use . because. of the difficulties of obtaining 
accurate economic data before 1971, as the method of 
collection changed and not all variables were reported 
prior to this date. This meant that we were limited to 
14 years observations, which for the purposes of 
totally reliable and . accurate regressions and 
correlations is fewer than would be liked in a perfect 
world. 
The policy implications arising-, from this research 
centre on the possible, lessons for both the Korean 
government and governments of less developed 
countries considering following Korea and have been 
discussed in chapter seven. 
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The prime policy implication is that the benefits from 
foreign direct investment inflow are not liable to be 
-immediate and will take time to occur. The only 
exception to this may be national savings. This would 
indicate that any government undertaking a programme 
encouraging foreign investment inflow should not base 
their expectations on an immediate significant impact. 
Secondly the benefits centre around output (G. N. P and 
G. D. P) and exports, though the inflow of foreign 
direct investment does also stimulate imports and does 
not appear to have a direct impact on the balance of 
payments. 
Thirdly there is a major gain for industry if the 
foreign direct investment inflow is associated with 
export based industries and is connected with larger 
concerns. 
Fourthly, the country of origin of the foreign direct 
investment may well be quite important as the source 
and the size of the foreign direct investment may well 
dictate the level of benefit gained. The research 
indicated that investment from Japan and the U. S. A 
does not appear to have as great an impact as that from 
other countries, which we discussed in chapters six and 
seven. This appears to be linked to the size of the 
project (in monetary terms), hence attention should be 
focus -on the value of the ventures, rather than the 
number of projects granted that year. 
An intangible- effect that arose'from the research is 
the role of government. The Korean government has 
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played a central role in the development of the economy 
and in the control of foreign direct investment 
inflow. This may well be an important point to 
remember when considering the impact of the inflow and 
the lessons for other developing countries. This is 
especially true while the economy was expanding and may 
well be the reason why Korea has so -far faced few 
problems with foreign direct investment. 
It may well be important for less developed countries 
considering the implications of foreign direct 
investment inflow, to take account of the controls 
placed upon it by the Koreans, remembering that they 
controlled the size, type and direction of the foreign 
direct investment. This was especially true during the 
early stages of economic development. Though in 
addition, any developing country would also have to 
remember that the'Koreans have exhibited' flexibility 
and a pragmatic approach to foreign direct investment, 
when they have perceived a need for it to assist in the 
development of the economy. 
A final point- to make is'that the outward looking 
economic policies of the Korean government have played 
an important part in the success of the economy and 
obviously in the role played by foreign direct 
investment. Because the Korean government has 
encouraged Korean manufacturing to become export 
oriented then there has always been a need to improve 
the level of technology and efficiency. With the need 
to improve the economy's competitiveness and develop 
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new industries, the Korean government has increasingly 
felt the need to encourage foreign direct investment, 
which is a reason why the government has had to 
liberalise its controls on the inflow of foreign direct 
investment. 
Avenues for future research should include research 
into government's control of foreign direct investment. 
This should include making a comparison of the controls 
enacted by the Korean government, with those of the 
Latin American countries and Japan. This should 
contain discussion with companies and officials in 
these countries to test the actual rules operated 
against those stated by the government. 
Another avenue for research could be centred on the 
economic policies pursued by the Korean government, 
examining the role played by the outward orientation of 
the government's policies, with particular attention 
being paid to the changes in these policies as the 
economy has developed in the last few years. 
In addition it would be interesting to carry out 
further studies centred on the issue of origin of 
foreign direct investment; to examine the results from 
Korea in greater depth and to investigate whether they 
are repeated with other developing countries where 
Japan and the U. S. A are the principal sources of 
foreign direct investment. - 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
AND SOURCES 
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a. Exports of goods and non-factor services 
Includes exports, freight and insurance, other 
transportation, travel and other services, reported 
in National Income Statistics (Bank of Korea) and Korea 
Statistical Yearbook (Economic Planning Board). 
b. Foreign Assets/Liabilities 
The foreign assets and liabilities reported by the 
Korean monetary and financial institutions, reported in 
Economic Statistics Yearbook and Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin (Bank of Korea). 
c. Foreian Direct Investment 
These figures are derived from two sources, the 
figures published by the Ministry of Finance and a set 
of private figures which detailed the source and 
direction of each project. 
The figures break into two subsets, firstly by the date 
of approval by the Ministry of Finance and by the date 
of arrival. In addition the private figures allowed 
us to assign the foreign direct investment its 
individual sector using the Korean Industrial 
Classification System. 
d. Foreign Savings 
Net transfers from the rest of the world and net 
borrowings from the rest of'the world, derived from 
Economic Statistics Yearbook and National Income 
Statistics (Bank of Korea). 
e. Gross Domestic Product 
Total final output, figures from International 
Financial Statistics 1985 (I. M. F). 
f. Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
Investment including allowance for depreciation, from 
Korae Statistical Yearbook (Economic Planning Board) 
g. Gross National Product 
From Ecomonic Statistics Yearbook (Bank of Korea) 
h. Imports of goods and non-factor services 
Includes imports, freight and insurance, other 
transportation, travel and other services, reported in 
National- Income Statistics (Bank of Korea) and Korea 
Statistical Yearbook (Economic Planning Board) 
i. Indices 
All indices are based on 1980=100. Indices used are 
production capacity, productivity, industrial 
production, shipments, and small scale manufacturing. 
Sources included, Korea Statistical Yearbook (Economic 
Planning Board), Economic Statistical Yearbook and 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Bank of Korea). 
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j. Industrial Sectors 
Korea manufacturing performance is often not only 
reported as a whole but is broken down into nine 
distinct sectors. The nine sectors are as follows and 
we have highlighted the important industries within 
these sectors. 
1. Food, beverages and tabacco 
This covers all manufactured food products. 
2. Textiles, wearing apparel and footwear 
This includes all textiles, leather products, apparel 
and clothing and footwear. 
3. Wood and wood products 
This includes veneers and plywood and furniture. 
4. Paper and paper products 
All paper products and printed matter and publishing. 
5. Chemical and petroleum products 
Includes petroleum products, organic and inorganic 
chemicals, medical and pharmaceutical products, 
fertilisers, and plastics. 
6. Non-metalic mineral products 
Including cement, glass, pottery and ceramics. 
7. Basic metals 
Iron and steel manufacturing and non-ferrous metals. 
8. Fabrications, -electrical, electronics and 
transportation 
Covering manufactures of metal (fabrications), 
machinery, electrical and electronics, 
telecommunications, road and other transport equipment, 
scientific and photographic equipment. 
9. Other products 
Includes, travel goods, toys, defence equipment, et al 
k. Korean Industrial Classification System 
This classifies Korean Industry by the type of 
business. Using this enabled us to identify the 
direction of the foreign direct investment. 
Manufacturing is split into the nine industrial sectors 
described above. 
1. Light and heavy industries 
This categorisation splits manufacturing between the 
labour intensive, low technology industries and the 
heavy and chemical industries, which are considered to 
require higher skill levels, need more technology and 
tend to be capital rather than labour intensive. 
Using the industrial sectors the light industries are 
represented by 1,2.3,4,6, and 9. - 
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in. Long-term Capital Inflow 
Includes loans and investments and capital from other 
sources, including trade credit, export credit and 
import pre-payments, taken from Economic Statistics 
Yearbook (Bank of Korea) and Korea Statistical Yearbook 
(Economic Planning Board). 
n. -Manufacturing Earnings Derived from the monthly earnings figures in the 
Economic Statistics Yearbook (Bank of Korea) and the 
Korea Statistical Yearbook (Economic Planning Board) 
o. Manufacturing Employees 
These figures are taken from principal economic 
indicators in the Economic Statisticals Yearbook (Bank 
of Korea). For the industrial sectors the figures 
supplied by the Summary of Mining and manufacturing in 
the Economic Statistics Yearbook and the Korea 
Statistical Yearbook (Economic Planning Board). 
p. Manufacturing Exports/Imports 
Derived from the export and import figures in the 
Economic Statistics Yearbook (bank of Korea) and the 
Korea Statistical Yearbook (Economic Planning Board). 
q. Manufacturing Gross National Product 
Taken from the G. N. P figures supplied in the Economic 
Statistics Yearbook (Bank of Korea). 
r. Manufacturing Output 
Manufacturing output figures from the National Income 
Statistics (Bank of Korea) 
s. National Savings 
Made up from Korean private and government savings, 
obtained from Economic Statistics Yearbook and National 
Income Statistics (Bank of Korea). 
t. Output (50 
Derived from the output figures supplied by National 
Income Statistics (Bank of Korea) and Korea Statistical 
Yearbook (Economic Planning Board) using companies with 
more than 500 employees. 
u. Overall Balance 
Overall balance of payments taken from the principal 
economic indicators in the Economic Statistics Yearbook 
(Bank of Korea). 
v. Remuneration 
Total level of wage payments. 
w. Trade Balance 
Taken from principal economic indicators in the 
Economic Statistics Yearbook (Bank of Korea). 
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